
















































of! linguistic! communication,! while! both! respecting! philosophical! insights!




that! the! approach! to! word! meaning! that! naturally! follows! from! this! is!
‘contextualism’.! Contextualism! challenges! two! assumptions! of! the!
traditional! ‘minimalist’! approach! to! semantics:! (i)! that! semantics! (rather!
than!pragmatics)!is!the!appropriate!locus!of!propositional!content!(hence!





pragmatic! contributions! to! truthSconditional! content.! The! second! argues!
that!the!ubiquity!of!contextSdependence!justifies!a!radically!different!view!of!
word! meaning! from! that! employed! in! all! current! pragmatic! theorising,!




meaning! is! supported! by! recent! research! in! psychology:! contextS
dependence! is! also! rampant! in! category! and! concept! formation,! and!
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The! main! aim! of! this! thesis! is! to! propose! a! new! perspective! on! word!
meaning! and! concepts! that! both! respects! philosophical! insights! into! the!
nature! of! concepts! and! integrates! contributions! from! theoretical! and!
empirical! studies! in! psychology! and! linguistics.! My! focus! is! what! words!
mean! in+ their+ contexts+ of+ use,! so! accounts! of! utterance! comprehension!





have! of! the! grammar! of! their! language,! as! in! the! ‘product’! tradition.!1!An!
emphasis! on! ‘speaker’! and! ‘utterance! meaning’! instead! of! ‘sentence!

























context.! This! important! shift! in! perspective! can! already! be! seen! in! the!
contributions! of! some! pragmatists,! but! also! of! a! few! linguists! and!
philosophers.!I!propose!to!bring!their!perspectives!together!under!the!label!
of! ‘contextualism’.! I! then! argue! that! the! logic! of! contextualism,! which! is!
based,!among!other!things,!on!robust!findings!of!the!ubiquity!of!contextS
dependence! in! communication,! should! be! pushed! to! its! logical! limit:! a!
radically!contextualist,!‘eliminativist’!view!of!word!meaning.!This!account!is!
radical! insofar! as! it! denies! that! words! encode! anything! like! a! stable!
linguistic!meaning!and!postulates!that!both!the!concepts!that!words!express!
and! the! meanings! we! assign! to! words! are! constructed! ad+ hoc+ through!
processes!of!general!reasoning.2!
To!support!my!claims,!I!look!to!two!wellSestablished!traditions!in!
psychological! perspectives! on! concepts! that! have! come! to! similar!
conclusions! as! radical! contextualism:! contextSdependence! is! rampant! in!
interpretation;! it! can! be! found! not! only! in! utterance! comprehension!
processes! but! more! generally! in! figuring+ out+ a+ scene,! as! is! evidenced! in!
particularities!of!our!categorising!behaviour!and!in!concept!construction.!
Contrary! to! the! traditional! view! according! to! which! memory! retrieves!
concepts!ready'made,!new!‘exemplar!models’!posit!that!memory!consists!of!




























memory! for! language.! Beginning! after! this! introduction,! chapter! 2! first!
introduces!the!complex!topic!of!concepts.!In!a!thesis!on!word!meaning,!it!
might!be!surprising!to!find!such!detailed!attention!to!theorising!on!concepts!















also! by! psychologists.! Since! this! introduces! an! important! difference! in!
perspective,! I! outline! the! points! of! contention! that! represent! the! main!
challenges! of! bringing! philosophical! and! psychological! perspectives!
together!on!the!topic!of!word!meaning.!!! 12!
The!remainder!of!chapter!2!focuses!on!philosophical!and!relevanceS






















contrasting! traditions’! (3.2),! sets! the! scene! for! the! most! critical!
disagreements!between!the!established!framework!for!theorising!on!word!





in! the! same! direction:! towards! an! acknowledgement! of! the! ubiquity! of!




psychological! perspective! to! concepts! begins! with! a! short! discussion! of!
some!preliminary!notions!important!to!the!debate:!mental!representation,!
abstraction! and! similarity.! Then,! a! section! entitled! ‘Concepts! and!
categorisation’! summarises! the! complex! series! of! discoveries! made! by!
certain! psychologists! studying! categorisation! and! categorising! behaviour.!








forms! as! input! to! our! everyday! processes! of! interpretation,! including!
utterance! comprehension,! we! construct! ad! hoc! concepts! and! occasionS
specific!word!meanings!by!selectively!reactivating!memory!traces!in!general!
(instead! of! semantic)! memory.! For! this! process,! it! suffices! to! scan! and!






and! a! final! section! on! its! implications! for! a! positive! account! of! meaning!
eliminativism.!!
!
In! this! last! paragraph! of! the! introduction,! I! briefly! summarise! the! main!
claims!of!this!thesis!and!how!they!relate!to!the!chapters!I!have!described!
above.!My!main!objective!is!to!put!‘meaning!eliminativism’!forth!as!a!viable!
option! to! current! accounts! of! word! meaning! in! context.! In! the! meaning!! 14!
eliminativist!position!I!defend,!words!do!not!need!to!have!fixed,!contextS







concepts! and! word! meanings! is! transformed! in! light! of! the! ubiquity! of!
contextSdependence,! among! other! things.! In! chapter! 3,! after! reviewing!
existing!accounts!of!word!meaning!and!identifying!the!logic!behind!the!role!
context!is!increasingly!taken!to!play,!I!claim!that!despite!being!on!the!right!
track,! contemporary! cognitive! pragmatic! accounts! of! word! meaning! in!
context! are! not! radical! enough.! I! argue! that! the! evidence! amassed! by!
contextualists!warrants!the!positing!of!a!new!framework!which!would!leave!
the! traditional! semantic! framework,! also! known! as! ‘the! modular! view’,!
behind.! In! chapter! 4,! I! extend! the! analysis! of! contextSdependence! to!
concepts.!Contrary!to!most!thinking!on!concepts,!and!to!key!aspects!of!the!
views! presented! in! chapter! 2,! I! argue! that! concepts! are! not! fixed,! preS
existing!mental!entities!simply!reactivated!in!new!settings.!Tasks!such!as!









leave! to! the! side! discourse! connectives,! pronouns! and! other! grammatical! markers.!
Relevance!theorists!have!developed!the!notion!of!‘procedural!meaning’!to!account!for!these!




words!such!as!‘the’!and!‘with’,!express!full'fledged! concepts! instead! of! something! more!
schematic,!this!is!a!topic!I!come!to!in!chapter!3!(§!3.3.3).!! 15!
dynamic! process! of! ad! hoc! construction.! Thus,! meaning! eliminativism! is!









that! concepts! are,! or! should! be,! the! central! concern! of! theorising! on!
language!and!thought!is!largely!compatible!with!the!approach!that!is!to!be!
the!central!focus!of!this!chapter:!Jerry!Fodor’s!philosophical!perspective!on!
concepts.! I! am! interested! in! Fodor,! not! only! because! he! is! one! of! the!
philosophers!who!early!on!led!the!challenge!against!the!assumptions!of!the!




looked! to! Fodor’s! construal! of! language! and! thought! and! adopted! his!
framework!as!a!base!for!theorising!on!communication!and!pragmatics,!but,!





of! relevanceStheoretic! cognitive! pragmatics! was! developed! with! Fodor’s!
theory! of! concepts! as! background;! and,! on! the! other! hand,! because! the!
arrival! of! more! recent! developments,! particularly! in! lexical! pragmatics,!
raises! some! thoughtSprovoking! questions! as! to! the! compatibility! of! the!
relevanceStheoretic! project! with! Fodor’s! framework.! Fodor’s! views! on!
concepts!are!also!particularly!relevant!as!part!of!my!presentation!because!I!
arrive!at!a!construal!of!concepts!that!is!only!very!partially!compatible!with!
Fodor’s,! and! ultimately! at! a! construal! of! word! meaning! that! departs!
significantly! from! that! of! relevance! theory.! As! stated! earlier,! one! of! my!
claims!is!that!word+meanings+are+concepts;!importantly,!however,!this!is!only!




















formulation! and! straightforward! applications! would! greatly! facilitate! the!
study!of!our!mental!lives.!For!those!of!our!mental!capacities!that!involve!the!











shades! and! intensities! of! blue! fall! under! the! concept! BLUE.! For! categories,! when! the!
distinction!needs!to!be!made!between!a!category!and!a!concept,!I!use!small!caps!in!italics,!
for!instance,!subjects!judged!peas!better!exemplars!of!the!category!VEGETABLE!than!brussels!
sprouts.! Finally,! I! use! italics! for! features.! For! instance,! according! to! the! definitional!
approach,!features!for!the!concept!CHAIR!were!seat+for+one,!with+backrest,!etc.!I!will!repeat!
particular!conventions!as!the!need!arises.!! 18!





resisted! definitions! and! proposed! definitions! succumbed! to! counterS
examples.! Let! us,! for! instance,! return! to! the! concept! CHAIR,! for! which! I!
proposed!some!possible!features:!seat'for'one,!with+back'rest,!four+legs!and!
slyly!added!‘…’!suggesting!that!other!features,!or!different!features,!would!be!
needed! to! complete! the! analysis.! In! fact,! some! chairs! are! big! enough,! or!
some!people!thin!enough,!that!two!can!sit!in!one!chair,!and!the!object!in!
question! is! no! less! a! CHAIR! for! that.! The! number! of! legs! is! not! strictly!
necessarily!four.!Yet!making!the!definition!less!precise!by!subtracting!how!
many!it!sits!or!the!number!of!legs!is!not!a!promising!solution.!The!set!of!
features! has! to! be! precise! enough! to! describe! chairs! and! only! chairs,!




which! arose! repeatedly,! prompted! philosophers,! followed! closely! by!
psychologists,!to!take!a!closer!look!at!the!theory.!The!assumptions!behind!
the! definitional! approach! were! then! analysed! and! depending! on! each!
researcher’s! perspective,! different! possible! revisions! were! suggested! or!
different!assumptions!were!outright!rejected.!!!
One!of!the!main!assumptions!of!the!classical!theory,!which!can!be!







6!Platonic! idealism! is! the! earliest! version! of! the! view! that! there! are! specific! defining!
‘essences’,!‘forms’!or!‘ideas’!behind!the!objects!that!surround!us.!I!come!back!to!this!idea!
and!related!claims!in!chapter!4,!§!4.3.4.!!! 19!
the! mental! representation! of! these! features! formulated! as! necessary! and!
sufficient!conditions.!The!standard!classical!theory!of!concepts!holds!that!
the! rules! for! defining! a! concept! obey! two! principles:! ‘necessity’! and!
‘sufficiency’.! Necessity! refers! to! the! fact! that! the! conditions! listed! for!
category!membership!must!be!true!of!the!entity!in!order!for!it!to!qualify!as!a!
member! of! the! class.! Sufficiency! means! that! if! something! fulfils! all! the!
conditions!listed!for!category!membership,!then!it!must!be!a!member!of!that!
category.!The!conditions!are!said!to!be!‘individually!necessary’!and!‘jointly!
sufficient’! to! completely! and! unmistakably! define! a! category.! Following!
these! rules! would! ensure! effective! definitions,! immune! to! the! criticisms!
expressed!above!concerning!CHAIR.!!










these! points! into! consideration,! there! was! still! the! problem! of! the!
psychological!reality!of!these!definitions.!What!role!were!they!playing!in,!for!




terms! of! the! other.! ‘Convince’! could! arguably! be! analysed! as! ‘cause! to!
believe’.! Furthermore,! since! processing! more! complex! concepts! should!
require! more! cognitive! effort,! Kintsch! hypothesised! that! if! subjects! were!









but,! no+ evidence! could! be! found! of! this.! Rather,! it! seemed! that! subjects!
possessed!and!used!concepts!independently!of!whether!they!or+anyone+else!
could! provide! necessary! and! sufficient! conditions! for! those! concepts.!
Concept!possession!could!no!longer!be!theorised!as!involving!the!mental!
representation!of!defining!features!for!classes.!In!fact,!the!decades!spent!
looking! for! definitions! had! produced! more! evidence! against! definitional!




such! as! Jerry! Fodor,! the! evidence! supported! abandoning! any!
decompositional!account!of!concepts.!For!others,!moving!forward!from!the!
failure! of! the! classical! theory! involved,! among! other! things,! rethinking!
decompositionality! by! questioning! the! need! for! strict! necessary! and!




concepts! run! deep.! As! illustrated! above! with! definitional!






But! perhaps! even! more! fundamentally,! psychologists! and!
philosophers,! in+ correspondence+ with+ their+ different+ methodologies,!
envisioned!their!course!of!action!and!their!aims!differently.!So,!despite!the!
fact! that! the! questions! they! asked! could! be! broadly! the! same,! the! way!
forward!was!unlikely!to!be!shared.!Roughly,!philosophers!examine!existing!
arguments! (be! they! philosophical! or! psychological)! and! employ! logical!
reasoning!to!address!questions!such!as!what+is+a+concept?;!psychologists,!on!
the!other!hand,!rely!on!empirical!methods!and,!in!particular,!the!cognitive!





often! than! not,! what! one! side! favours! as! a! valid! contribution! the! other!
judges!detrimental;!what!one!side!deems!of!critical!importance,!the!other!
largely!ignores.!!!
On! this! note,! an! important! and! recurring! criticism! by! certain!
philosophers!of!the!work!of!psychologists!on!the!topic!of!concepts!is!their!
alleged!disregard!for!the!limits!of!psychological!explanation.8!They!hold!that!







hand! when! it! comes! to! theorising! on! concepts! because! psychological!
accounts!only!concern!themselves!or!should+only+concern+themselves+with!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!In! this! subsection,! I! focus! on! the! criticisms! of! Jerry! Fodor! and! Georges! Rey,! who! are!
representatives! of! this! philosophical! perspective.! Of! course,! not! all! philosophers! would!
agree! with! them;! in! fact,! as! we’ll! see! below,! Fodor! often! deplores! the! everSincreasing!
popularity!of!the!view!he!argues!against.!!! 22!






were! exclusively! addressed! by! philosophers! and! Fodor’s! view! that! an!
explanation!of!access+to!or!possession+of!concepts!would!necessarily!follow!
an!explanation!of!defining+or+identity+conditions!for!concepts!was!the!norm.!
Fodor’s! concern! is! that! recent! psychological! accounts! appear! to! either!












contribution! to! theories! of! concepts.! Far! from! denying! the! value! of!
discoveries! such! as! prototypes,! their! disagreement! is! with! particular!
interpretations! that,! in! their! view,! misrepresent! or! exaggerate! the!
consequences!of!psychological!findings!(e.g.,!by!such!claims!as!that!concepts!
are! constituted! by! prototypes).! Redressing! the! situation! would! therefore!




a! more! complete! understanding! of! categorisation! behaviour! reveals.! I! address! Fodor’s!
criticisms!in!the!section!on!categorisation!in!chapter!3.!! 23!
people! access! their! beliefs,! for! instance,! but! on! maintaining! a! strict!
distinction! between! such! findings! and! core! metaphysical! issues.! This!
distinction!is!supposed!to!afford!psychology!an!adequate!framework!for!a!
more!measured!and!controlled!development!of!its!contributions.!!But!there!




that! an! adherence! to! existing! philosophical! principles! is! the! answer.! For!
instance,!while!the!point!they!make!about!the!metaphysical/epistemological!
distinction!is!undeniable,!this!leaves!ample!room!for!disagreements!on!how!
psychological! approaches! should! deal! with! it.! In! the! remainder! of! this!
section,! I! look! at! two! slightly! contrasting! philosophical! accounts! of! this!


























concepts! have! traditionally! been! called! upon! to! perform! in! order! to!
conclude!that:!!
…as! a! theory! of! concepts,! [Smith! and! Medin’s]! proposal! hopelessly!
confuses! metaphysical! issues! of! conceptual! identity! with! (roughly!
speaking)! epistemological! issues! of! conceptual! access! (Rey,! 1983:!
238).!!
The! reason! for! this! very! negative! evaluation,! to! the! best! of! my!
understanding,!is!that!according!to!Rey,!Smith!and!Medin’s!‘conception!of!
concept’!does!not!serve!any!of!the!functions!concepts!have!traditionally!been!
called! upon! to! serve.! To! illustrate! these! ‘functions’,! Rey! lists! four! nonS
exclusive,! nonSexhaustive! functions! of! concepts:! stability,! linguistic,!
metaphysical! and! epistemological+ functions.! The! purpose! of! the! stability!
function! is! to! guarantee! commonalities! between! contents! so! that! two!
subjects!or!a!single!subject!at!two!different!times!can!be!said!to!be!in!the!
same+cognitive!state.!The!fear!is!that!without!stability,!we!would!not!be!able!


















for! metaphysical! claims! (Rey,! 1983:! 243).! Despite! the! fact! that! the!
distinction!between!metaphysical!and!epistemological!is,!as!he!puts!it,!‘not!
everywhere! perfectly! sharp’! he! argues! that! there! is! a! sense! in! which!


















negative,! precisely! because! he! takes! them! to! ‘hopelessly! confuse’! the!
metaphysical!with!the!epistemological,!I!would!argue!that!the!overall!article,!
and!some!of!Rey’s!following!work!(1985,!2010),!actually!points!to!a!way!of!
respecting! the! metaphysical/epistemological! distinction! that! is! open+ to+
psychologists:!Rey’s!advocacy!of!Hilary!Putnam’s!‘division!of!linguistic!labour!





concept.! In! other! words,! you! can! claim! that! there! are! properties! which!
something!must,!as+a+metaphysical+necessity,!have!to!be!X,!and,!at!the!same!
time,! that! these! necessities! need! not! play! any! epistemological! role.!









An! approach! largely! developed! after! Smith! and! Medin! (1981)! but!
squarely! within! today’s! psychological! approaches! to! concepts! describes!




is! the! characterisation! of! the! ‘universal’! cow,! is,! I! will! argue,! a! deeply!
engrained,! human! tendency! to! believe! and+ act+ as+ if! natural! kinds! have!
essences.! This! is! a! human! psychological! propensity! and! therefore!
independent! of! whether! kinds! do! in! fact! have! essences.! Therefore,!
independently!both!of!whether!natural!kinds!have!essences,!and!of!whether!


















(i.e.,! roughly,! any! account! failing! to! prioritise! the! question! of! concept!
identity).12!I!come!back!to!Fodor’s!proposal!for!a!theory!of!concepts!later!in!
this! chapter! (section! 2.6).! Here! I! am! interested! in! the! role! he! sees!
psychology!playing!in!an!overall!account!of!the!mind.!As!for!Rey!above,!for!
Fodor,! opposing! philosophical! and! psychological! approaches! does! not!
necessarily!imply!a!rejection!of!psychological!enquiry!as!a!whole,!but!it!does!
call!for!strictly!prioritising!certain!questions!over!others.!He!holds!that!the!
validity! of! the! psychological! question! critically! depends! on! rejecting! the!
attempts!that!have!become!so!common!in!cognitive!science!and!philosophy!












limited:! they! claim! that! for! pragmatists,! concepts! are! ‘collections! of! actionSoriented!
abilities’!of!the!kind!that!allow!us!not!only!to!sort!things!and!draw!inferences!but,!more!
globally,!to!‘coordinate!our!behavior!with!the!objects!of!the!world’!(p.!60).!!! 28!
concepts! are! the! kinds! of! things! that! underpin! capacities;! they! serve! to!
represent!the!things!our!thoughts!are!about.!13!This!approach!inadvertently!
replaces! the! leading! question! by! the! subordinated! one;! nevertheless,!
recognising! this! opens! the! possibility! for! an! interdisciplinary! account! of!
concepts! by! stipulating! that! philosophers! and! psychologists! ask! different!
but! complementary! questions,! this! on! the! condition! that! the! question! of!
concept!identity!always!precedes!the!question!of!concept!possession.!





























both! philosophical! and! psychological! approaches! to! launch! effective!
interdisciplinary! dialogues.! Or! perhaps,! on! a! more! positive! note,!
interdisciplinary!dialogue!has+already+begun,!but!it!is!only!in!its!early!stages!
and! therefore! not! yet! widespread! although! ready! to! blossom.! There! are,!
after!all,!some!bright!lights!on!the!map!of!interdisciplinary!approaches!to!
concepts!which!can!be!cited!as!examples:!the!philosophers!Eric!Margolis!and!
Stephen! Laurence! have! carefully! read! the! experimental! literature! on!
concepts! and! convincingly! argue! that! bridges! between! philosophical!






present! the! work! of! influential! psychologists! like! Lawrence! Barsalou,!
Edward!E.!Smith,!Douglas!Medin,!and!Douglas!Hintzman,!among!others,!who!
do! not! lose! sight! of! the! theoretical! issues! while! still! developing! mostly!
empirical! accounts.! They! study! concepts! and! conceptual! processes! by!
contrasting! the! available! evidence! with! whatever! the! current! standard!
account!is!in!order!to!point!out!deficiencies!and!suggest!improvements.!!
Yet,! this! optimism! might! be! misguided;! despite! certain! exceptions!
and!a!general!pluridisciplinary!ambition,!it!still!seems!to!be!the!case!that!the!
differences! in! method,! terminology! and! theoretical! influences! are! so!
profound!that!interdisciplinary!dialogue!cannot!be!sustained!and!the!two!
accounts!will!continue!to!follow!separate!trajectories.!We!must!acknowledge!
that! after! the! common! rejection! of! the! classical! theory! of! concepts,!
philosophers! and! psychologists! each! followed! a! different! logic! in! further!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14!Other!philosophers,!however,!like!Jesse!Prinz!and!Andy!Clark,!take!a!less!conciliatory!





human! beings! represent! the! world! to! themselves,! how! they! ‘lock! onto’!
properties! and! compose! thoughts! involving! them.! For! a! philosopher! like!
Jerry! Fodor,! the! further! main! task! at! hand! was! to! account! for! the!
productivity! and! systematicity! of! thought.! For! him,! one! of! the! basic!
observations! was! that! thought! is! systematic.! That! is,! anyone! capable! of!
having!one!thought,!for!instance!that!Jim+punched+James,!is!also!capable!of!
having! another! thought,! namely! that! James+ punched+ Jim.! A! second! basic!
observation! is! that! the! capacity! for! having! different! thoughts! seems!
unbounded! despite! the! fact! that! as! a! resource! the! mind! must! be! finite.!
Thought!is!productive!because!it!takes!building!blocks!(that!is,!concepts)!and!
recombines!them!in!novel!ways.!To!account!for!these!observations,!Fodor!
adopts! the! constraint! that! whatever! concepts! are,! they! must! be!
compositional,! as! otherwise! systematicity! and! productivity! cannot! be!
explained.15!!!




to! a! class.! Critically,! concepts! are! mental! structures! that! are! inclusive! of!
information,! that! is,! psychologists! are! happy! to! include! all! sorts! of!
‘contingent’! information! in! their! knowledge! structures! and! say! of! these!










16!I! am! thinking! of! psychologists! like! Michael! Posner,! Eleanor! Rosch,! Douglas! Medin,!




can! be! associated! with! it.! Despite! rejecting! the! definitional! approach,!
psychologists! hold! on! to! rich! conceptual! representations.! In! prototype!
theory,! concepts! are! knowledge! structures! that! include! the! typical!
properties!of!the!things!that!they!apply!to;!in!theoryStheory,!they!contain!
something!like!a!theory!of!what!the!concept!applies!to;!finally,!in!exemplar!
theory,! the! representation! of! a! concept/category! contains! individual!
exemplars!having!been!judged!to!belong!to!the!category.!Chapters!4!and!5!
are! dedicated! to! a! careful! presentation! of! these! and! other! related!
possibilities.!Once!both!the!philosophical!and!the!psychological!perspectives!
on! concepts! have! been! presented,! two! opposing! perspectives! on! mental!
representation! will! have! emerged.! In! Fodor’s! view,! accounting! for! the!
productivity!and!systematicity!of!thought,!among!other!things,!entails!that!
concepts!are!bare,!atomic!mental!representations.!For!psychologists,!the!use!
we! put! our! concepts! to! suggests! mental! representations! that! are! rich!
(although!not+definitional)!knowledge!structures.!I!will!often!come!back!to!
this! simple! opposition! as! it! reappears! in! various! discussions! in! future!
sections!and!chapters.!
2.4(The(Fodorian(Framework((
This! section! first! sets! out! a! general! framework! for! theorising! on! human!
cognition.! It! contains! Fodor’s! very! influential! constraints! on! how+best! to!
construe,!in!a!postSbehaviourist!era,!general!issues!such!as!the!basis!for!an!
internal!system!of!representations!and!a!construal!of!cognitive!processes!as!
computations,! plus! his! contribution! on! how! to! include! beliefs! and! other!
mental!entities!into!our!theories!of!mind!and!how!to!frame!this!science!of!
the!mind!within!a!more!general!‘physicalist’!framework.!The!following!three!
sections! focus! on! Fodor’s! most! important! contributions! to! the! topic! of!
concepts.! In! the! final! section! before! the! closing! remarks,! I! adopt! the!
relevanceStheoretic!perspective!on!Fodor’s!theory.!As!announced!above,!I!
am!most!interested!in!certain!reformulations!that!the!pragmatic!perspective!








on! the! basis! of! an! internal! system! of! representations! and! computations.!
Fodor’s!representational!theory!of!mind!holds!that!mental!representations!
in! this! internal! system! of! representations! have! semantic! properties! and!














devices! are! present.! As! for! attributing! a! compositional! semantics! to! the!
language! of! thought,! this! means! that! ‘the! content! of! a! complex!
representation! is! a! function! of! its! syntax! and! the! contents! of! the!
representations!from!which!it!is!composed’!(p.!562).!The!same!arguments!
that!support!productivity!and!systematicity!in!natural!language!would!also!




psychology! within! a! physicalist! framework’! (Cain,! 2002:! 1).! In! order! to!
understand!Fodor’s!position!on!how!(human)!behaviour!is!to!be!explained,!it!
is!helpful!to!have!in!mind!two!basic!commitments!that!underlie!the!diverse!




The! basic! assumption! of! commonsense! belief/desire! psychology! is! that!
sentient! beings! ‘have,! and! act! out! of,! beliefs! and! desires’.! A! further!




and! events! that! fall! under! the! description! of! commonsense! belief/desire!
psychology!(‘folk!psychology’!for!short)!is!so!great!that!we!can!assume!it!is!
involved!each!time!we!interact!with!another!social!being.!Out!of!all!of!these!
mental! states! and! events,! Fodor,! and! psychologists! in! general,! are!
particularly!interested!in!intentional!states.!Intentional!(mental)!states!are!
of! particular! interest! because! they! have! ‘semantic! properties’.! In! other!
words,! they! can! be! differentiated! by! their! meaning! or! content! and,! are!
critically!about!something!so!that!they!have!truth,!or!satisfaction,!conditions.!
This!can!be!illustrated!with!an!example:!suppose!I!have!the!belief!that!Fang!












aboutness! differentiates! it! from! other! kinds! of! mental! states! such! as!
emotional! or! affective! states! which,! in! contrast! with! intentional! mental!
states,!do!not!represent!anything!from!the!outside!world.18!!
Finally,! Fodor’s! insight! is! that! the! importance! of! ‘commonsense!
belief/desire!psychology’!goes!beyond!offering!the!best!explanations!for!our!




for! instance,! belief)! to! describe! unobservable! phenomena;! and! it! makes!























even! mental! states! are! somehow! to! be! described! in! terms! of! physical!
systems.!In!other!words,!at!the!most!basic!level!of!explanation,!a!person’s!
mental!states!would!be!described!as!the!products!of!her!physical!nature!and!
its! interactions! with! her! physical! surroundings! (Cain,! 2002:! 16).! Can!
physicalism!be!true!of!intentional!states?!Traditionally,! this! question! has!
been!answered!in!the!negative.!Roughly,!prior!to!the!arrival!of!cognitive!
science,! the! accepted! position! on! this! issue! was! ‘dualism’:! the! mind! is! a!
nonphysical!substance;!it!can!have!‘no!position!in!physical!space’!(Fodor,!
1980:! 114).! This! implies! the! denial! of! mental! states! since,! if! a! physical!
system!cannot!have!mental!states,!then!as!far!as!scientific!explanation!goes,!







the! possibility! of! offering! a! physicalist! framework! for! intentional! mental!
states.! Much! of! Fodor’s! insistence! on! informational! semantics! and!
conceptual!atomism!can!be!best!understood!in!the!light!of!his!commitment!
to!physicalism.!He!chooses!informational!semantics!as!the!framework!for!his!











arguments! against! empiricism! and! in! favour! of! atomism,! section! 2.6;! his!





for! an! extensive! revision! of! what! they! call! ‘the! standard! picture’.! The!
standard!picture!has!important!overlaps!with!what!I!have!been!calling!the!
classical! theory! of! concepts.! Both! theories! not! only! subscribe! to! the!
existence! of! definitions! but! also! make! them! play! a! central! role! in! their!
explanations.!The!only!difference!would!be!that!Fodor!et!al.!are!particularly!
interested! in! language! and! consequently! argue! against! definitions! by!
challenging!diverse!positions!held!in!classical!theories!of!word!meaning.!At!
the!heart!of!the!problem,!according!to!Fodor!et!al.,!is!that!adherence!to!the!
definitional! account! seems! to! depend! not! on! direct! evidence! supporting!
definitions! but! rather! on! asSyetSunchallenged! assumptions! concerning!
definitions.!Notice!that!Fodor,!as!so!many!other!researchers!interested!in!
theories!of!concepts,!is!particularly!interested!in!lexical!concepts.!The!article!




meaning! that! Fodor! et! al.! draw! our! attention! to.! In! order! to! revise! ‘the!
standard!picture’,!the!authors!propose!to!take!a!closer!look!at!the!exact!role!
that! definitions! are! supposed! to! be! playing! within! these! theoretical!
positions.! Their! first! objective! is! to! show! that! they! share! a! common!
weakness:!their!reliance!on!definitions.!A!second!objective!is!to!present!a!
meaning! postulate! approach! as! a! viable! alternative! to! the! definitional!! 37!
account.!Despite!the!fact!that!Fodor!later!rejects!meaning!postulates,!at!this!
stage!of!his!thinking!they!are!quite!important.!










extension! of! ‘male’?! The! definitional! account! in! itself! is! not! equipped! to!
answer!this!question,!which!suggests!to!Fodor!and!colleagues!that!the!first!
weakness!of!this!account!is!that!the!answers!offered!are!incomplete.!As!it!is!










to! what! the! standard! picture! maintains,! there! is! no! difference! between!








Another! theoretical! position! closely! related! to! the! idea! that! the!
definition! of! a! word! determines! its! extension! holds! that! to! know! the!
meaning! of! a! word! is! to! know! its! definition;! and,! similarly,! that! to!
understand! a! word! is! to! have! this! definition! available.! This,! in! turn,!
presupposes! that! understanding! a! sentence! involves! creating! a! mental!
representation!of!its!contents!in!which!expressions!are!replaced!by!their!
definitions.!In!other!words,!it!holds!that!definitional!analysis!is!necessary!for!
the! process! of! decoding! to! take! place;! for! instance,! failing! to! derive!
UNMARRIED!MAN!from!the!word!‘bachelor’!would!result!in!not!understanding!a!
sentence! containing! this! expression.! Fodor,! Garrett,! Walker! and! Parkes!
(1980),!however,!note!that!there!is!not!much!evidence!to!back!up!this!claim.!




BACHELOR.! But! the! results! showed! that! there! is! no! difference! between!
processing!one!or!the!other,!and,!even!if!a!difference!were!to!be!found,!since!









from! arguments! whose! validity! turns! on! the! meanings! of! their! logical!
vocabulary! to! ‘informally! valid! arguments’! whose! validity! turns! on! the!
meanings! of! the! nonSlogical! vocabulary.! To! illustrate! this,! consider! once!
more! ‘John! is! a! bachelor’.! As! stated! above,! definitional! theory! holds! that!
understanding! a! sentence! involves! replacing! expressions! with! their!
definitions!at!a!designated!level!of!representation,!the!‘semantic!level’.!The!
resulting! expression! could! be! something! like! ‘John+ is+ a+ man+ and+ John+ is+! 39!






from! ‘John+ left+ and+ Mary+ wept,’+ to! ‘Mary+ wept’! and! that! from! ‘John+ is+ a+
bachelor’,+to+‘John+is+unmarried’.!Both!are!examples!of!the!schema!F!&!G!⟶!F.!
Provided! that! many! expressions! could! be! defined,! this! would! offer! a!
systematic!approach!to!validity!intuitions!in!general,!or,!in!other!words,!a!
window! through! language! processing! to! the! workings! of! our! inferential!
apparatus.!
This!possibility!was!explored!by,!among!others,!Fodor!himself!in!Katz!













meaning! of! a! content! word! (i.e.,! ‘kill’).! Fodor! and! colleagues! consider!





Parkes! (1980)! present! the! definitional! approach! under! the! most!! 40!
unfavourable!light.!Their!arguments!go!beyond!the!usual!acknowledgment!
that! there! must! be! something! wrong! with! the! core! assumptions! of! this!
approach! if! definitions! are! so! radically! elusive.! ! They! argue! that! even! if!
definitions! could! be! found,! they! would! fail! to! do! the! work! that! the!
definitional!account!set!out!for!them.!It!is!also!argued!that!it!is!not!the!case!
that! definitions! straightforwardly! fix! extensions,! that! understanding! an!
expression! involves! the! availability! of! a! definition! and,! finally,! that!
definitions!serve!to!underwrite!the!validity!of!informally!valid!arguments.!
For!all!of!these!reasons,!according!to!the!authors,!moving!past!what!they!call!




in! Fodor! (1981b),! presented! below! in! section! 2.4,! to! psychological!











property! feature! MALE! remains,! and! when! MALE! is! removed,! UNMARRIED!
remains.!The!problem!with!this!logic!is!that!there!are!innumerable!cases!in!









Traditionally,!an!entailment!such!as! RED!⟶! COLOURED!or! DOG!⟶!ANIMAL,!a!
‘oneSway’! inference! between! two! lexical! concepts,! is! called! a! ‘meaning!








definitions! should,! at! least! initially,! be! seen! as! an! advantage! since! that!
means! that! they! can! allow! for! lexically! governed! inferences,! which! are!
ubiquitous!in!natural!language,!without!the!constraint!of!having!to!provide!




using! meaning! postulates.! Instead! of! trying! to! define! CHAIR,! as! I! did! in!
chapter! 1,! I! can! simply! postulate! that! CHAIR! entails! FURNITURE,! and! CHAIR!
entails! SEAT.! Finally,! given! an! account! integrating! meaning! postulates,! a!






and! fail! to! capture! informally! valid! arguments! while+ meaning+ postulates+
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22!Notice!that!meaning!postulates!hold!between!concepts!not+words.!It!is!the!concept!RED!
that! has! a! meaning! postulate,! or! an! inference! rule,! attached! to! it:! RED! ⟶! COLOUR.! The!
underlying!assumption!is!that!words!encode!concepts!! 42!
capture+ both.! For! Fodor! and! colleagues,! this! means! that! the! meaning!
postulates!approach!could!even!be!considered!preferable!to!the!definitional!
approach;!they!argue!that,!!
so! far! as! questions! of! validity! are! concerned,! definitions! just! are! a!
special!case!of!meaning!postulates.!Roughly,!they’re!the!symmetrical!
ones!(Fodor!et!al.,!1980:!274).!!
Occam’s! razor! would! recommend! keeping! only! one! of! the! two,! so!
definitions,!in!the!few!cases!where!they!are!possible!(e.g.!‘bachelor’),!would!
once!again!lose!out.!
Despite! all! of! these! advantages,! Fodor! later! decided! to! abandon!
meaning!postulates.!The!meaning!postulates!account!is!still!of!interest!to!my!
purposes!in!this!chapter!because,!although!it!was!later!rejected!by!Fodor,!
relevance! theory! adopted! it! early! on! and! continues! to! defend! it! today!
(Sperber! and! Wilson,! 1986/95;! Horsey,! 2006).! I! come! back! to! the!
disagreement!between!Fodor’s!current!position!and!classic!relevance!theory!
later!in!this!chapter!(§!2.9.3).!In!the!above!paragraphs,!my!objective!has!
been! to! briefly! present! Fodor’s! early! arguments! in! favour! of! meaning!
postulates!as!a!background!both!for!relevance!theory’s!current!position!and!
Fodor’s!later!change!of!heart.!It!is!worth!noticing!that!Fodor’s!reasons!for!










to! suppose! that! complex! terms! straightforwardly! break! down! into!
primitives! that! express! sensorySmotor! properties.! This! issue! is! not!! 43!




supposed! to! complement! the! definitional! account! presented! above.23!He!
points!out!that!there!are!several!important!points!of!agreement!between!the!
empiricist! and! the! nativist! accounts:! both! hold! that! concepts! are! either!
‘primitive’! (that! is! undefinable)! or! complex.! Both! hold! that! the! primitive!
basis!is!innate,!or,!in!other!words,!that!it!is!not!learned!through!rational!
processes.!Finally,!both!hold!that!possible!concepts!are!constrained!by!the!
basic! components! that! can! go! into! concept! construction! and! a! limited!
number!of!combinatorial!devices.!But!agreement!stops!here.!According!to!
Fodor! (1981b),! the! basic! components! are! lexical! concepts:! something!
expressible!in!English!by!a!‘monomorphemic’!predicate!term!such!as!‘heavy’!
or!‘chair’!or!‘green’;!and!the!other!type!of!concept!is!a!‘phrasal’!concept!such!




centres! round! concepts! such! as! BACHELOR.! For! the! definitional! account,!
BACHELOR!is!definable!and!so!falls!on!the!‘complex’!side!of!the!divide!while!



























soon! given! the! possibility! to! test! your! hypothesis! on! a! new! trial.! The!
experimenter!now!presents!a!red!square!and!since!you!see!no!green!shape!
nor! triangular! form,! you! answer! ‘nonSflurg’! and! are! given! ‘wrong’! as!






already+have+it,! before! confirming! the! hypothesis.! This! means! that! these!











empiricism! holds! that! primitive! concepts! are! undefinable! and! that! the!











sufficient! for! the! availability! of! all+ concepts! except! those! that! are!
patently!phrasal!(Fodor,!1981b:!273,!my!emphasis).!!
To!illustrate,!imagine!the!attainment!of!the!concept!TRIANGLE.!The!empiricist!
story! would! have! the! concepts! LINE! and! ANGLE! become! available! directly!






concepts! to! their! occasioning! experiences.! Trouble! in! determining! what!
these!might!be!is!probably!what!later!led!Fodor!to!attempt!a!retreat!from!
this! position,! labelled! ‘radical! nativism’,! in! his! (1998)! reformulation! of!
innateness.! However,! despite! these! more! recent! reformulations,! it! is! the!
earlier!version!that!underlies!Fodor’s!bestSknown!account!of!concepts!and!
so!the!one!I!choose!to!discuss.!!
Fodor! (1981b)! attracts! attention! to! the! advantages! of! his! nativist!
story.!First!of!all,!it!offers!an!approach!to!concept!attainment!that!no!longer!
depends! on! concepts! having! definitional! structure.! Thus,! arguably,! it!! 46!
integrates! some! of! the! lessons! learned! from! the! failure! of! the! standard!
classical!theory!of!concepts!presented!in!the!previous!chapter.!Basically,!the!
consensus! regarding! research! into! definitions! was! that! subjects! do! not!
automatically!have!the!necessary!and!sufficient!conditions!for!concepts!that!
were! believed! to! constitute! their! definitions.! Therefore,! they! could! not!
possibly!use!them!in!the!hypothesis!formulation!and!confirmation!paradigm!
above! to! learn! new! concepts.! For! instance,! going! back! to! the! TRIANGLE!
example,! the! subject! would! have! to! formulate! a! hypothesis! in! which! the!
definition!of!TRIANGLE!appeared!in!order!to!learn!the!concept.!This!might!not!
seem!problematic!for!TRIANGLE!since!there!is!intuitively!a!way!to!build!it!out!
of! primitive! concepts! such! as! LINE! and! ANGLE,! but! it! would! be! quite!
challenging!for!tens!of!thousands!of!other!words!for!which!definitions!would!
have! to! be! postulated! (e.g.! SHIP,! TRUMPET,! BURGER,! ELECTRON).! Another!
advantage!is!that,!from!this!perspective,!it!would!naturally!follow!that!the!







of! the! empiricistSplusSdefinitional! account! presented! above.! He!
acknowledges! that! there! is! a! weaker! version! of! the! story! in! which! the!
primitive!basis!is!not!strictly!made!up!of!sensory!concepts.!According!to!this!
perspective,! the! question! of! which! concepts! are! primitive! becomes! an!
empirical!matter!and!the!theory!simply!states!that!it!probably!includes!a!
logical!syntax!and!a!toSbeSdetermined!framework!of!basic!concepts.!Fodor!is!
convinced! that! the! evidence! is! overwhelming! even! against! this! weaker!
version!and!offers!a!worked!out!example!in!order!to!convince!the!reader.!
The! example! he! takes! up! was! originally! proposed! by! George! Miller! in! a!
paper!published!in!1978.!Miller’s!claim!is!that!when!nouns!such!as!‘butter’,!
‘dye’,!‘grease’!(named!type!M!nouns)!are!used!as!verbs,!the!meaning!of!the!! 47!









not! a! case! of! the! factory,! or! the! explosion,! painting! the! surroundings.!
Perhaps!this!flaw!could!be!corrected!by!adding!the!condition!that!‘x’!denote!
an!agent!or,!in!other!words,!that!the!covering!aspect!of!the!definition!be!
intentional.! But! according! to! Fodor,! this! move! would! still! be! insufficient!
because!there!would!still!be!cases!where!an+agent+intentionally+covers+the+
surface+of+y+with+paint!without!it!being!the!case!that!the+agent+painted+y.!He!
gives! the! example! of! Michelangelo! and! the! Sistine! Chapel.! Michelangelo!
covered!the!surface!of!the!ceiling!with!paint!in!the!process!of!painting!a!
picture! on! the! ceiling.! Fodor! finds! it! inappropriate! to! describe! this! as!
Michelangelo+painted+the+ceiling!suggesting!that!this!simpler!description!is!
rather!only!suitable!for!a!house!painter.!He!suggests!that!to!further!patch!the!
definition! up,! it! would! now! be! necessary! to! add! the! concept! PRIMARY!
INTENTION!OF!AN!ACT!in!order!to!distinguish!between!the!great!master!and!the!
common!painter.!But!this!last!addition!would!surely!prove!too!costly.!Recall!
that! the! interest! of! definitions! is,! in! part,! to! help! concept! learners! (i.e.,!














be! abandoned! following! the! observation! that! those! lexical! concepts!
ordinarily!considered!to!form!part!of!the!group!of!complex!concepts,!are!
actually!more!compatible!with!inclusion!in!the!primitive!basis.!This!claim!is!
central! to! Fodor’s! conceptual! atomism,! one! of! his! most! important!
contributions!to!theories!of!concepts.!In!upcoming!sections,!discussions!of!







“Carrying! information”! is! a! relation! that! is! best! introduced! by!
examples,! so! here! are! some! popular! ones.! In! typical! cases:! smoke!
carries!information!that!there!is!fire;!a!tree’s!rings!carry!information!
about! its! age;! a! falling! thermometer! carries! information! that! it! is!
getting!cold;!utterances!of!the!form!of!words!“that!is!a!platypus”!carry!
the! information! that! that! is! a! platypus;! and! so! forth! (Fodor! 1990a,!
reprinted!in!Margolis!&!Laurence!1999:!514).!!
Moreover,! the! relations! between! symbols! and! things! symbolised! are!
relations!of!causal!covariance.!‘Dog’!tokens!are!caused!by!dogs!and!we!can!




based! semantics.! As! stated! in! the! introduction! to! this! chapter,! Fodor! is!! 49!






response! ‘dog’! is! ‘under! the! control! of’! a! certain! type! of! discriminative!
stimulus!(dogs,!of!course).!Also,!as!would!be!expected,!the!probability!(or!
frequency)! of! the! response! increases! with! the! presence! of! this! stimulus,!
which!is!in!accordance!with!classic!operant!conditioning.!!
Fodor! does! not! doubt! that! the! behaviourist! program,! of! which!
Skinner! was! a! prime! advocate,! has! been! judiciously! shelved! following!
Chomsky’s!(1959)!review!of!Verbal+Behaviour.!He!simply!points!out!that,!
while! it! was! thoroughly! effective! in! arguing! against! Skinner’s! learning!
theory,!Chomsky’s!review!leaves!Skinner’s!semantics!‘untouched’.!Typically,!
Chomsky!noted,!utterances!are!not!responses!but!actions!and!consequently!
uttering! ‘dog’! depends! more! on! the! contingencies! of! a! conversational!
context!than!on!the!presence!of!a!dog.!But!this!observation,!according!to!











states.! As! mentioned! earlier! in! this! chapter! (§! 2.2.2),! Fodor! is! strongly!
committed!to!commonsense!belief/desire!psychology,!which!gives!a!central!


















the! presence! of! –! and! only! in! the! presence! of! –! dogs! need! not! have! a!
disposition! to! utter! ‘cat’! –! even! in! the! presence! of! a! cat! –! or! any! other!









would! argue! that! theoretical! inferences! mediate! the! application! of! our!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





concepts.! To! illustrate,! according! to! Quine,! applying! PROTON! to! protons!












difference! between! a! dog! and! a! parrot! to! possess! the! concepts! DOG! and!
PARROT!just!as!we!would!not!consider!someone!who!does!not!know!that!a!
dog!is!an!animal!to!be!in!full!possession!of!the!concept!DOG.!!
For! Fodor,! however,! it! is! of! the! utmost! importance! to! distinguish!
between!these!‘truisms’!and!deeper!issues!of!concept!possession!conditions.!
He! holds! that! inferentialSrole! semantics! and! any! ‘anatomistic’! theory! of!
concepts! leads! via! a! slippery! slope! towards! ‘ruinous’! holism! (Fodor! and!
Lepore,! 1992;! Fodor,! 2003).! Any! move! towards! accepting! inferences! as!
contentSconstitutive! risks! ending! in! having! to! accept! endless! possession!
conditions! for! even! the! simplest! of! concepts.! So,! for! instance,! Fodor’s!
atomism! holds! that! having! the! concept! DOG! is! independent! of! having! any!
other! concept,! even! the! concepts! CAT! or! ANIMAL.! Accepting! that! some!
inferences!belong!to!the!possession!conditions!for!DOG,!on!the!other!hand,!
would!see!ANIMAL!as!part+of!the!concept!DOG;!in!other!words,!the!inference!
DOG! ⟶! ANIMAL! would! be! considered! (potentially)! necessary! to! the!
possession!of!DOG.!The!worry!is!that!if!ANIMAL!is!necessary,!FURRY,!BARKS!or!
BITES! POSTMAN,! and! so! on! quasiSindefinitely,! could! be! equally! necessary.!
According! to! Fodor,! the! only! way! to! block! such! a! deluge! would! be! by!











objections! and! reSestablishing! a! modified! (and! psychologised)!
analytic/synthetic!distinction!(§!2.7.3).!For!now,!it!is!simply!important!to!
note!that!at!least!part!of!Fodor’s!argument!in!favour!of!conceptual!atomism!




dog! instances! independently! of! any! other! thoughts.! The! conditions! for!






view! and! classical! empiricism.! To! recap,! the! key! issue! for! Fodor! is! that,!
contrary!to!the!received!view,!lexical!concepts!are!not!decompositional,!and,!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27!As! hinted! here! by! Fodor,! the! issue! of! whether! or! not! there! is! an! analytic/synthetic!
distinction! is! far! from! a! settled! matter! in! philosophy.! This! is! unsurprising! given! that!
establishing! how! knowledge! is! possible! is! at! the! heart! of! philosophical! investigation.!






traditional! accounts! of! concepts,! this! notion! of! a! priori! truths! translated! as! contentS
constitutive!inferences!for!concepts!such!as!‘bachelors!are!unmarried’.!In!this!view,!failing!
to!infer!that!a+bachelor+is+unmarried!is!simply!failing!to!grasp!the!concept!BACHELOR.!!! 53!
therefore,! proposing! that! lexical! concepts! are! structured! like! phrasal!
concepts!cannot!be!the!answer!to!where!conceptual!content!comes!from.!
The!arguments!presented!thus!far!come!together!as!follows:!the!assumption!





the! constructs! would! remain! intact.! Fodor’s! proposal! is! to! dismiss! the!






the! simple! side! of! the! primitive/complex! divide.! Primitive! concepts! are!
unstructured!atoms!so!that,!again!contrary!to!the!received!view,!they!cannot!
be!learned!through!hypothesis!formation.!On!this!basis,!Fodor!offers!his!first!
formulation! of! nativism:! contrary! to! traditional! thinking! on! concept!
acquisition,! monomorphemic! lexical! concepts! are! attained,! rather! than!
learned;!they!are!triggered!by!the!environment!as!part!of!a!process!best!
described!as!‘bruteScausal’.!!
In! a! second! phase,! roughly! covering! the! decade! between! Fodor’s!
criticisms! of! empiricism! and! his! writings! on! conceptual! content! around!
1990,!Fodor’s!criticisms!shift!from!the!deficiencies!of!the!definitional!view!to!
the! dangers! of! inferentialSrole! semantics.! His! focus! becomes! the!
development! of! his! own! informationSbased! semantics.! To! this! end,! he!









the! view! he! rejects! has! been! widely! adopted! by! cognitive! scientists! and!
philosophers! of! mind.! In! response,! Fodor! reassesses! his! project! and!
reformulates!certain!aspects!of!it.!As!before,!limits!of!time!and!space!do!not!



















thereby! put! the! cognitive! sciences! back! on! the! right! track.! Part! of! this!




pragmatism,! for! instance,! (2003)! Hume+variations! and! (2004)! ‘Having! concepts:! a! brief!
refutation! of! the! twentieth! century’.! Time! and! space! constraints! do! not! allow! a! full!
presentation!of!these!publications,!but!they!are!mentioned!when!particularly!relevant.!!! 55!
‘Incompatible! perspectives! on! concepts?’).! There,! I! said! that! Fodor’s!
dissatisfaction!with!the!theories!he!labels!concept!pragmatism,!the!reason!
they!cannot!answer!the!leading!questions!regarding!concepts,!is!chiefly!to!
do! with! the! way! concepts! are! framed! in! these! approaches:! putting!
epistemological! questions! before! or+ worse! instead! of! metaphysical! ones!
leads!to!conceiving!of!concepts!as!capacities,!which!they!are!not.!The!book!
argues! for! a! different! conception! of! concepts! with! the! help! of! five! ‘nonS
negotiable’!criteria!any!theory!of!concepts!should!respect!but!that!are,!in!











Fodor’s! five! criteria! on! an! adequate! theory! of! concepts! are! listed!
below,!I!have!reordered!them!with!respect!to!his!presentation!so!as!to!first!















issue! of! the! acquisition! of! word! meaning! in! chapter! 3! (§! 3.5.4).! Fodor’s!
remaining!two!conditions!are!more!frequently!the!nexus!of!disagreement:!
(iv)!the!‘publicity!constraint’:!concepts+are+public;+they’re+the+sort+of+things+















identical;! anything! less! than! this,! is! branded! a! sort! of! relativism.! Any!
theoretical! or! experimental! procedure! that! distinguishes! between! two!
subjects’! corresponding! concepts! is! therefore! simply! judged! as! having! it!
wrong! on! concept! individuation.! Furthermore,! Fodor! has! the! validity! of!
intentional! explanation,! anywhere! it! is! found,! depend! on! his! rigorous!
construal!of!content!identity:!the!generalisations!of!representational!theory!
of!mind!(on!the!model!of!‘Thirsty!people!drink!water’)!are!only!valid!insofar!
as! the! mental! contents! of! these! generalisations! (among! them! WATER,! for!
instance)!really!are!shared!by!those!the!explanation!is!designed!to!cover.!!
According!to!Fodor,!if!concept!identity!were!in!any!way!relaxed,!then!
everyone! else’s! concept! WATER! could! be! different! from! my! own;!




postpones! the! problem! since! any! construal! of! similarity! depends! on! an!
underlying!notion!of!identity!(Fodor,!1998:!30S34).!!




thoughts.! If! in! these! thoughts,! RAIN! contributes! the! same! contents,! then!
accounting! for! the! productivity! and! systematicity! of! thought! is! relatively!














a! solid! foundation! by! the! fact! that! the! building! blocks,! such! as! THIRSTY,!
contribute!the!exact!same!content!in!all!the!thoughts!they!appear!in.!Notice!
the!weight!placed!on!conceptual!content:!thoughts!can!be!productively!and!
systematically! recombined! because,! following! Fodor’s! strict! construal! of!
concept! individuation,! they! always! contribute! the+ same! content! to! the!




advantage! of! simplicity! and! elegance,! but! I! am! particularly! interested! in!
issues! to! do! with! word! meaning! and! communication;! and,! naturally,! I!
wonder! whether! Fodor’s! compositionality! of! thought! translates! into! a!
compositionality!of!language.!More!specifically,!how!are!the!constituents!of!
an!utterance!supposed!to!correspond!to!the!constituents!of!the!thought!the!
utterance! is! intended! to! communicate?! It! seems! that! the! very! nature! of!





My! point! is! that! a! perfectly! unelliptical,! unmetaphorical,! undeictic!
sentence!that!is!being!used!to!express!exactly!the!thought!that!it!is!
conventionally!used!to!express,!often!doesn’t!express!the!thought!that!













(productivity! and! systematicity)! governing! thought! also! apply! in! public!
languages:!!
Language! (/thought)! is! productive! and! systematic! because! it! is!
compositional…! if! being! able! to! say! (/think)! that! John! loves! Mary!
implies!being!able!to!say!(/think)!Mary!loves!John,!that’s!because!both!! 59!
sentences! (/thoughts)! are! made! out! of! the! same! set! of! primitive!
elements! by! the! application! of! the! same! constructive! rules! (Fodor,!
2004:!37).!!
My!own!position!is!that!building!an!account!of!how!compositionality!works!
in! public! languages! requires! adopting! a! truly! inferential! model! of!
communication! and! taking! a! very! different! perspective! on! concepts.! My!
starting! point! is! relevance! theory! and! so! I! turn! my! attention,! in! the!
remainder!of!this!chapter,!to!their!view!on!concepts!and!word!meaning.!
Critically,!relevance!theory!claims!to!work!within!the!general!framework!set!









natural! languages.! And,! in! particular,! the! question! of! the! nature! of! the!
word/concept!mapping![oneStoSmany,!oneStoSone,!or!manyStoSone].30!These!















encoding! concepts.! Diane! Blakemore! (1987)! proposed! a! conceptualS
procedural!distinction!to!reflect!the!fact!that!some!words!encode!conceptual!
content!and!others!encode!procedures.!In!other!words,!while!content!words!
encode! concepts,! discourse! connectives! such! as! ‘also’,! ‘so’! and! ‘after! all’!
seem!rather!to!offer!guiding!support!to!the!hearer!for!the!inferential!aspect!
of! interpretation.! This! view! has! been! substantially! developed! since!
Blakemore’s!early!work!and!the!case!for!a!procedural+semantic!analysis!of!a!
range!of!linguistic!phenomena!including!pronouns,!mood!markers,!particles,!
demonstratives! and! interjections! has! been! made! (see! Wilson! &! Sperber,!
1993;! Wharton,! 2003;! Scott,! 2013;! for! a! survey! and! update,! see! Wilson,!
2011).!On!the!side!of!concepts,!a!classic!distinction!involves!differentiating!
between! lexical! and! phrasal! concepts.! ! The! first! can! be! expressed! in! a!
natural! language! with! a! single! word! and! the! second! are! expressed! by! a!






that’),! other! words,! which! do! encode! some! conceptual! component! seem!
nonetheless!not!to!encode!a!‘fullSfledged’!concept.31!Sperber!and!Wilson!give!
‘my’,! ‘have’,! ‘near’,! and! ‘long’! as! examples! of! words! that! have! a! certain!
conceptual!content!but!can!be!compared!to!pronouns!in!that!they!depend!on!






























least! be! taken! to! adopt! an! updated! version! of! the! code! model! of!





of! accepting! the! thesis! relevance! theory! defends,! roughly,! that! what! is!
communicated!simply!cannot!be!fully!encoded.!They!cite!a!passage!from!
Fodor’s!(1975)!Language+of+thought!capturing!his!view!of!language:!!!
A! speaker! is,! above! all,! someone! with! something! he! intends! to!
communicate.!For!want!of!a!better!term,!I!shall!call!what!he!has!in!






reminiscent! of! the! old! code! model! of! verbal! communication! in! which!
linguistic!sentences!correspond!to!thoughts!in!a!straightforward!manner.32!
The!assumption!is!that!a!thought!is!transmitted!in!the!message!because!it!
has! been! entirely! captured! by! the! signs! of! a! particular! code.! In! this!
perspective,! communication! is! successful! simply! when! both! interlocutors!
share!a!single!code.!Updated!versions!of!the!code!model!allow!for!some!
inferential! processes,! but! these! are! not! seen! as! essential! to! the!
comprehension!process,!as!they!are!in!relevance!theory,!but!rather!only!as!
convenient!short!cuts.!
Basically,! in! the! code! model! and! in! its! updated! version,! all! of! the!
communicable! thoughts! must! be! encodable! because! it! is! primordially!
through! decoding! that! a! message! may! be! reconstructed.! Fodor! further!
assumes! that! most! single! lexical! items! straightforwardly! express! atomic!
concepts!(e.g.,!‘chair’!expresses!the!atomic!concept!CHAIR,!‘walk’!expresses!
the! atomic! concept! WALK)! and,! therefore,! that! most! lexical! concepts! are!
‘simple’.!For!the!traditional!linguistic!view,!however,!there!are!also!lexical!
items! which! encode! complex! concepts! (e.g.,! ‘grandmother’! is! taken! to!
encode!‘FEMALE!PARENT!OF!PARENT’).!For!Fodor,!these!latter!types!of!examples!
can!be!merged!with!the!‘simple’!lexical!items!(so!‘grandmother’!encodes!the!
















! Mary:! ! I!need!a!minute.!
The! first! thing! to! notice! is! that! Mary’s! answer! does! not! directly! answer!
Peter’s!question.!Decoding!the!linguistic!evidence!provided!by!Mary!will!not!
get! Peter! very! far.! After! all,! a! minute! refers! unambiguously! to! 60!






answer! to! his! question.33!It! follows! from! the! presumption! of! optimal!
relevance!that!he!has!the!right!to!suppose!that!the!extra!cognitive!effort!
being! asked! of! him! by! Mary’s! indirectness! will! pay! off! in! the! form! of!
increased!cognitive!effects.!!




by! ‘minute’! to! perhaps! something! like! ENOUGH! TIME! TO! FINISH! WHAT!
SOMEONE/MARY!IS!DOING.34!The!role!of!the!word!‘minute’!in!Mary’s!utterance!is!
no!more!than!a+piece+of+evidence!that!points!in!the!direction!of!her!intended!














According! to! the! first! option,! word! meanings! are! complex!
arrangements! of! semantic/conceptual! features.! These! features! are! what!
organise!the!vocabularies!of!natural!languages.!For!instance,!dogs,!cats!and!
horses! all! have! the! features! ANIMAL,!FOURSLEGGED,!MAMMAL,! and! so! on.! The!
theory!behind!this!assumed!that!if!all!the!words!could!be!analysed,!it!would!
be! found! that! the! set! of! features! necessary! to! account! for! the! whole!
vocabulary! of! a! natural! language! would! be! smaller! than! the! number! of!
words!in!that!language.!For!our!purposes!here,!the!important!point!is!that!a!
certain! reading! of! this! position! blocks! the! possibility! that! the! mapping!
between!words!and!concepts!is!oneStoSone!because!features/concepts!are!
fewer!than!words.!As!stated!above,!this!position!has!been!scrutinized!and!
criticised! by! Fodor! and! relevance! theory! follows! him! in! rejecting! it.! The!
possibility! that! Fodor! argues! for,! however,! that! excepting! rare! cases! of!
mismatches,!there!is!roughly!a!oneStoSone!mapping!between!concepts!and!
words! cannot! be! accepted! either! for,! as! shown! above,! it! does! not! take!





Thus,! Sperber! and! Wilson! (1998)! suggest! a! third! possibility! to!
characterize!the!mapping!between!concepts!and!words:!it!is!concepts!that!
greatly!outnumber!words!since!only!a!fraction!of!the!concepts!available!to!
our! minds! is! lexicalized! (Sperber! &! Wilson! 1998,! reprinted! in! Wilson! &!
Sperber,! 2012:! 35).! For! instance,! the! ad! hoc! atomic! concept! MINUTE*,!





Fodor’s! conception! of! the! mappings! between! words! and! concepts,! their!
account!is!still!compatible!with!concept!atomism,!and!is!in!line!with!his!view!
that! there! are! two! kinds! of! semantics! as! endorsed! in! Fodor! (1975).!35!
Relevance!theory!follows!Fodor!(1975)!in!claiming!that!there!are!two!types!
of! semantics:! translational! linguistic! semantics! and! ‘real’! semantics!
(Carston,! 2002a:! 56S61).36!Translational! linguistic! semantics,! as! its! name!
suggests,! offers! translations! between! natural! language! expressions! and!
forms! in! the! language! of! thought,! roughly! between! the! words! of! our!
languages! and! the! concepts! of! our! internal! representational! systems.! A!
particular! individual’s! translational! semantics! would! then! be! the! set! of!
statements! in! the! form:! the! public! language! expression! ‘abc’! means+ (or+
encodes)+ the+ Mentalese+ form! ‘ijk’.! Translational! approaches! to! semantics!
have!long!been!criticised!as!incomplete!since!instead!of!providing!truthS




‘real’! semantics.! ‘Real’! semantics! deals! with! the! relations! between! the!













theorists,! translational! semantics! provides! a! semanticsSpragmatics!
interface.!!!
Furthermore,! despite! the! fact! that,! when! used! in! communication,!
single!lexical!items!do!not!systematically!map!to!the+same!atomic!concepts,!
as!Fodor’s!example!of!‘cat’!to! CAT!would!suggest!but!an!example!such!as!
‘minute’! to! MINUTE! or! MINUTE*! disputes,! it! can! still! be! the! case! that! the!
constituents!of!our!mental!representations!are!atomic.!That!is,!if! CAT!and!
MINUTE! are! atomic! concepts,! the! same! may! also! be! true! of! MINUTE*.! The!
difference!is!that,!in!the!relevanceStheoretic!account,!arriving!at!MINUTE*!is!a!
fully! pragmatic! inferential! process.! This! might! be! incompatible! with!
mainstream!semantics!in!that!it!allows!pragmatic!processes!to!contribute!at!
a!level!traditionally!assumed!to!rely!exclusively!on!code,!but!this!does!not!
necessarily! introduce! an! insurmountable! antagonism! between! the!
relevanceStheoretic!and!the!mainstream!semantic!perspectives!on!the!task!









According! to! Sperber! and! Wilson! (1986/95),! concepts! can! be! usefully!
pictured! as! labels! or! addresses! in! memory.37!As! such,! they! serve! two!
functions:! they! are! headings! or! nodes! at! which! information,! particularly!
information!pertaining!to!the!concept’s!denotation!(i.e.,!the!things!in!the!




constituents! in! logical! forms.38!The! information! stored! at! a! conceptual!





•  The+ encyclopaedic+ entry+ contains+ information+ about+ its+ extension+
and/or+ denotation:+ the+ objects,+ events+ and/or+ properties+ which+
instantiate+it.++





rules.! These! rules! describe! output! assumptions! on! the! basis! of! input!
assumptions.! As! mentioned! earlier! (section! 2.5),! another! point! of!
disagreement! between! Fodor! and! Sperber! and! Wilson! is! their! current!
position!on!meaning!postulates.!!I!return!to!this!issue!below.!
The! encyclopaedic! entry! of! a! concept! would! contain! assumptions!






from! the! language! module,! typically! restricted! to! schematic! phonological!
and! syntactic! information! and! perhaps! including! orthographical!
information.! Newer! notions! brought! to! the! fore! by! the! usageSbased!






about! surface! linguistic! form! as! possible,! in! order! not! to! become!










of! the! vocabulary! of! any! particular! natural! language.! Thus,! they! are! in!






























To! recapitulate,! Horsey! suggests! that! it! is! possible! to! provide! a!































has! truthSconditional! content! and! Fodor’s! position! does! not! address! the!
critical! question! of! its! origin;! it! does! not! explain! how! AND! expresses!








integrating! meaning! postulates! into! a! moderately! atomistic! theory! of!
meaning.!Horsey’s!thought!provoking!criticisms!of!Fodor’s!pure!atomism!




contentSconstitutive,! how! would! these! concepts! still! qualify! as! atomic?!
Horsey! reservedly! qualifies! his! atomism! as! ‘moderate’! but! by! Fodor’s!
standards! (as! set! out! in! Fodor! 2003,! for! instance),! it! qualifies! rather! as!
‘inferential! anatomism’! and! shares! the! lot! with! other! antiSatomistic!







general.! Following! relevance! theory,! he! adopts! the! assumption! that! the!
information!stored!under!a!concept!is!organised!in!different!entries!(logical,!
encyclopaedic! and! lexical)! corresponding! to! different! functions! (broadly,!
providing! deductive! rules,! providing! background! information! and!
interfacing!with!the!parser).!The!differences!are!critical!in!selecting!what!is!
in! the! logical! entry! as! constitutive! of! the! content! of! the! concept! and!
excluding! what! resides! in! the! other! two.! Some! philosophers! fear! that!
anything!less!than!a!clear!distinction!between!what!constitutes!conceptual!
content! and! what! is! only! contingent! information! associated! to! a! concept!
‘blurs! the! lines’! between! the! well! demarcated! and! stable! mental! entities!
concepts!are!taken!to!be!and!the!information,!often!labelled!‘encyclopaedic!
information’!that!they!are!‘merely’!associated!with.!Horsey!seems!to!seek!a!
reformulation! of! this! distinction! more! compatible! with! his! subjective!
characterisation! of! validity! while! still! answering! to! the! fears! of! these!
philosophers;! however,! as! I’ll! endeavour! to! show! in! the! chapter! on!
psychological!perspectives!on!concepts!and!the!chapter!on!memory,!there!is!







potential! to! replace! a! certain! aspect! of! the! logical/encyclopaedic! and!




The! topic! of! the! kind! of! changes! that! the! newly! emerging! conception! of!
memory! and! of! memory’s! role! in! interpretations! bring! to! the! topic! of!
concepts!and!word!meanings!is!a!complex!one!and!I!will!need!to!return!to!it!
several!times!in!the!coming!chapters.!In!these!closing!remarks,!however,!I!! 72!










propositional! mental! representations! such! as! ‘FANG! IS! FEROCIOUS’.! These!
representations!were!assumed!to!exist!in!wellSdemarcated!and!stable!forms.!
A!further!assumption!was!that!they!were!retrieved!from!memory!in!these!
same! forms,! unchanged! by! any! mechanism! pertaining! to! retrieval! itself.!
Information!in!memory!was!pictured!to!exist!like!written!documents!in!files!
with!memory!as!the!filing!cabinet!that!kept!each!piece!of!information!in!its!
place.! Research! into! memory! starting! in! the! 1970s,! however,! has! rather!
uncovered! that! the! contents! of! memory! are! more! correctly! pictured! as!
imprints!left!behind!by!our!experiences!than!conceptual!information!that!is!
organised,!put!in!files!and!stored!in!cabinets.!Information!is!in!a!much!more!
‘undifferentiated’! form! than! previously! imagined;! it! can! be! correctly!
pictured!as!‘traces!of!episodes’!rather!than!filed!documents.!The!assumption!
that!memory!is!a!collection!of!mainly!static!recorded!facts!has,!therefore,!
given! way! to! the! emerging! picture! of! a! dynamic! memory! made! up! of!
innumerable! individual! memories! of! events! which! processes! of! retrieval!
shape!into!the!organised!structures!we!are!familiar!with.!If!this!is!true,!then!
the!feeling!of!pulling!information!from!memory!is!not!the!process!of!finding!









distinctively+ context'sensitive.! The! cue! used! to! probe! memory! carries!
elements! of! the! context! in! which! it! was! created! and! naturally! activates!
memory!traces!according+to+their+relevance+to+the+particular+task+at+hand.!!
To!illustrate!how!this!new!understanding!of!memory!may!challenge!
the! idea! that! a! concept’s! information! is! stored! under! different! entries,!
consider,!for!instance,!the!case!of!frequency!and!coSoccurrence!‘information’!
related!to!words!mentioned!briefly!above.!How!would!this!information!be!
integrated! into! the! account! involving! the! three! distinct! entries! (logical,!
encyclopaedic,!lexical)?!It!seems!that!it!should!figure!in!the!lexical!entry!
together!with!information!about!the!surface!form.!In!the!emerging!picture,!
however,! this! is! not! information! about+ words,! rather! it! is! information!







perspectives! on! concepts,! broadly! speaking,! philosophical! and!
psychological,!that!the!rest!of!the!thesis!takes!as!known.!!There!are,!then,!






contribute! at! a! level! traditionally! assumed! to! rely! exclusively! on! code,! a!
paradigm!shift!ensues.!The!only!justification!other!than!tradition!to!keep!
pragmatics! subordinated! to! semantics! was! that! it! could! not! contribute!










semantics,! trying! to! reconcile! or! find! a! middle! ground! with! traditional!
semantics,!and!finally,!breaking!with!the!traditional!semantic!framework.!!
The!second!point!to!take!away!from!the!discussions!in!this!chapter!is!









the! detail.! Relevance! theory’s! proposal! can! be! reformulated! as! follows:!
information!is!stored!not!at!a!particular!node!or!‘conceptual!address’!but!in!
general! memory;! however,! it! is! true! that! this! information! is! not! all!
automatically!activated!each!time!the!concept!is!deployed;!rather,!activation!
is!selective,!and!selection!obeys+the+general+principle+of+relevance.!Finally,!this!
information! is! general,! ‘encyclopaedic’! information! that! a! subject! can!
associate! with! any! aspect! of! her! experience! and! is! therefore! not! to! be!
confused!with!what!philosophers!take!to!be!conceptual!content.!!
The!third!and!final!point!is!to!do!with!Fodor’s!‘criteria!for!a!theory!of!




and! ‘compositionality’! constraints:! briefly,! publicity! depends! on! no! one!
else’s! concept! WATER,! being! any! different! from! my! own;! and,! for!
compositionality! to! work! as! Fodor! construes! it,! the! concept! RAIN,! for!
instance,!has!to!contribute!the+same!content!to!any!thought!of!which!it!is!
part.!!As!announced,!my!own!construal!of!concepts!will!not!comply!with!
these! constraints! as! construed! by! Fodor.! In! chapter! 4,! I! will! develop! an!
alternative!to!the!idea!of!sharing!concepts!that!will!involve!subjects!using!
what! they! share,! namely! contexts,! in! order! to! converge! on!
conceptualisations! rather! than! share! conceptStypes.! For! Fodor,! this! is!
exactly!the!kind!of!approach!that!must!be!avoided!because!it!poses!a!danger!








My! first! objective! in! this! chapter! is! to! bring! together! a! varied! set! of!
contributions!to!the!complex!and!rapidly!evolving!topic!of!word!meaning!in!
context.!The!disagreements!between!theorists!I!call!on!are!large!and!small,!
but! the! issues! raised! represent,! in! my! view,! the! biggest! challenge! facing!
cognitive!pragmatic!approaches!to!language!processing!today.!This!chapter!
directly! follows! from! the! previous! chapter’s! discussion! of! philosophical!





and! word! meaning.! The! logic! behind! the! particular! approach! to! word!
meaning!I!suggest!in!this!chapter!is!largely!supported!by!research!from!the!
fields!of!categorisation!and!memory!research!that!I!will!only!very!briefly!







group! together! the! views! of! philosophers,! linguists,! pragmatists,! and!
psychologists!truly!open!to!taking!the!consequences!of!rampant!contextS
sensitivity!seriously.!Then,!in!an!effort!to!organise!the!diverse!contributions!
and! show! how! they! can! be! taken! to! collectively,! if! not! uniformly,! move!
forward!in!a!particular!direction,!I!organise!the!chapter!into!three!groupings!






review! the! contributions! by! relevance! theorists! like! Dan! Sperber! and!




word! meaning.! In! this! section,! I! also! give! an! account! of! the! relevanceS
theoretic!ad!hoc!concept!construction!and!utterance!comprehension!process!
that!I!take!as!my!point!of!departure.!My!contention!however,!is!that!these!
proposals! are! not! radical! enough,! and! that! the! evidence! supports! going!




communication)! and! resolutely! stepping! outside! of! the! traditional!
framework! are! widely! justified! by! the! evidence.! To! support! this! radical!
suggestion,!in!a!section!between!the!first!and!second!stages,!I!go!back!to!the!
initial! inspiration! for! contextualism! as! contained! in! the! contributions! of!
philosophers!like!Friedrich!Waismann,!John!Searle!and!Hilary!Putnam.!The!







To! introduce! this! topic,! I! propose! to! first! briefly! take! a! look! at! two!







recognise! the! sentences! of! their! language.! In! this! tradition,! the! linguists’!







writings! of! the! later! Wittgenstein! and! he! is! frequently! credited! with! a!










John! Searle,! and! Paul! Grice. 42!They! focused! on! the! actions! that! are!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41!A!very!similar!division!into!two!traditions!can!be!found!in!the!writings!of!most!authors!in!
this! field.! King! and! Stanley! (2005),! for! instance,! label! them! the! ‘expressionScentered!
conception’!and!the!‘speechSactScentered!conception’!of!semantics.!I!adopt!the!terminology!
of!Clark!for!its!initial!clarity.!As!the!chapter!progresses,!it!will!become!evident!that!many!
language! theorists! share! Clark’s! thoughts! and! position.! Their! views! will! be! presented!










accomplished! as! communication! unfolds.! Austin! famously! developed! the!
thesis!that!as!people!use!language!they!are!‘doing!things!with!words’;!not!
































sentences! as! the! fundamental! category! of! language.! The! action! tradition!
argues,! on! the! contrary,! that! it! is! utterances! that! are! more! basic.! The!
approach! focuses! on! language! use! and! argues! that! since! it! is! only! ever!
utterances!(not!sentences)!that!we!actually!hear!or!produce,!it!is!utterances!
that! are! the! fundamental! category! of! language.! The! action! tradition!
considers! it! a! category! mistake! to! speak! of! sentence! production! and!
comprehension;! again,! because! it! is! only! utterances! we! produce! and!
understand.!The!difference!is!important!because!sentences!can!be!devoid!of!
critical! information! necessary! to! identify! referents:! speaker(s)! and!
hearer(s),! time,! place! and! other! circumstances.! But! also! because! very!



















watched,! poacher! and+binoculars! and! the! way! they! are! put! together.! (2)!
would! be! considered! a! structurally! ambiguous! sentence! or! a! surface!
manifestation!of!two!distinct!sentences!and!the!task!of!the!linguist!would!be!! 81!
to! describe! how! speakers! process! (and! perhaps! disambiguate)! such!
structures.! In! the! action! tradition,! which! puts! utterances! and! speaker!
meaning!first,!(2)!would!not!necessarily!be!considered!ambiguous.!In!the!
context!of!an!utterance,!speaker!and!hearer!share!a!common!background!so!
that! the! speaker,! who+ has+ a+ particular+ poacher+ in+ mind,! can! reasonably!
believe!that!his!hearer!can!identify!this!poacher!(Clark,!1992:!introduction+
xiv).! If! the! speaker! does! not! believe! that! his! hearer! can! identify! the!




elephant! in! my! pajamas’,! notice! that! what! makes! the! phrase! funny! (and!
quotable)!is!not!so!much!the!fact!that!it!is!ambiguous!but!that,!despite+a+
certain+amount+of+structural+ambiguity,!it!is!reliably!processed!in!the!same!
way.! True! ambiguity! would! predict! that! at! least! a! significant! number! of!
tokens!would!be!interpreted!as!the!elephant!being!in!pajamas;!however,!
Groucho!Marx’s!completion!‘How!he!got!into!my!pajamas!I’ll!never!know’!
suggests! that! it! is! only! through! a! considerable! deviation! from! normal!
understanding!that!we!can!imagine!the!elephant!in!the!pajamas.!It!is!having!
to!reSprocess!an!utterance!by!reviewing!tacit!background!assumptions!(e.g.!
elephants! do! not! wear! pajamas)! that! characterises! jokes.! It’s! once! we’ve!
found! the! ‘right’! way,! the! way! the! joker! intended! his! utterance! to! be!
interpreted,!that!we!exclaim!‘Oh!!I!get!it!’.!!
Finally,!the!third!tenet!–!speaking+and+listening+are+not+autonomous+
activities+ but+ parts+ of+ collective+ activities+ –! represents! Clark’s! particular!
contribution!to!theorising!about!language.!Once!we!admit!that!utterances!










the! differences! are! minor,! many! times! they! carry! important! theoretical!
implications!that!should!not!be!overlooked!or!downplayed.!For!instance,!in!
these!paragraphs,!I’ve!used!Clark’s!terminology!to!describe!two!traditions:!
the! product! tradition! and! the! action! tradition;! but,! despite! Clark’s!
impressive!influence!on!the!general!field!of!linguistics!(he!has!an!hSindex!of!
50!and!his!1996!book!Using+language!has!been!cited!in!Google!Scholar!over!





























ordinary! language! philosophers! is! that,! in+ vacuo,+ words+ do+ not+ refer+ and+
sentences+do+not+have+truth+conditions.!In!linguistics!and!pragmatics,!this!is!
often! expressed! as! the! ‘linguistic! underdeterminacy! thesis’,! or! the!
observation! that! sentence! meaning+ underdetermines+ truth+ conditions.! In!
stark! opposition! to! the! traditional! view! of! sentence! meaning! as!
propositional,! this! position! holds! that! it! is! only! utterances! which! can! be!




semanticist’s! fundamental! assumption! that! what! words! contribute! are!
stable,! contextSindependent! meanings! and,! importantly,! to! develop!
alternative!views.!!




change! are! not! new! to! this! debate.! The! original! ordinary! language!
philosophers!Ludwig!Wittgenstein,!Peter!Strawson,!John!L.!Austin,!and!John!
Searle,! among! others,! already! presented! strong! arguments! for! a! radical!
change! in! the! conception! of! meaning! in! the! 1950s! and! 60s,! but! the!
traditional! view! successfully! resisted! these! challenges,! and! held! strong.! I!





rekindled! old! arguments! and! relaunched! the! debate.! New! elements,!
particularly! by! people! working! in! my! field,! that! of! cognitive! pragmatics,!





by! contextualists.! It! is! no! longer! generally! ignored! as! inconsequential;!
rather,! it! is! increasingly! agreed! that! it! must+be! accounted! for.! A! related!
encouraging!fact!for!contextualists!is!that!addressing!the!issue!of!contextS
sensitivity!has!already!triggered!possibly!farSreaching!changes.!As!different!
underlying! assumptions! are! critically! addressed,! a! clearer! picture! of! the!
complexity! of! the! issues! can! emerge.! At! first,! this! picture! reveals!
inconsistencies!which!might!lead!to!disagreements!amongst!theorists,!but!as!
these! disagreements! themselves! are! addressed,! a! new! consensus! can! be!
built.! Finally,! while! more! formally! inclined! theorists! today! mostly!








of! challenge! to! standard! formal! theories! like! the! one! she! proposes.! Her!
approach! is! not! to! downplay! the! importance! of! speaker! intentions! in!
accounting!for!what!is!‘intuitively’!said!and!communicated,!rather,!it!is!a!
redefinition! of! semantics,! a! thinning! down! of! semantics! into! minimal!
semantics! that! integrates! some! of! the! lessons! of! contextualism.! She! has!
recently! set! out! four! claims! to! broadly! define! minimalism:! (i)! semantic!
content! for! wellSformed! declarative! sentences! is! truthSevaluable! content;!




(iv)! recovery! of! semantic! content! is! possible! without! access! to! current!
speaker! intentions! (crudely,! grasp! of! semantic! content! involves! ‘word!
reading’!not!‘mindreading’)!(Borg,!2012:!4S5).!
These!claims!clearly!belong!to!the!framework!described!above!as!the!
product! tradition:! sentence! meaning,! rather! than! utterance! meaning,! is!
considered!as!basic!and!from!this!fundamental!stance,!positions!on!semantic!
content!and!truth!follow.!Very!generally,!theorists!identifying!themselves!as!
minimalists! hold! as! in! (i)! above,! that! sentences! express! complete!
propositions,!that!is,!that!they!have!truthSevaluable!content.!Moreover,!as!in!
(ii),!they!also!maintain!that!contextSindependent!aspects!of!meaning!such!as!
‘syntactic! structure’! and! ‘lexical! content’! suffice! to! build! up! sentence!
meaning.! There! is! an! issue! of! this! sentence! meaning! being! propositional!
relative+ to+ a+ context.! In! most! minimalist! approaches,! the! belief! is! that!
indexicals! and! demonstratives! set! up! ‘slots’! that! are! filled! by! contextual!
processes!of!‘saturation’,!that!is,!by!bottomSup!contextual!processes!that!do!
not!call!on!speaker!intentions.!Mandatory!and!optional!contextual!processes!





what! this! amounts! to! below.! For! now,! it! is! important! to! note! that! this!




the! preScontextualist! era! of! the! early! Wittgenstein,! Gottlob! Frege,! and!
Bertrand!Russell,!among!others.!!











crucial! disagreement! emerges! if! we! interpret! ‘contextSdependent!
expressions’!in!(iii)!as!referring!not!only!to!indexicals!and!demonstratives!
but! to! all! potentially! contextSsensitive! expressions! in! a! natural! language!
(from! more! commonly! accepted! contextSdependent! expressions! such! as!
‘tall’!and!‘ready’!to!‘red’,!and,!following+the+much+feared+slippery+slope+logic,!in!
fact,!to!any!and!all!natural!language!expressions).!Minimalist!theorists!can!




what! we! take! semantic! content! to! contribute,! slicing! the! contribution! of!
what!is!linguistically!mandated!thin!enough!as!to!avoid!stepping!outside!of!
formalist!approaches.!Finally,!a!last!important!disagreement!centres!around!















time! and! space! do! not! allow! for! a! detailed! presentation! of! each! of! the!
approaches!mentioned!above.!In!these!paragraphs,!I!have!sought!only!to!flag!
key! issues! that! I! come! back! to! throughout! the! chapter! and! to! attract!
attention!to!two!related!facts:!that!these!approaches!seek!to!address!the!
issues! brought! forth! by! contextualism! and! that! there! is! no! widespread!
agreement! amongst! them! as! to! which! strategies! will! work! against!
contextualism!and!which!minimalist!claims!are!nonSnegotiable.!!
!
Now,! hopefully! safe! from! underestimating! the! divergences! amongst! the!
representatives! of! the! traditional! view,! I! close! this! section! with! a! brief!
summary,!in!the!form!of!a!characterisation!of!the!standard!minimalist!view.!
One!of!the!central!contentious!claims!is!that,!in!general,!sentences!express!
complete! propositions.! ContextSdependence! or! sensitivity! is! downplayed!
and! an! effort! is! made! to! offer! formal! solutions! to! issues! of! identifying!
referents!and!resolving!ambiguity.!The!belief!is!that!a!formal!account!can!be!
given! of! the! kind! of! contextual! parameters! required! so! that! the! mental!
process! of! arriving! at! truthSconditional! content! ‘runs! exhaustively! along!
syntactic!tracks’!(Borg,!2004:!84).!
The!traditional!view!proposes!a!certain!division!of!labour!between!
semantics! and! pragmatics.! In! language! interpretation,! semantics! is!
responsible!for!sentence!meaning,!its!output!is!a!proposition!(i.e.!a!truthS
conditional! content)! that! the! speaker! can! be! taken! to! have! said! (if! not!









wide! agreement! that! indexicals! and! demonstratives! necessitate! a! certain!! 88!




traditional! approach! presented! above! would! work! if! the! aspects! of! the!
context!that!contribute!to!even!the!most!minimal!content!could!be!treated!


























be! sufficient! to! determine! the! referent! of! a! demonstrative.! According! to!
contextualism,!what!Kaplan’s!distinction!reveals!is!that!part!of!the!truthS





appearing! in! utterances.! I! propose! to! look! at! indexicals! first.! With! most!































































and! demonstratives.! One! involves! ad! hoc! rules! and! ruleSfollowing!
proportionate! in! complexity! to! the! difficulty! and! awkwardness! of!
accounting! for! convergence! in! reference! without! speaker! intentions.! The!
other! takes! very! natural! (and! independently! motivated)! mindSreading!
abilities!and!only!schematic!or!flexible!language!conventions!and!arrives!at!
the! same! result.! Furthermore,! as! I’ll! argue,! the! case! of! indexicals! and!
demonstratives!is!only!the!tip!of!the!iceberg!when!it!comes!to!making!a!case!
for!contextualism.!In!the!remainder!of!this!chapter,!I!present!many!more!






of! his! key! insights! jointly! adopted! by! Recanati! and! the! proponents! of!




‘what! is! said’! for! relevance! theory’s! notion! of! ‘explicature’.! Among! the!
contributions! of! cognitive! pragmatics,! I! am! particularly! interested! in! the!







first! look! back! to! some! early! prescient! work! in! philosophical!
semantic/pragmatic! theorising! and! argue! that! the! positions! in! the! ‘first!
stage’!were!not!radical!enough,!particularly!with!respect!to!word!meaning.!




underlying! language! comprehension! and! interpretation.! It! is! widely!
acknowledged! that,! as! a! field,! pragmatics! has! progressively! moved! away!
from! philosophical! formulations! and! towards! increasingly! more! cognitive!
frameworks.!But!it!is!also!important!to!recognise!that!theorising!in!general,!
whether!it!comes!from!psychologists,!philosophers!or!linguists!has!moved!
towards! more! cognitive! formulations! as! part! of! the! cognitive! revolution!
which!has!affected!not!only!pragmatics,!linguistics!and!psychology!but!also!
philosophy.!Notably,!moving!away!from!philosophical!formulations!does!not!
mean! turning! one’s! back! to! philosophical! influences.! The! constraints! on!
formulating! solutions! to! the! issues! which! arise! in! pragmatics! are! simply!




A! good! example! of! a! proposal! completely! reformulated! under! the!
influence! of! the! cognitive! revolution! is! that! of! Herbert! Paul! Grice.! For!
contemporary!pragmatists,!Grice!was!a!philosophical!source!of!insight!into!
psychological! mechanisms! of! language! comprehension.! Grice’s! key!





‘implicating’! it.! This! sayingSimplicating! distinction! has! proven! to! be!! 93!
indispensable! in! pragmatics! irrespective! of! differences! between!










utterance! and! the! way! they! are! put! together! while,!at+the+same+time,! be!













one,! it! is! hard! to! identify! just! what! a! speaker! could! mSintend! without!
departing! from! the! literal! meaning! of! his! words! and! how! they! are! put!
together.!In!the!above!example,!for!instance,!I!would!probably!let!elements!






unguarded! everyday! speech);! this! influences! the! literal! aspects! of! the!
utterance,!which!are!put!in!parenthesis,!so!to!speak:!the!negation!and/or!the!
meaning!of!the!constituents!would!likely!undergo!some!modulation!in!order!















provides! input! to! cognitive! processes! (Wilson! and! Sperber! 2004:! 608).+














referred! to! as! the! ‘linguistic! underdeterminacy! hypothesis’.! Among!
contemporary! pragmatists! and! some! linguists! the! hypothesis! is! wellS

















In! the! section! on! relevance! theory’s! ‘enriched! explicit! content’,! I! first!









Deirdre! Wilson’s! theory! of! concepts! and! ensuing! positions! on! semantics.!
Then,!I!move!on!to!contributions!made!towards!defining!a!speakerSmeant!




but! also! provides! a! detailed! account! of! how! pragmatic! processes! are!
involved.! Finally,! some! problems! do! arise! with! this! account,! particularly!




According! to! Recanati! (2001b),! bringing! clarity! to! the! original! twoSlevel!
distinction!and+thereby+to+the+issue+of+levels+of+meaning!calls!for!two!further!
distinctions!–!beyond!those!given!by!Grice!–!to!be!made:!!
Anyone! who! has! reflected! on! the! sentence! meaning/utterance!
meaning! distinction! knows! that! a! simple! distinction! is! in! fact!
insufficient!(Recanati,!2001b:!75).!!
The!first!distinction!he!calls!for!is!between!the!linguistic!meaning!of!the!







The! second! distinction! is! between! what! is! ‘actually’! said! by! an!






Imagine! you! ask! the! philosopher! whether! he! can! cook,! in! this! case,! an!









The! importance! of! this! triad! is! what! it! reveals! about! sentence!
meaning! and! propositionality.! As! expected! by! the! product! tradition,!
meaning! at! the! first! level! is! composed! of! the! conventional,! linguistic!
meaning!of!the!words!and!represents!contextSindependent!meaning.!Two!of!
the!features!that!we!saw!were!important!for!formal!semantics!are!present!
here:! literal! conventional! meanings! and! contextSindependence.! A! third!
feature,!however,!also!of!great!importance!to!traditional!semantics,!being+
propositional,! is! not! yet! present! at! this! level.! In! Recanati’s! triad,! in! fact,!
propositionality!starts!only!at!the!second!level,!with!contextSdependence.!!
Consider!once!again!the!sentenceStype!‘I!am!French’.!In!the!view!that!
emerges! from! revisiting! Grice’s! distinction,! it! is! ‘skeletal’! because,! as! it!
stands,!it!constrains!how!the!context!should!intervene!to!make!an!utterance!
of!it!truthSevaluable!(generally,!the!speaker!of!the!utterance!must!be!French!
in! order! for! the! utterance! to! be! true)! but,! short! of! a! full! situation! of!
utterance!(someone!actually!producing!the!utterance),!it!is!not!yet!properly!
‘enriched’! (Recanati,! 2001b,! 2003).! The! conventional! meanings! of! the!
constituents!of!the!phrase!do!have!the!potential!to!say!something!true!or!
false,!but!to!do!so,!there!must!be!an!act!of!utterance!(or!at!least!of!thought).!!
Finally,! consider! the! processes! at! work! at! each! level! of! meaning.!
What!is!said!is!a!‘fleshing!out’!of!sentence!meaning.!The!propositions!arrived!
at! through! this! process! are! virtually! indefinite! but! they! are! strongly!! 98!
constrained! by! the! sentence! meaning.! For! instance,! ‘I! am! French’! can!
express!that!Recanati,!or!anyone+else+who+utters+the+sentence,!is!French;!but,!
it!would!not!likewise!be!able!to!express!the!proposition!that!kangaroos!have!
tails.! This! changes! with! the! mechanism! of! implicature! introduced! in! the!
third! level.! At! this! point,! an! utterance! can! pretty! much! communicate!







together! results! in! two! very! different! interpretations! of! the! triad.! If,! for!
















context! is! minimal.! Critically,! in! pragmatic! minimalism,! it! is! necessarily!
something!in+the+sentence!that!triggers!the!process!whereby!the!sentence!is!! 99!

































































levels! of! sentence! meaning! and! speaker’s! meaning! are! connected! to! different! types! of!

















The! starting! point! for! Sperber! and! Wilson! (1986/95)! is! their! goal! of!
explaining!how!speakers!communicate!their!thoughts.!They!take!it!as!given!
that!the!overall!process!is!inferential,!and!that!it!depends!on!the!recognition!
of! the! speaker’s! communicative! intention! (a! complex! higher! order!
intention),!which!is!achieved!by!following!their!relevanceSbased!principles.!
The! interpretation! process! they! describe! includes,! like! all! the! others! we!
have!seen!so!far,!reference!assignment!and!disambiguation;!but,!critically,!it!






between! semantics! and! pragmatics! resulted! in! supposing! that! my!
neighbour’s!utterance!semantically!expresses!that!she+has+had+breakfast+at+
some+time+in+her+life,+at+least+once.!The!further!content,!namely!that!she!has!
had! breakfast+ on+ that+ very+ day,! would,! in! the! Gricean,! and! in! many!
contemporary! minimalist! semantics! frameworks,! be! considered! to! be!









To! address! this,! relevance! theory! embraces! the! notions! of! ‘free’!
pragmatic! enrichment! (originally! introduced! by! Recanati! in! 1993)! and!
‘unarticulated’!constituents!(originally!introduced!by!John!Perry!in!1986).!
Adoption!of!these!notions!constitutes!a!rejection!of!the!semantic!doctrine!
according! to! which! anything! not! articulated! in! the! linguistic! form! falls!
outside! of! what! can! be! taken! as! explicitly! expressed.! A! counterintuitive!
consequence! of! the! minimalist! position! is! that! speakers! of! everyday!
utterances!like!(5)!above!would!turn!out!not!to!explicitly!say!much!at!all.!
According!to!Carston!(2009a),!if!one!adopts!the!minimalist!perspective,!the!
speaker! in! the! situation! described! could! not! be! taken! to! have! explicitly!
communicated!(i.e.!‘meant’!or!endorsed)!any!thought!at!all!by!uttering!‘I’ve!
had! breakfast’;! she! would! not! have! made! an! assertion,! but! merely!
implicated! something.! Furthermore,! cases! like! this! one! abound:! many!

























breakfast! this+ morning’! that! provides! the! crucial! premise! for! further!
inferences!such!as!my+neighbour+is+not+hungry!and,!therefore,!it!is!deriving!
this! content! that! should! be! represented! as! a! key! subtask! of! any!
psychologically! plausible! comprehension! process! (Carston! 2009a,! section!
3).!
The! above! observations! led! relevance! theory! to! abandon! Grice’s!
distinction!between!what!is!said!and!what!is!implicated!and!propose!instead!
a!distinction!between!what!is!explicitly!and!implicitly!communicated:!in!(5),!







what! she! implicitly! communicated! (or! implicated),! labelled! the!
‘implicature(s)’.!!
!
Ideas! introduced! in! the! above! section! are! more! fully! explained! below! in!
discussions! of! relevance! theory’s! utterance! comprehension! process!
(including! processes! of! ad! hoc! concept! construction).! First,! however,! I!! 104!
would!like!to!touch!on!some!theoretical!and!terminological!issues!related!to!












syntax! associates! with! each! occurrence! of! a! natural! language!




In! standard! syntax! and! the! traditional! view! of! the! division! between!
semantics!and!pragmatics,!the!explicit!content!of!the!utterance!is!equated!




utterance+ underdetermines+ the+ propositional+ form+ expressed! (Sperber! &!
Wilson,! 1986/95)! and! that! it,! therefore,! must! be! developed.! The!
development,!of!course,!includes!fully!pragmatic!processes.!Furthermore,!in!
the! last! decade! or! so,! relevance! theory! has! expanded! this! idea! of!
‘development’! from! the! level! of! the! ‘phrase’! to! that! of! individual! words!
which!are!now!said!to!be!‘pragmatically!adjusted!and!fineStuned!in!context,!













communication! which! assumes! that! linguistic! sentences! correspond! to!
thoughts!through!straightforward!matching,!that!the!content!of!a!thought!is!
transmitted! in! the! message! because! it! has! been! entirely! captured! by! the!
signs!of!a!particular!code.!Sperber!and!Wilson!hold,!on!the!contrary,!that!
utterances! are! ‘pieces! of! evidence! about! the! speaker’s! meaning,! and!







explains! that! the! relevanceStheoretic! linguistic! semantics! model! she!
supports!!
…will!adopt!a!simple!model!of!linguistic!semantics!that!treats!words!as!
encoding! mentallySrepresented! concepts,! elements! of! a! conceptual!
representation!system!or!‘language!of!thought’,!which!constitute!their!
linguistic! meanings! and! determine! what! might! be! called! their!
linguisticallySspecified!denotations!(p.!273).!!
It! seems! that! conceiving! of! language! as! a! code! goes! together! with! the!
adoption!of!the!division!discussed!in!chapter!2!(§!2.7.2)!between!linguistic!! 106!
or! ‘translational’! and! ‘real’! semantics.! In! this! perspective,! ‘code’! is!





between! words! and! concepts,! and! further! by! the! general! emphasis! on!
inferenceSbased! comprehension! processes! that! is! characteristic! of! their!
approach.!
To! illustrate,! consider! the! following:! according! to! Wilson! (2003:!







‘drink’+ is+ being+ translated+ into+ the+ language+ of+ thought.! These! pragmatic!
processes! modulate! DRINK! to! create! an! occasion! specific! concept! DRINK*!
which!in!this!particular!context!denotes!drinking!alcoholic!drinks!(and!more!
specifically,!significant+amounts+of+alcoholic!drinks)!rather!than!liquids!in!
general.! So! it! is! important! to! note! that! the! code! model! of! language! is!













project,! and! given! the! most! recent! developments! in! lexical! pragmatics,! a!




cognitive! pragmatics! (§! 3.3.2),! relevance! theory! is! one! of! the! very! few!
approaches! to! not! only! theoretically! reject! minimalism! but! to! actually!








What! I! offer! here! is! a! presentation! of! the! standard! relevanceStheoretic!
picture!that!includes!an!account!of!ad!hoc!concept!construction.!There!is!
also!an!issue!of!the!evolution!of!ideas!about!ad!hoc!concept!construction!
within+ relevance+ theory;! these! differences! are! important! since! serious!
doubts! about! certain! aspects! of! the! standard! account,! as! represented! by!
Wilson! (2003)! and! Wilson! and! Carston! (2007),! for! instance,! have! arisen!
within!relevance!theory.!I!come!back!to!these!objections!at!the!end!of!this!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59!Assimakopoulos! (2012)! has! also! recently! discussed! whether! relevance! theorist’s!




encode! concepts! involves! more! arguments! than! I! could! mention! here.! I! come! back! to!
possible! alternatives! to! the! ‘code’! model! shortly! with! references! to! the! notion! of!
‘entrenchment’,!as!developed!by!Beckner!et!al!(2009)!and!HansSJörg!Schmid!(2008),!at!the!
end! of! this! chapter! (section! 3.6! ‘Closing! remarks’)! and! in! subsequent! chapters! after! a!
discussion! of! psychological! factors.! For! the! issue! of! whether! words! encode! concepts,! a!
whole! section! (3.5! ‘The! second! stage:! abandoning! the! modular! view’)! is! dedicated! to!
presenting!an!alternative.!! 108!
section;! but! first,! it! is! necessary! to! present! the! standard! version! of! the!













The! process! is! considered! effective! when! it! has! constructed! appropriate!
hypotheses! concerning! the! explicit! and! implicit! content.! A! stepSbySstep!
description! of! the! whole! process! is! as! follows:! the! language! module!
intervenes! first,! it! recovers! the! ‘linguistically! encoded! meaning’! of! the!
utterance! and! feeds! it! to! the! pragmatic! module.! The! pragmatic! work! is!
construed! as! involving! subStasks! which! are! carried! out! in! parallel,! not!
sequentially.!In!the!picture!of!the!standard!position!I!am!drawing!here,!once!
the! linguistically! encoded! meaning! has! been! recovered,! the! pragmatic!
module!follows!a!path!of!least!effort,!enriching!it!both!at!the!explicit!and!
implicit!level!until!expectations!of!relevance!are!met,!or!abandoned.!!





theoretic! terminology,! so! it! is! the! ‘central! feature! of! relevanceStheoretic!
pragmatics’!(Wilson,!2003:!283).!
To! illustrate! this! complex! process,! suppose! that! I! receive! the!
following!message!on!my!phone:!!! 109!
(7)! Be!an!angel!and!pick!up!some!bread!on!your!way!home.61!






‘filed’! under,! or! associated! with,! these! concepts! and! proceed! to! their!
modulation.!According!to!Wilson!and!Carston!(2007),!‘angel’,!for!instance,!
encodes! the! concept! ANGEL! which! activates! a! certain! ‘range! of! logical!
properties’,! among! them,! possibly! ‘an! angel! is! a! SUPERNATURAL! BEING! OF! A!
CERTAIN! KIND’.! In! their! (2007)! example:! ‘Sally! is! an! angel’,! this! activation!
would!enable!certain!deductive!inferences!to!be!drawn;!for!instance,!‘from!
the! proposition! that! Sally! is! an! ANGEL,! it! is! deducible! that! Sally! is! a!
SUPERNATURAL!BEING!OF!A!CERTAIN!KIND’!(Wilson!and!Carston,!2007:!247).!The!
encoded!concept!also!allows!access!to!the!encyclopaedic!entry,!that!is,!a!
particular! subject’s! wide! collection! of! information! related! to! angels,!
everything! from! scientific! and! cultureSspecific! beliefs! to! personal! and!
idiosyncratic!representations.62!Accessing! ANGEL!would!activate!properties!
of! different! subsets! of! angels! such! as! ‘good! angels’,! ‘guardian! angels’,!
‘avenging! angels’,! ‘dark! angels’,! and! so! forth,! thereby! enabling! further!


















others.! I! am! being! asked! to! do! something,! so! any! properties! related! to!












ANGEL! that! could! be! paraphrased! as! SOMEONE! PARTICULARLY! HELPFUL! (AND!
SOMEHOW!ANGELSLIKE).63!!
At!this!stage,!through!a!process!of!mutual!parallel!adjustment,!an!ad!
























hoc! concept! construction,! this! does! not! mean! sequential! processing;!
explicatures!need!not!precede!implicatures!in!the!comprehension!process.!
Rather,!the!process!depends!on!explicatures,!implicatures!and!contextual!
assumptions! being! mutually! adjusted! in! parallel! ‘until! they! form! an!






now! turn! my! attention! to! some! very! interesting! remarks! in! Carston’s!
(2002a,! chapter! 5)! section! on! ‘word! meaning! and! concepts’! where! she!
presents!and!discusses!some!of!the!very!issues!that!my!account!raises.!Her!
starting! point! is! the! possibility! that! the! assumption! that! words+ encode+











modulation.! According! to! Robyn! Carston, 65!however,! this! is! not! what!








the! idea! that! it+is+full'fledged+concepts+that+words+encode,! that! what! they!
encode! are! concept+ schemas.! These! are! described! as! ‘pointers! to! a!
conceptual!space,!on!the!basis!of!which,!on!every!occasion!of!use,!an!actual!
concept! (an! ingredient! of! a! thought)! is! pragmatically! inferred’! (Carston!
2002a:!360).!Yet,!she!also!finds!some!aspects!of!this!proposal!problematic!
and! so! the! issue! of! a! definite! alternative! to! what! I! called! the! standard!
account! above! is,! at! the! end! of! Carston’s! section,! left! largely! open.66!
Nevertheless,! the! arguments! presented! for! concept! schemas! and+ against+
them!are!well!worth!close!inspection.!!
Carston! reflects! on! the! word! ‘happy’! and! the! concept! that! it! is!
supposed! to! encode.! According! to! the! standard+ account,! ‘happy’! both!
encodes!a!general!and!abstract!concept! HAPPY!and!provides!the!basis!for!



















evaluable! for! Searle’s! wellSknown! examples:! ‘Bob! opened! the! grass’! and!
‘Chris!opened!the!fork’!?!!
A! good! alternative! seems! to! be! to! stop! looking! to! a! general! and!
abstract!concept!OPEN!as!the+element!that!provides!access!to!the!information!
needed!for!interpretation,!and!rather!look!to!the+word!‘open’!as!a!gateway!to!
our! vast! stores! of! information! related! to! opening! in! memory.! The! claim!
would!be!that!the!lexical!form!maps!to!a!‘conceptual!address’!in!memory!to!
which!are!attached!packages!of!information.!Carston!credits!this!view,!which!
will! receive! much! more! detailed! attention! throughout! this! thesis,! to! the!
psychologist! Lawrence! Barsalou.! Roughly,! a! selective! process! would! pick!
out!of!the!packages!only!those!bits!of!information!relevant!to!the!current!
context! and! the! result! would! be! a! concept.68!For! lexical! pragmatics,! this!















considered! is! a! much! more! radical! rearrangement! of! the! process! of!














to! is! a! space! in+ memory,! then! there! is! no! longer! anything! necessarily!
conceptual!or!schematic!about!Carston’s!alternative.!
There!are!other!related!objections!to!consider.!Carston!recognises!that!
the! acquisition! story! for! concept! schemas! is! unclear.! In! the! Fodorian!
framework,! learning! the! word! ‘open’! would! be! a! matter! of! learning! to!






















(1998),! following! the! work! of! Douglas! Hintzman! (1986),! has! a! radical!






are! associated.! The! only! meaning! that! words! have! is! that! which!
emerges!in!context!(Recanati,!1998,!section!16!‘Cognitive!science!and!
contextualism’,!cited!by!Carston!2002a:!n.!16!p.!375).!69!!















understanding! and! move! decidedly! forward! on! accounts! of! the!
comprehension! of! individual! words! and! expressions! within! utterances!
(lexical!pragmatics).!!
However,! I! believe! that! the! most! important! contribution! is! the!
recognition!of!the!pervasiveness!of!contextSdependence!in!this!picture.!The!
traditional! view! of! contextSdependence! was! mostly! dismissive:! a! certain!
view! of! the! semanticSpragmatic! divide! mistakenly! paired! contextS
dependence! with! nonStruth! conditional! content! and! therefore! labelled!
contextSdependence!of!only!secondary!interest.!As!a!result,!it!was!generally!
downplayed! and! relegated! to! a! ‘lesser’,! subordinate! discipline! (i.e.,!
pragmatics).! The! only! imaginable! advantage! of! this! solution! is! that! no!
fundamental! changes! to! the! discipline! of! semantics! would! be! required.!




stirred! undeniable! interest.! Of! course,! this! does! not! mean! convergent!
interpretations!of!the!evidence,!but,!at!the!very!least,!an!acknowledgement!
of!a!need!to!address!the!issue.!Cappelen!and!Lepore,!2005,!2007;!King!&!





established! results! of! contemporary! cognitive! pragmatics,! which! I! have!
done! in! section! (3.3)! entitled! ‘The! first! stage:! from! philosophical!
perspectives!to!cognitive!pragmatics’,!I!would!move!on!to!arguments!calling!
for!more!extreme!positions.!This!begins!with!the!contributions!I!present!as!
part! of! the! section! entitled! ‘Philosophical! foundations! for! radical!
contextualism’.!The!main!idea!is!that,!free!from!the!constraints!previously!
imposed!by!semantic!theorising,!contextSdependence!can!be!seen!as!quite!! 117!




puts! semantics! as! the! main! discipline! for! issues! of! content! and! truthS
conditions! and! subordinates! pragmatics! to! semantics.! Furthermore,! as! is!
usually!the!case!when!arguing!against!an!established!tradition,!the!burden!
of! evidence! is! on! those! who! disagree;! understandably,! the! burden! of!
evidence!is!also!in!proportion!to!the!consequences!of!adopting!the!proposed!
changes.!In!the!case!of!semantics!and!pragmatics,!the!minimum!change!calls!
for! reconsidering! the! extent! to! which! pragmatics! ‘intrudes’,! or! should+be+
allowed+to+‘intrude’,!into!semantics.!The!term!chosen!by!the!semanticist!is!
deliberately!laden!with!negative!connotations:!an!intrusion!is!an!illegal!and!





them! unwelcome;! rather! than! a! persuasive! argument! in! favour! of! the!
established!order,!this!seems!to!reveal!a!certain!unease!with!a!changing!
picture.!!
The! amount! and! robustness! of! the! evidence! brought! forth! by!
contextualists! even! seems! to! point! in! the! direction! of! a! reversal! of! the!
hierarchy,! if! not! a! disappearance! altogether! of! semantics! as! traditionally!
construed.!The!defining!characteristic!of!the!new!picture!is!that!contextS





are! ready! to! adi! such! a! radical! position.! But! the! more! evidence! that! is!
amassed! by! pragmatists,! the! more! contextSdependence! seems! to! be!! 118!
ubiquitous!and!deeply!tied!to!how!language!works.!This!section!takes!up!the!
challenge!of!presenting!arguments!in!favour!of!such!a!move,!which!I!propose!
to! call! ‘radical! contextualism’! (to! differentiate! it! both! from! antiS
contextualism!and!from!more!conservative!versions!of!contextualism!which!
maintain! that! words! have! fully! semantic,! contextSindependent,! standing!
meanings).! Radical! contextualism! experiences! resistance! from! outside! of!
pragmatics,!particularly!from!semantics,!and!from!within!pragmatics,!from!
theorists! comfortable! with! one! of! the! current! positions! on! the!
semantics/pragmatics! divide.! There! are! strong! arguments,! however,! as! I!
hope!to!show!in!this!section!and!the!next,!to!support!radical!contextualism.!
They! come! from! many! sources:! not! only! pragmatists,! but! linguists! more!
generally,! philosophers,! psychologists,! and! artificial! intelligence! theorists.!
Understandably,!semanticists!are!the!most!reluctant!since!accepting!radical!
contextualism!would!involve!acknowledging!that!semantics!does!not!deliver!










consequences! it! could! bring.! I! am! particularly! interested! in! the!
consequences! for! conceptions! of! word! meaning.! A! fresh! look! at! word!
meaning,!I!believe,!involves!breaking!free!from!the!framework!of!traditional!
formal! semantics! and! pushing! the! limits! of! contextSsensitivity! beyond!
making!a!place!for!pragmatics!alongside!semantics.!
With!respect!to!the!two!contrasting!traditions!in!language!theorising!
described! earlier! in! this! chapter! (section! 3.2),! radical! contextualism! is!
clearly!in!line!with!the!action!tradition;!it!inherits!some!of!its!inspiration!
from!the!later!Wittgenstein!(i.e.,!after!his!‘anthropological!turn’),!and!from!! 119!
the! ordinary! language! philosophers! of! the! 1950s! and! 1960s.! A! careful!
presentation! of! precise! influences! and! connections! amongst! the! Vienna!
circle,!the!Oxford!natural!language!philosophers!and!present!day!theorists!
would!undoubtedly!enrich!the!discussion!in!this!section!but,!unfortunately,!
is! beyond! the! scope! of! this! thesis.70!I! rather! focus! on! a! particular! issue!
present! across! key! contributions! in! the! various! traditions! above:! the!





















what! Monk! (1991)! calls! his! ‘verificationist! phase’! (circa! 1929).! Waismann! is! the! only!
member!to!have!engaged!in!long!and!frequent!discussions!with!Wittgenstein!on!a!range!of!













lack! the! set! of! predetermined! rules! that! would! make! them! efficient.!!
Waismann! holds! that! what! has! been! overlooked! is! the! ‘open! texture’! of!
concepts:!!
The! fact! that! in! many! cases! there! is! no! such! thing! as! a! conclusive!











description! can! be! given! for! how! it! may! be! used! and! such!
descriptions/definitions! are! beyond! our! reach! because! not! only! can! we!
never!be!sure!that!we!have!taken!every!possible!detail!into!consideration!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!








whether! it! be! regarding! their! intelligence! or! emotions,! Waismann’s! example! might! not!
seem!novel!in!any!interesting!way.!It!must!be!understood!in!its!1950s!context:!it!seems,!





but! it! is! quite! impossible! to! predict! future! changes! to! actual! conditions.!
Waismann’s!is!one!of!the!first!accounts!of!linguistic!underdeterminacy.!His!
message! will! reappear! in! the! writings! of! Searle! and! numerous!
contemporary!pragmatists.!The!key!point!is!that!the!meaning!of!everyday!





for! every! sentence! the! literal! meaning! of! the! sentence! can! be!
construed! as! the! meaning! it! has! independently! of! any! context!
whatever!(Searle,!1978:!207).!!
Searle! clearly! foreshadows! the! position! taken! today! by! theorists! like!
Recanati! who! claim! that! it! is! not! sentences! but! utterances! that! are!
propositional! and! therefore! truthSconditional.!73But! Searle’s! contribution!
also!has!a!direct!impact!on!word!meaning.!As!I!will!try!to!show,!his!message!
that! contexts! come! with! background! assumptions! carries! important!
consequences!for!lexical!pragmatics.!!
Searle’s! starting! point! is! that,! contrary! to! the! received! view,! the!
difference! between! sentences! and! utterances! is! not! the! same! as! the!
difference! between! types! and! tokens.! This! confusion,! like! many! others!
concerning! meaning,! stems! from! underestimating! contextSsensitivity.! The!
received!view!holds!that!sentenceStypes!have!contextSfree!meaning!and!that!
it! is! this! contextSfree! meaning! that! determines! the! applicability! (i.e.,! the!
truthSconditions)! of! the! sentence.! Furthermore,! it! assumes! that! contextS










time! of! day! at! which! they! are! uttered;! rather,! context'dependency+ is+ a+
fundamental+characteristic+of+language,!due!to!the!fact!that!the!conditions!of!













the! cat! and! the! mat! are! floating! freely! in! space,! they! are! disposed! as!
described!by!‘The!cat!is!on!the!mat’!but!there!is!no!force!of!gravity!to!this!




acknowledge! the! role! of! background! assumptions! and! accept! that! ‘the!
notion!of!the!literal!meaning!of!a!sentence!only!has!application!relative!to!a!




sentences,! would! also! make! different! contributions! to! truth! conditions!
depending!on!their!use.!Searle!is!aware!that!this!challenges!the!accepted!
tradition! since! Frege:! classic! compositionality! stipulates! that! each!! 123!
constituent!of!a!sentence!has!a!definite!semantic!content!in!such!a!way!that!
the! literal! meaning! of! a! sentence! is! made! up! of! the! meaning! of! its!












and! the! nonSliteral;! rather,! truth! conditions! may! be! different! among!










your! eyes’! and! ‘open! the! book’,! we! rely! on! what+ we+ know! about! our!
internally!generated!eye!movements!and!about!our!interactions!with!books.!
For!‘open!a!restaurant’,!and!‘open!fire’!we!rely!on!what!we!know!about!
common! practices! in! relation! to! businesses,! restaurants,! war,! and! so! on.!






whatever! the! ‘core’! meaning! of! a! word! such! as! ‘open’! might! be,! it! is!
insufficient,! its!contribution!cannot! be! ‘grasped’! independently! of! context!
and!thus!calls+for!pragmatic!processes.!!
Another! important! point! to! take! away! from! Searle’s! notion! of!
‘background’!and!Waismann’s!‘open!texture’!is!the!way!they!potentially!turn!
the!tables!on!traditional!views!of!the!division!of!labour!between!semantics!
and! pragmatics.! If! conditions! of! application! are! not! fixed! prior! to! an!





In! the! seminal! ‘The! meaning! of! “meaning”’! (1975),! Putnam! explicitly!























has! an! extension.! Furthermore,! in! mathematical! terms,! a! ‘set’! is! definite,!
something!either!belongs!to!it!or!does!not,!but!natural!language!is!teeming!
with! ‘borderline! cases’.! A! final! idealisation! of! ‘extension’! involves!





explain! why! two! terms! with! the+ same! extension! can! differ+ in+ meaning.!
Putnam’s!example!is!‘creature!with!a!heart’!and!‘creature!with!a!kidney’,!
since! every! creature! with! a! kidney! has! a! heart,! these! expressions! have!




term’! when! attempting! to! account! for! the! meaning! of! a! term! beyond+its+
extension,!then!the!distinction!has!fallen!short!of!actually!clarifying!meaning.!
Of! course,! a! clear! account! of! the! notion! of! ‘concept’! would! be! an! ideal!











very! brief! presentation! of! the! thought! experiment.! Putnam! invites! us! to!
imagine!a!planet!exactly!like!the!Earth!that!has!lakes!and!rivers!filled!with!a!
liquid!just!like!ours.!The!inhabitants!are!duplicates,!‘Doppelgängers’,!of!the!
Earth’s! inhabitants,! they! have! the! same! thoughts! regarding! water! as! we!
have,! they! quench! their! thirst! with! this! liquid! and! the! EnglishSspeakers!
among! them! call! it! ‘water’.! Now! imagine! this! scenario! taking! place! circa!
1750!when,!through!the!advances!of!science!the!composition!of!water!is!
finally!known!and,!as!it!turns!out,!the!liquid!on!Twin!Earth!is!not!H2O!but!a!







that! is! different! and! ‘water’! means! something! different! here! and! there!




have! in! their! heads! since! my! Doppelganger! and! I! have! the! same! waterS
thoughts! and! ‘water’! does! not! mean! the! same! thing! here! and! there!
nonetheless.!!
Putnam’s!proposal!for!dealing!with!this!meaning/reference!problem,!
and! some! very! similar! ones,! involves! adopting! the! ‘division! of! linguistic!
labour! hypothesis’.! He! illustrates! this! with! the! example! of! GOLD,! already!
mentioned!in!relation!to!Georges!Rey’s!references!to!Putnam!in!chapter!1.!
According! to! Putnam,! we! dissociate! acquiring! the! word! ‘gold’! and! the!





whether! something! really! is! gold.! So! there! are! both! superficial! ways! of!
recognising!gold!and!necessary!and!sufficient!conditions!for!something!to!












specific! subset! of! speakers! who! know,! perhaps! not! perfectly! but!
authoritatively,!what!the!associated!‘conditions!of!application’!or!‘criteria’!
are!for!a!certain!term.!Other!speakers’!competent!use!of!this!term!depends!
on! a! structured! coSoperation! between! speakers! closer! and! farther! away!
from!the!authoritative!information!that!we!all!suppose!exists!somewhere!
within!the!community.!For!Georges!Rey,!this!idea!is!key!to!maintaining!a!
clear! distinction! between! the! metaphysical! and! the! epistemological!
functions! of! concepts! since! it! makes! a! distinction! between! knowing! the!
defining! conditions! or! criteria! for! a! term! (being! an! expert)! and! being! a!
competent!user!of!the!term.76!!
In!a!very!recent!publication,!Putnam!(2013)!succinctly!sets!out!how!his!
externalism! should! be! understood:! first,! there! is! the! now! very! widely!





76!In! the! following! chapter,! I! come! back! to! this! issue! once! again! to! give! a! specifically!
psychological!take!on!this!distinction.!!! 128!




the! logical! positivists! who! assumed! that! scientific! definitions! fix! the!
references!of!our!terms.!He!calls!attention!to!the!fact!that!it!is!a!combination!
of!theories!and!experiments!that!tell!us!what!our!terms!refer!to,!and!stresses!


































extension! is! fixed! socially.! Social! and! physical! interactions! are! just! as!
important!as!what!is!in!our!minds,!and!what!happens!in!our!minds!depends!
on!a!process!of!acculturation!so!interaction!is!found!at!every!step.!Secondly,!






indexicals! have! long! been! recognised! to! vary! in! their! extension! across!
contexts!why!would!terms!like!‘water’!not!do!the!same?!The!validity!of!the!
description!given!above,!the!fact!that!I!can!point!to!a!glass!of!water!and!say!
‘This! is! water’,! means,! according! to! Putnam! that! ‘indexicality! extends!







To! summarise! this! section,! Putnam! claims! that! a! term’s! extension! is! not!
fixed!by!a!concept!(or!an!intension)!an!individual!speaker!has!in!his!head.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!






Rather,! as! revealed! by! the! division! of! linguistic! labour! hypothesis,!
extensions! are! determined! socially! and! indexically,! with! no! need! for! the!
speaker! to! be! in! full! possession! of! complete! or! exact! conditions! of!
application! for! the! concepts! he! competently! uses.! With! regard! to! the!
heightened!importance!this!puts!on!cooperative!activity,!Putnam!writes:!!
We!may!summarise!the!discussion!by!pointing!out!that!there!are!two!
sorts! of! tools! in! the! world:! there! are! tools! like! a! hammer! or! a!
screwdriver!which!can!be!used!by!one!person;!and!there!are!tools!like!
















Recanati! (2004)! describes! one! quasiScontextualist! position,! ‘strong!
optionality’! and! three! contextualist! positions! ranging! from! moderate! to!
radical.! The! first,! the! ‘strong! optionality! view’,! holds! that! modulation! is!
optional!because!there!is!potentially!a!context!in!which!the!sense!expressed!
by!a!word!is!simply!the!sense!that!that!word!possesses!by!virtue!of!the!rules!
of! the! language;! in! other! words,! modulation! is! optional! in! the! most!! 131!
straightforward!sense:!it!either!takes!place!for+contingent+reasons!or!does!
not!take!place!at!all!(Recanati,!2004:!137).!This!position!is!much!like!that!
described! earlier! in! this! chapter! (§! 3.3.2.4)! with! regards! to! relevance!
theory’s!standard!position!on!ad!hoc!concept!construction!and!the!utterance!









of! a! whole,! they! must! cohere! and! to! cohere,! they! inevitably! undergo! a!
process!of!adjustment.!!
Radical! contextualism! begins! with! the! third! position! on! Recanati’s!
gradient:!the!‘wrong!format!view’.!He!describes!it!as!the!view!that!!
words! have! meanings,! but! these! meanings! don’t! have! the! proper!
format!for!being!recruited!into!the!interpretations!of!utterances;!they!
are!not!determinate!senses!but!overly!rich!or!overly!abstract!‘semantic!













assumed! that! the! pragmatic! process! of! occasionSspecific! meaning!
modulation!is!a!process!of!elaborating!or!delimiting!these!meanings!to!suit!a!







The! senses! that! are! the! words’! contributions! to! contents! are!
constructed,! but! the! construction! can! proceed! without! the! help! of!
conventional,! contextSindependent! word! meanings! (Recanati! 2004:!
147).!!
To!illustrate!how!this!particular!construction!process!works,!Recanati!
refers! to! an! unstated! but! commonly! assumed! picture! of! where! contextS
independent! linguistic! meanings! are! supposed! to! come! from:! they! are!
allegedly! the! products+ of! a! certain! induction! process.! Imagine! a! child!




the! contextSindependent! linguistic! meaning! can! be! the! input! to! another!
process:!that!of!meaning!modulation.!Imagine!we!line!these!processes!up:!
we!begin!with!contextualised!senses,!those!to!which!the!child!is!actually!
exposed;! the! first! process! is! one! of! induction! or! abstraction! that! has!
linguistic! meaning! as! its! output.! When! somewhere! down! the! line! an!




















views! ‘both! contextualised! senses! and! contextSindependent! linguistic!
meanings! are! input,! and! both! are! output! in! some! construction! process’!
(2004:! 147).! Notice! that! ‘linguistic! meaning’! appears! as! a! middle! step!
between!two!instances!of!the!only!place!where!meaning!is!irrefutably!found:!
in+context.!This!suggests!a!possible!simplification!of!this!lineSup:!why!not!
simply! skip! the! intermediate! step! of! creating! a! contextSindependent!
linguistic! meaning! and! suppose! that! the! computations! involved! in!
constructing! the! occasionSspecific! meaning! expressed! by! a! word! (or!
expression)! in+context! takes! as! input! the! contextualised! senses! that! that!
word!(or!expression)!actually!had!on!previous!occasions!of!use?!This!is!the!
meaning!eliminativism!position:!there!is!no!need!for!an!abstract!contextS
independent! linguistic! meaning! because! the! process! of! constructing!
occasionSspecific! senses! for! words! and! expressions! can! merge! the! two!
processes!(i.e.,!abstraction/induction!and!modulation)!into!a!single!process!
that! takes! previous! uses! as! input! and! yields! as! output! occasionSspecific!
senses!perfectly!adapted!to!the!context!at!hand!(Recanati,!2004:!147).!!
!




following! the! logic! of! ‘eliminating’! linguistic! meaning.! I! am! open! to! the!
possibility!that!in!the!end!meaning!eliminativism!will!probably!be!deemed!
too! radical;! it! is,! after! all,! construed! as! the! most! extreme! contextualist!
position!possible!by!Recanati.!His!aim!in!describing!the!possible!positions!! 134!




instance,! use! the! framework! to! argue! in! favour! of! moving! as! close! as!
possible! to! the! extreme! radical! contextualism! described! in! meaning!
eliminativism! and! as! far! away! from! moderate,! or! ‘modular’,! forms! of!
contextualism.! Such! an! extreme! position! faces! many! objections,! some! of!
which! are! addressed! in! the! closing! remarks! of! this! chapter;! I! discuss!
detailed!solutions!in!chapters!to!come.!But!first,!I!endeavour!to!illustrate!
radical! contextualism! with! some! concrete! proposals.! Any! particular!
proposal! in! lexical! pragmatics! is! unlikely! to! fit! neatly! with! one! specific!











semantic! contents! that! are! not! contextSrelative! (2007:! 59);! secondly,! he!
looks! to! frame! his! approach! within! the! action! tradition.! As! mentioned!
earlier!in!this!chapter!(section!3.2),!Bosch!joins!Clark!in!viewing!the!field!of!
language! studies! as! divided! into! two! traditions:! a! ‘product’,! or! sentenceS





















of! limiting! the! information! accessible! to! the! language! user! to! linguistic+
knowledge,! and! privileging! linguistic+ processes! of! interpretation,! as! the!












claim! is! that! what! is! missing! from! these! accounts! is! the! realisation! that!
language!processing!is!not!only!the!processing!of+language.!In!other!words,!
it! does! not! only! involve! the! processing! of! information! from! linguistic!







that! the! lexical! entry! is! rather! only! a! pointer! to! a! lexical! concept! that!




gradient! seems! to! serve! to! place! Bosch’s! perspective! farther! out! than!
standard! relevance! theory’s! quasiScontextualism! and! somewhere! on! the!
radical!contextualist!side!of!the!divide.!His!mention!of!a!lexical!entry!might!
suggest!compatibility!with!the!description!given!of!the!wrong!format!view;!
but! other! considerations,! such! as! his! construal! of! ‘polysemy’,! discussed!
below,!might!suggest!a!more!radical!position.!!
Bosch’s!original!contribution!is!the!deconstruction!of!the!traditional!









80!It! would! undoubtedly! be! of! interest! to! present! these! accounts! and! detail! Bosch’s!
criticisms!but!limits!of!time!and!space!do!not!allow!for!this.!! 137!
contextSdependency! were! too! limited.! Kaplan! proposed! a! short! list! of!
explicit!indexicals,!which!depended!on!the!context!of!the!utterance!for!their!
truthSevaluable!content,!and!this!was!expanded!by!Perry!to!some!implicit!
constituents! (also! called! ‘unarticulated’! constituents)! that! functioned! like+

























81!According! to! Perry! (1998),! ‘since! rain! occurs! at! a! time! in! a! place,! there! is! no! truthS
evaluable!proposition!unless!a!place!is!supplied’!(p.!9;!see!also!Perry!and!Blackburn,!1986).!


















is! raining! in! exactly! the! same! way! in! all! four! contexts! and! that! there! is!
nonetheless! a! difference! in! what! the! verb! ‘rain’! contributes.! From! such!
examples,!Bosch!concludes!that!the!observed!variations!in!truth!conditions!







which! they! appear,! Bosch! suggests! attributing! the! variations! in! truth!
conditions! directly! to! ‘the! differences! in! conceptual! representations! that!
result!from!differences!in!the!utterance!context’!(2007:!58).!Critically,!this!
implies! dispensing! with! semantic! contents! that! are! not! contextSsensitive!



























approaches! it! is! the! enriched! ‘work’! that! is! truthSconditionally! relevant.!














know! what! a! concept! denotes! does! not! come! primordially! from! what! is!
commonly!considered!lexical+information,!suggesting!instead!that!contextual!
information! concurrent! with! utterances! is! the! key! source.! In! (2007),! he!
proposes! to! call! the! contextual! referents! or! contextSsensitive! semantic!
values!of!expressions!‘contextual!concepts’,!but!again,!nothing!more!than!a!
‘rough! sketch’! is! given! of! these! ‘contextual+ concepts’! as+ conceptual+
constructs.!!
As!suggested!above,!while!it!is!easy!to!see!signs!of!the!wrong!format!
view! in! Bosch’s! proposal,! because! he! contemplates! different! possible!
contents!for!lexical!entries!in!the!WORK!example!and!explains!polysemy!as!
the! product! of! the! combination! of! underspecified! lexical! representations!
and! contextual! effects,! I! would! argue! that! his! position! is! too! radically!
contextualist!to!be!best!described!as!a!wrong!format!view.!It!is!important!
not!to!miss!the!fact!that,!as!Bosch!discusses!the!notions!of!lexical!entries!and!
lexical! representations,! he! rejects! them,! at! least! as! they! are! traditionally+







To! see! this,! consider! Bosch’s! double! claim! that! the! construction!
process! of! occasionSspecific! senses! requires! general! reasoning! and! that!






use,! then! it! would! effectively! be! the! case! that,! as! Bosch! defends,! the!









‘work’,! for! instance,! that! allows! us! to! differentiate! between! possible!





the! nature! of! word! meaning! (Carston,! 2012,! 2013).! As! these! articles!
arguably!revisit!and!extend!on!her!(2002a)!‘concept!schema’!proposal!(§!
3.3.3),!I!begin!this!section!with!a!short!review!of!that!proposal.!Very!briefly,!
the! standard! relevanceStheoretic! linguistic! semantics! model! holds! that!
literal,!‘core’!word!meanings!exist!and!that!their!role!is!to!determine!the!
linguistically! specified! denotations! of! words.! This,! together! with! the! idea!
that! words! encode! (atomic)! concepts! like! those! that! serve! as! the!
constituents!of!our!thoughts!(in!Mentalese)!is!challenged!by!the!observation!
that!the!thoughts!we!communicate!with!use!of!words!like!‘happy’!are!not!
ever! general! and! abstract! thoughts! but! rather! always! ‘specific! sorts’! of!
thoughts! that! have! ‘ad! hoc’! concepts! (i.e.,! HAPPY*,! HAPPY! **)! as! their!
constituents.! The! standard! account! holds! that! a! general! and! abstract!
concept!HAPPY!is!the!(partial)!input!to!the!pragmatic!process!that!has!the!
specific! sorts! of! HAPPY! as! output,! this! however,! assumes! that! there! is! a!



















this! lexical! meaning! modulated! by! pragmatic! processes! is! conceptual,! or!










83!In! my! own! account,! there! is! no! abstract,! contextSindependent! concept! HAPPY! because!
concepts!themselves!are!contextSdependent!(as!I!discuss!in!chapter!4,!sections!4.4!and!4.5),!
but! I! also! explain! why! we! are! convinced!and+act+as+if+! ‘core’! and! abstract! concepts,! or!
‘concept!essences’!exist!in!a!subsection!on!‘psychological!essentialism’!(chapter!4,!§!4.3.4).!!! 143!
recruitment!into!an!interpretation.!This!proposal!is!contextualist,!under!the!
description! I! have! developed! here,! insofar! as! it! does! not! construe!
modulation! as! optional;! and! it! is! a! moderate! contextualism! insofar! as!
Carston! (2012,! 2013)! still! assumes! that! contextSindependent! word!
meanings! exist:! she! cites! as! one! of! her! objectives! the! exploration! of! ‘the!
nature!of!the!contextSfree!word!meaning’!that!serves!the!pragmatic!process!
of!occasionSspecific!meaning!construction!as!input.!Naturally,!much!as!in!the!
(2002a)! section! on! ‘word! meaning! and! concepts’,! in! the! course! of! the!
discussion,!multiple!possible!answers!to!the!question!of!the!nature!of!word!
meaning!are!discussed,!and!Carston!seems!drawn!to!options!that!point!to!
occasionSspecific! meaning! construction! processes! that! completely! bypass!
the!need!of!anything!like!a!stable!meaning!associated!with!a!word;!these!




Carston! (2012)! organises! the! possibilities! she! examines! along! a!
gradient! much! in! the! same! way! as! Recanati.! She! describes! the! first!
possibility!as!evidenced!by!Jerry!Fodor!(1998)!and!what!I!have!called!the!
standard+relevance!theoretic!position!(Sperber!and!Wilson,!1986/95,!1998):!
word! meanings! are! concepts! and! words! can+ and+ do+ sometimes+ simply!
express!the!concepts!they!encode.!The!second!position!introduces!the!idea!


















the! construction! of! occasionSspecific! senses! involves! adopting! a! specific!
model! of! memory.! In! meaning! eliminativism,! contextSindependent! wordS
type! (linguistic)! meaning! does! not! exist;! only! contextualised! senses! exist!
(see!figure!1,!§!3.5.1);!the!multipleStrace!memory!model!Recanati!refers!to!
holds!that!we!keep!these!contextualised!senses!in!memory!in!the!form!of!
traces+ of+ episodes! of! distinct! occasions! of! language! use.! As! described! in!
chapter!2!(§!2.7.3),!these!‘memory!traces’!can!be!selectively!activated!and!







The! second! possibility! mentioned! by! Carston! (2012)! for! what! a!
















disposal! is! their! ‘sensitivity! to! context! and! commonSsense’! which! allows!
them!to!build!reasonable!interpretations!for!words!and!expressions!for+the+
purposes+ at+ hand.! Rayo! describes! these! grabSbags! as! containing! ‘mental!
items:! ! memories,! mental! images,! pieces! of! encyclopaedic! information,!
pieces!of!anecdotal!information,!mental!maps,!and!so!forth’!(2013:!648).!!
In!view!of!the!contents!of!grabSbags,!I!would!argue!that!these!two!
seemingly! different! possibilities! for! what! constitutes! the! input! to!
construction! processes! are! actually! complementary+ aspects+ of+ a! single!
essentially!meaning!eliminativist!approach.!As!the!chapter!on!memory!will!



























not! the! case! in! Rayo! or! Bosch’s! accounts.! Carston! also! mentions! a! key!
advantage!to!Rayo’s!approach!(that!has!its!parallel!in!Bosch’s!account):!‘an!
immediate!and!simple!solution!to!the!polysemy/metonymy!problem’.!This!
solution! involves! grabSbags! that! are! put! together! differently! on! each!
occasion!of!use.!Instead!of!the!words!or!expressions!pointing!to!anything!
like! a! contextSindependent! meaning! as! the! (even! partial)! input! to! the!
construction!process,!in!the!grabSbag!model,!the!subject!freely!selects!what!
comes! to! mind! in! accordance! with! ‘common! sense! and! sensitivity! to!
context’.!A!look!at!how!this!approach!handles!examples!such!as!‘stop’!and!
‘novel’! suggests! a! very! direct! occasionSspecific! construction! process.! For!
instance,!interpreting!the!word!‘stop’!in!an!utterance!would!not!necessarily!
involve!any!grammatical!information!associated!with!‘stop’!(that!is,!different+








possible! senses! to! be! the! basic,! core! meaning! of! a! polysemous! word!








the! proposal! Carston! has! already! considered! in! her! section! on! ‘Word!
meaning! and! concepts’! (2002a),! discussed! above! (§! 3.3.3);! among! other!
things,!the!acquisition!story!for!concept!schemas!is!still!unclear:!how!is!a!
child!supposed!to!learn!an!abstract!schema!(for!HAPPY,!for!instance)!that!is!
other! than! the! concepts! (HAPPY*,! HAPPY**,! etc.)! that! actually! figure! in! her!
thoughts?!This!would!presuppose!that!the!child!extracts!an!adult!schematic!




the! child! can! extract! type! meanings! from! concrete! experiences! with!
occasionSspecific!senses;!the!problem!is!that,!even!supposing!she!can,!it!still!
does! not! mean! that! these! capacities! are! employed! towards! creating! an!
abstract! schematic! wordStype! meaning! that! serves! ‘as! a! gateway’! in!
understanding! occasionSspecific! meanings.! Rather,! I! will! defend! the! view!
that,! much! as! in! Recanati’s! meaning! eliminativist! position,! processes! of!
abstraction!and!extraction!are!part!of!an!occasionSspecific!word!meaning!
construction!process!that!takes!‘contextualised!senses’!as!input!without!the!
need! for! anything! like! a! wordStype! contextSindependent! (schematic)!
meaning.!
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Carston! seems! to! suggest! that! the! way! forward! is! to! continue! to! ‘take!





hand,! Carston’s! (2012)! closing! suggestion! is! that! these! possibilities! be!







for! caution! is! also! supported! by! the! fact! that! it! is! much! easier! to! argue!
against! the! existence! of! contextSindependent! word! meaning! than! to!
formulate! a! detailed! alternative.! So! it! is! one! thing! to! reject! the! more!
traditional!outlooks!on!word!meaning!in!context!in+view+of+the+evidence,!but!
it! is! quite! another! to! propose! an! alternative! that! can! resist!
counterarguments.!That,!however,!is!what!I!propose!to!do.!In!chapter!4,!I!
revisit!the!notion!of!‘concept’,!through!the!research!done!by!psychologists!
on! categorisation! among! other! things,! and! I! offer! an! account! of! ad! hoc!
concepts! in! line! with! the! most! radical! contextualists! presented! in! this!
chapter.!Discussions!in!chapter!4!will!reveal!the!need!for!a!chapterSlong!
discussion!of!memory!(chapter!5).!What!I!propose!in!the!last!subsection!of!
this! chapter! is! a! detailed! presentation! of! François! Recanati’s! notion! of!
‘semantic! potential’.! My! aim! is! to! show! that! the! eliminativist! approach!
proposes!an!alternative!to!traditional!approaches!to!word!meaning!beyond!
‘eliminating’! the! notion! of! a! contextSindependent,! standing,! linguisticallyS
specified!word!meaning.!!
3.5.4%Recanati’s%‘Semantic%Potential’%
François! Recanati! is! an! important! theorist! comfortable! with! radically!
contextualist! ideas! and! an! essential! source! for! developing! a! meaning!
eliminativist!position.!As!discussed!at!the!beginning!of!this!chapter!(section!
3.3! on! ‘the! first! stage’! of! contextualism),! he! has! made! important!
contributions!to!cognitive!pragmatics!and!has!proven!key!in!the!onSgoing!
challenges! to! the! framework! established! by! formal! semantics.! In! this!! 149!
subsection,! I! focus! on! one! of! his! most! important! contributions! for! my!
purposes:!the!notion!of!‘semantic!potential’.!As!I!develop!it!here,!it!is!largely!
compatible!with!contextualism!in!general!and!with!the!notions!presented!so!
far! in! this! third! stage.! It! is! part! of! the! action! tradition/contextualist!
framework!insofar!as!it!stresses!the!importance!of!utterance!and!speaker!
meaning! and! rejects! the! idea! that! pragmatic! and! semantic! processes! are!
insulated! from! one! another;! it! is! a! radical! contextualism! insofar! as! it!




linked! to! fixed! sets! of! conditions! of! application,! but! rather,! that! truthS
conditions! are+ arrived+ at+ as+ part+ of,! or! better,+ as+ a+ result+ of+ the!




Miller! in! their! work! on! ‘norm! theory’! (Kahneman! and! Miller,! 1986).86!I!
introduce! their! theory! here! as! a! brief! detour! because,! despite! not! being!
mentioned!by!Recanati,!it!is!particularly!useful!in!giving!a!clear!account!of!







own+ norm.! For! Kahneman! and! Miller,! ‘norms’! serve! two! functions:! to!




he! received! a! Nobel! Prize! in! 2002,! (for! a! general! introduction,! see! Kahneman,! 2011!
Thinking,+fast+and+slow).!!! 150!










in! language! processing,! let’s! think! back! to! the! ‘intelligent! dog’! example.!
Waismann!chooses!the!combination!of!DOG!+!INTELLIGENT!precisely!because!
to! him! it! is! surprising,! I! can! now! add! that! surprise,! as! defined! by! norm!
theory,!is!the+failure+to+make+sense+of+an+experience.!The!combination!is!so!
novel! to! Waismann,! that! he! feels! compelled! to! ask! the! speaker! for!
clarification.!With!this!clarification,!and!some!quick!thinking!on!his!own,!
Waismann! constructs! a! set! of! norms,! or! a! framework,! that! make! the!
utterance!less!abnormal!and!therefore!more!understandable!to!him!in!that!
context.!Norm!theory!posits!that!this!is!achieved!by!‘aggregating’!a!set!of!
representations! selectively! recruited! for+ the+ context+ at+ hand.! Notice! the!
similarities!between!relevance!theory’s!ad!hoc!concepts,!Bosch’s!contextual!
concepts,!Rayo’s!grabSbag!and!‘generating!frameworks!of!evaluation’!for!the!
purposes! at! hand.! In! chapter! 4,! much! more! will! be! said! about! how!
aggregating! selectively! recruited! representations! can! answer! questions!
about! categorisation! and! concepts.! For! now,! the! important! point! is! that!
meaning! eliminativism! is! potentially! supported! by! a! theory! (i.e.,! ‘norm!
theory’)!which!holds!that!it!is!not!so!much!that!norms,!or+meanings,+do!not!



















new! notion! of! just! what! is! associated! with! a! word! or! expression! of! a!
particular! language.! Following! Recanati,! I! suggest! that! addressing! this!
involves!two!notions!he!has!introduced:!contextualised!senses!and!semantic!
potential.! Contextualised! senses,! presented! above! (§! 3.5.1),! are! those!
occasionSspecific!meanings!a!word!(or!expression)!assumes!or!expresses!(or!
is! taken! to! express)! in! a! particular! context.! Critically,! contextualists! in!
general,!not!only!those!of!a!more!radical!stripe,!accept!the!existence!of!such!
occasionSspecific,! or! contextualised! senses.! In! a! wrong! format! view,!
contextualised! senses! are! supposed! to! serve! as! input! to! those! extraction!
processes! implied! by! the! idea! that! there! is! a! contextSindependent!
(conceptual)!schematic!standing!meaning!for!words.!In!Carston’s!(2002a)!
proposal,!for!instance,!these!contextualised!senses!are!the!input!the!child!
would! have! at! her! disposal! for! the! task! of! extracting! an! adult! schematic+
wordStype!meaning,!something!problematic!by!Carston’s!own!admission.!In!
meaning! eliminativism! this! problem! and! related! problems! are! simply!
avoided.!It!is!not!assumed!that!it!is!possible!or!necessary!to!extract!a!sense!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87!Importantly,! this! ad! hoc! concept! construction! process! can! follow! Barsalou’s! original!
notion!of!ad!hoc!concept!construction!in!which!a!conceptual!content!is!the!end!result!and!
the! input! is! unconstrained! by! encoded! concepts! or! anything! that! qualifies! as! linguistic,!
contextSindependent!word!meaning.!! 152!





equates! it! with! the! notion! of! contextualised! senses:! it! is! nothing! like! a!
definition!or!conditions!of!application!and!it!integrates!anything+arrived!at!
as!part!of!an!interpretation.!Recanati!suggests!that!it!is!the!collection!of!
situations! in! which! a! speaker! has! observed! the! particular! word! or!






















language! learner! (or! everyday! speaker/reader)! learns+ as! his! experience!
with! language! increases.! Recanati! calls! the! collection! of! legitimate,! valid!! 153!
uses! of! the! predicate! P! which! represent! the! semantic! potential! for! a!
particular! predicate! the! ‘sourceSsituations’! and! the! situation! the! speaker!
may!want!to!apply!the!predicate!to!the!‘targetSsituation’.!With!these!two!
further!notions,!a!very!interesting!explanation!of!context!dependence!can!be!










far,! that! need! to! be! discussed! before! a! full! defence! of! an! eliminativist!
position! can! be! offered.! One! particularly! thorny! issue,! the! notion! of!





pointing! out! that! without! saying! in! what! respect! something! is! like!
something! else,! similarity! can! be! quite! empty.! In! Chapter! 4,! however,! I!
introduce! Tversky’s! notion! of! similarity! and! argue! that! adequately+
contextualised,!similarity!is!well!constrained.!In!that!chapter,!I!also!define!






senses! when! constructing! occasionSspecific! senses! for! the! words! and!








selected! to! justify! the! similarity! between! sourceSsituations! and! targetS










justify! applying! ‘bath’! in! his! mind! might! not! be! those! of! the! language!
community! at! large.! But,! as! his! experience! with! language! grows,! he! will!
accumulate! sourceSsituations! eventually! resulting! in! correct! use! and! this!
usually! by! the! time! production! begins.! Many! researchers! have! now!
recognised! the! importance! of! modelling! child! language! acquisition! as!
gradual;! grasping! the! meaning! of! a! word! is! not! an! allSorSnone!
accomplishment! but! rather! accumulative! over! exposures.! The! semantic!
potential!notion!offers!a!way!of!conceptualising,!not!only!why!learning!must!
be!progressive,!but!also!the!kind!of!associations!that!the!child!accumulates!




in! modelling! figurative! language! use.! A! truly! novel! and! figurative! use! is!
difficult!to!interpret,!or!purely!‘evocative’,!insofar!as!there!are!few!or!no!! 155!
sourceSsituations! to! call! on! when! interpreting! it.! The! interpretation! of!
established!or!‘conventionalised’!metaphors,!on!the!other!hand,!can!rely!on!




metaphors.! These! examples! are! not! meant! as! an! exhaustive! catalogue! of!
possible! applications! of! semantic! potential,! but! are! intended! merely! to!
clarify!the!notion!by!illustration.!!
3.6(Closing(Remarks(
The! aim! of! this! chapter! has! been! to! bring! together! the! complex! set! of!
contributions! to! the! topic! of! word! meaning! from! theorists! working! in!














consensus! within! the! field,! we! must! explore! the! logical! limits! of! this!
phenomenon,!and!stay!open!to!the!radical!consequences!it!might!bring.!I!am!





from! the! assumption! that,! while! words! in+ use! have! contextual! meaning,!




processes,! there! is! a! division! between! what! is! touched! by! pragmatic!
processes!and!what!is!not:!between!the!encoded!concepts!that!remain!fixed!
and! the! ad! hoc! concepts! that! are! occasionSspecific.! Only! a! strict! division!
between! semantics! and! pragmatics,! with! pragmatics! subordinated+ to+
semantics,! can! justify! such! a! division.! Perhaps! the! work! on! meaning!
modulation!has!revealed,!not!that!linguistic!meanings!are!static!and!fixed!
before! they! are! used! in! context,! but! rather! that! contextSindependent!
meanings!are!a!chimera,!real!only!in!the!linguist’s!and!language!enthusiast’s!





existence! of! contextSindependent! meanings! in! no! way! equates!
communicating!with!words!to!communicating!with!‘kicks!under!the!table!
and!taps!on!the!shoulder’,!in!the!words!of!Stanley!(2000:!396).!My!view!is!
‘eliminativist’! in! that! it! challenges! the! assumption! of! strictly! linguistic!
information/meanings!perfectly!separate!from!the!use!to!which!they!are!
put.!But!it!is!multiplicativist,!if!I!may,!in!that,!following!the!action!tradition,!it!
approaches! the! phenomena! from! the! opposite! direction:! it! starts! with!
language!in+use!where!meanings!multiply!as!occasions!of!use!multiply;!the!
extent! to! which! they! can! vary! is! limited! only! by! speakers’! tendency! to!
converge!and!conform.!If!we!see!convention!as!no!more!than!‘a!regularity!of!
behaviour’!and!entrenched!formSmeaning!pairs!as!‘solutions!to!recurring!
coordination! problems’,! as! suggested! by! Beckner! et! al! (2009),! HansSJörg!
Schmid!(2008),!and!the!action!tradition!in!general,!we!see!that!when!we!! 157!
communicate! using! words,! we! not! only! benefit! from! past! regularities!
produced!in!the!course!of!countless!interactions,!but!we!also!greatly!benefit!






contextSdependent,! occasion! specific! word! meanings! (i.e.,! the! relevance!




model.! Furthermore,! these! alternatives! do! not! disrupt! the! foundational!
principles! of! relevance! theory,! as! psychological! plausibility! is! still!






There! are! still! considerable! challenges! in! developing! this! new!
account.!Support!seems!dispersed!in!the!writings!of!very!different!theorists:!
Recanati,! Rayo,! Barsalou,! Bosch,! Kahneman! and! Miller! seem! to! arrive! at!
proposals! compatible! with! certain! radically! contextualist! views!
independently!of!each!other.!Recanati’s!meaning!eliminativism,!the!only!one!
of!these!that!explicitly!adopts!eliminativism+visSàSvis!any!kind!of!contextS
independent! linguisticallySspecified! word! meanings! and! discusses! the!
consequences!for!theorising!on!word!meaning!in!context,!has!not!often!been!
discussed!in!the!literature!and,!to!my!knowledge,!no!one!within!pragmatics,!




traditional! semantics/pragmatics! divide! and! winning! support! for!
eliminativism!will!be!easy,!but!there!is!one!major!objection!that!I!believe!I!
can! address:! namely,! the! worry! that,! without! some+ kind! of! contextS
independent! input! into! the! construction! process,! whether! it! be! contextS




following! chapter! to! present! evidence! in! support! of! the! idea! that! our!
cognition! is! wellSequipped! with! construction! processes,! which! we! can!
describe!as!pragmatic!or+as+part+of+our+general+reasoning,!that!produce!not!
only! the! occasionSspecific! meanings! for! our! language! comprehension!
processes! but! all! sorts! of! contextSdependent,! occasionSspecific! structures!
that!support!our!interpretations!and!processing!of!all!the!objects!and!events!
in! the! stream! of! our! experience.! Among! the! structures! created! are!










in! this! chapter.! The! main! focus! of! chapter! 3! was! the! contributions! of!
contextualist!approaches!to!word!meaning!in!context.!In!view!of!the!results,!
I! made! a! case! for! a! particularly! radical! form! of! contextualism:! meaning!
eliminativism.!The!main!aim!of!this!chapter!is!to!provide!a!detailed!account!
of! the! psychological! framework! in! which! I! see! my! own! radically!
contextualist,! meaning! eliminativist,! approach! working.! As! mentioned!




has! proposed! a! fully! worked! out! account! using! Recanati’s! notions! of!
‘contextualised!senses’!and!‘semantic!potential’;!this!is!probably!due!to!the!







processes! of! occasionSspecific! word! meaning! construction! and! utterance!
comprehension.! My! account! postulates,! much! like! Fodor’s,! that! word!




previous! chapter,! I! suggest! reSexamining! the! contextSdependence! of!
concepts! themselves! as! a! necessary! step! in! a! full! account! of! the! contextS
dependence! of! word! meaning.! Finally,! as! suggested! at! the! end! of! the!









word! meaning.! To! make! a! solid! case! for! this,! however,! the! evidence!






attempts! a! brief! but! thorough! presentation! of! the! most! important!
contributions! in! the! study! of! categorisation! for! my! purposes.! Lastly,! I!
propose!a!comprehensive!account!of!categories!and!concepts!that!joins!key!
contributions! from! the! philosophers! and! language! theorists! of! previous!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88!I! also! take! it! as! uncontroversial! that! concepts,! insofar+as+they+apply+to+things,! are,! or!









chapters! with! the! contributions! of! psychologists! (section! 4.4,! ‘Barsalou’s!
comprehensive!account!of!categorisation’).!One!of!the!main!challenges!of!
this!chapter!is!that!technical!terms!at!the!heart!of!the!discussion!are!taken!to!
mean! very! different! things! depending! on! the! perspective! adopted.! In! an!
effort!to!give!as!clear!a!presentation!of!my!account!as!possible,!the!first!
section!of!this!chapter!therefore!offers!a!brief!discussion!and!disambiguation!









classify! different! shades! or! intensities! of! blue! as! falling! under! BLUE.! This!













world! is! in! abstract! form;! in! other! words,! that! our! longSterm! memory!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90!As!a!reminder!of!my!conventions,!I!put!technical!terms!in!single!quote!marks!when!I!first!
introduce! them! and! thereafter! only! when! needed.! Small! capitals! are! used! for! concepts,!
small!capitals!in!italics!for!categories!and!italics!for!criteria!or!features.!!! 162!
contains! stable,! invariant! representations! of! categories! and! perfectly!
delimitated! concepts! instead! of! undifferentiated! information.! Despite! the!







come! from,! or! how! and+ when! abstract! ideas! and! concepts! are! created.!
Answering! these! questions! is! particularly! important! to! building! an!
eliminativist! approach! to! word! meaning! since,! on! the! one! hand,!
eliminativism! denies! that! the! construction! process! outputting! occasionS
specific!senses!of!‘blue’!needs!an!abstract!concept!BLUE!as!input!and,!on!the!
other!hand,!claims!that!it!can!take!particular!contextualised!senses!stored!in!
memory! as! input! and! create! a! new! occasionSspecific! sense! for! ‘blue’! as!
output.!!
A! very! important! part! of! this! chapter! is,! therefore,! to! show! that,!
instead!of!taking!‘abstractions’!as!the!input!to!our!construction!processes,!as!
previously!assumed,!we!can!begin!to!see!that!our!cognitive!systems!are!set!





importantly,! they! do! not! undertake! the! roles! previously! assumed.! This!
possibility!was!already!evoked!in!the!very!last!section!of!chapter!3!where!I!
presented! recent! thinking! on! reasoning,! decisionSmaking! and! language!
interpretation! suggesting! that! making! decisions,! evaluating! a! particular!
scene,!and!making!sense!of!an!utterance,!for!instance,!do!not!depend!on!the!
retrieval! of! preScomputed! ‘norms’,! but! that! the! process! of! interpretation!
generates! its! own! structures! (frameworks! of! evaluation,! categorical!









research! is! relevant,! not! only! because! it! helps! to! dispel! some!
misunderstandings!regarding!possible!interpretations!of!this!research,!but!
because!the!field!has!evolved!in!such!a!way!as!to!point!to!an!account!of!
concepts! that! is! highly! compatible! with,! and! thus+ offers+ support+ to,! the!
contextualist!and!radical!contextualist!accounts!presented!in!the!previous!






detailed.! First,! I! focus! on! prototypes:! among! the! possible! interpretations!
that! would! make! prototypes! singularly! important! to! theories! of! word!




and! sufficient! conditions! for! category! membership.! Thereafter,! however,!
two! difficulties! emerged:! first,! even! after! careful! thought! and! long!
deliberations,!philosophers!found!it!difficult!to!come!up!with!strict!criteria!
for! more! than! a! handful! of! terms;! secondly,! it! seemed! that! in! their!
categorising! behaviour,! competent! users! did! not! actually! rely! on! such!
defining!criteria.!Defining!criteria!simply!did!not!seem!to!be!playing!the!role!
originally!envisaged!for!them!in!the!traditional!account.!!With!the!arrival!of!
prototypes,! a! possible! solution! to! this! failure! was! envisaged:! since!! 164!
prototypes! are! very! much! like! definitions! in! that! they! name! criteria! for!
membership!to!a!class,!the!logic!of!definitions!could!in!part!be!preserved!in!






that! helped! some! psychologists! move! past! their! initial! interpretations! of!





and! unified! view! of! categorisation! behaviour.! Finally,! to! close! this! long!
second! section! of! this! chapter,! I! focus! on! the! notion! of! psychological!





A! third! major! section! of! this! chapter! will! then! bring! the! diverse!
contributions!together!and!offer!a!comprehensive!account!of!concepts!and!
categories.!This!section!will!take!up!where!chapter!3!left!off.!There,!I!claimed!

















at! his! disposal,! however,! is! the! means! of! creating! an! ad! hoc! category!
INTELLIGENT+BEINGS!that!does!include!them,!for!the!purposes!of!the!context!at!
hand.!Notice!that!the!process!assumed!here!is!very!much!like!the!relevanceS
theoretic! process! of! widening! and! narrowing! of! denotations,! but! the!
difference! is! that! the! input! is! not! any! linguisticallySspecified! standing!
meaning! of! ‘intelligent’.! Although! the! output! is! ultimately! an! occasionS










Jerry! Fodor! credits! Zenon! Pylyshyn! with! important! insights! into!
foundational!questions!regarding!cognitive!science.!Two!of!these!questions!
directly!regard!mental!representations:!‘What!kinds!of!things!are!mental!
representations?’! and! ‘How! do! mental! representations! have! content?’!
(Fodor,!2009:!ix).!There!are!broadly!two!stages!in!Pylyshyn’s!research!into!
mental!representations,!the!first!spanning!from!the!1970s!to!the!1980s!and!! 166!
the! second! culminating! with! the! 2009! publication! just! cited.! In! this!
subsection,!which!focuses!on!the!first!stage,!the!key!question!asked!is!what+
kind+of+things+mental+representations+could+be.!In!the!early!postSbehaviourist!
era,! the! idea! that! mental! representations! were! mental! images! was! very!
popular.!Pylyshyn!(1973),!however,!found!that,!despite!its!acceptance!and!
the! amount! of! research! it! inspired,! closer! inspection! revealed! that! the!





mental! representations! could! not! possibly! be! ‘images’! in! any! intelligible!






about+them,! and! that! mental! images! as! representations! are! supposed! to!
capture.! The! only! evidence! backing! up! the! mental! imagery! view! is! that!
subjects!report!experiencing!images!as!they!introspect!on!what!they!know.!
Yet,!that!this!subjective!experience!can!be!identified!with!actual!processing!












for! postulating! abstract! representations! inaccessible! to! conscious!
experience.!To!illustrate,!he!offers!the!following!example:!10!milliseconds!
suffice!for!a!subject!to!identify!a!letter!flashed!before!him!on!a!display,!but!it!
takes! more! than! 300! milliseconds! for! the! subject! to! name! the! letter.! He!
interprets!this!as!showing!that!while!it!takes!only!10!milliseconds!to!extract!
enough! information! from! a! visual! display! to! identify! a! letter,! this!
information,! arguably! because! of! the! format! it! is! in,! is! not! immediately!
available!to!speech!processes.!!
This!meshes!quite!well!with!the!then!received!view!of!knowledge!as!





1973! article,! particularly! with! respect! to! the! necessary! otherness! or!
‘abstractedness’!of!mental!representations.91!But!at!this!stage,!circa!1973,!
Pylyshyn! reasons! that! the! best! way! to! guarantee! that! mental!
representations! accurately! capture! what+ we+ know! about! the! world! is! to!
separate! them! from! our! experience! by! underlining! their! conceptual! or!
propositional!nature,!or,!in!other!words,!whatever!separates!them!from!the!
raw!data.!In!stark!contrast!to!the!‘picture’!metaphor,!he!concludes!that!the!
representations! that! arise! from! experience! with! the! world! must! not!




of! things! mental! representations! are,! Pylyshyn! answers! that! they! are!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!






Following! mainstream! thinking! in! cognitive! science! at! the! time,!
Pylyshyn! holds! that! the! interpretive! process! proceeds! via! typeStoken!




achieved! by! reducing! ‘raw’! data! into! types;! and,! second,! the! widespread!
belief!that!this!reduction!is!necessary!in!order!not!to!overload!memory.!As!a!
result,!the!types!in!Pylyshyn’s!(1973)!account!represent!the!abstractions!by!
which! all! sensory! experiences! are! interpreted! and! the! results! of! these!
interpretive! processes! are! themselves! abstract! because! the! particular!
instances! in! our! experience! token! abstract! types.! It! is! important! to!
remember! that! this! combined! view! of! mental! representations! and! typeS
token!pairings!leading!to!abstract!representations!became,!for!some!time,!
the!widely!accepted!position!in!cognitive!science.!!
The! particular! construal! of! the! notion! of! abstraction! it! assumes,!





















come! across! one! apple;! roughly,! according! to! one! possibility,! there! is! a!
perfect,!‘abstract’!form!APPLE!that!allows!something!like!recognition!to!take!
place:! the! type! APPLE! is! tokened! by! the! active! representation! of! the!
















these+ abstractions+ are+ formed! are! discussed! in! the! literature.! Lawrence!
Barsalou! (2003)! suggests! some! further! terminology! to! help! remedy! this!
situation.!The!starting!point!is!that!most!theorists!could!be!taken!to!share!




events! to! create! classes! and! extract! properties! from! their! contexts! of!





concrete.! For! instance,! the! perceptual! features! shared! by! APPLES! are! the!
perceptual! features! of! the! individual! items! labelled! as! APPLES,! so! more!
readily! available! to! our! senses.! Compare! this! with! FRUIT.! Superficial!
perceptual!features!are!not!helpful!in!the!same!way!for!FRUIT!as!they!were!
for! APPLE;! and! this! complication! is! only! magnified! in! immaterial! abstract!
concepts!like!PEACE.!!
The!categorising!behaviour!illustrated!above!is!thought!by!some!to!
depend! on! what! Barsalou! calls! ‘summary! representations’.! A! summary!
representation! for! APPLE! and! a! summary! representation! for! ORANGE,! for!




call! an! ‘abstract! summary’.! Depending! on! the! approach,! summary!
representations!can!range!from!very!strict!declarative!rules!held!in!longS
term! memory! to! more! flexible! forms! such! as! statistical! prototypes! and!
connectionists! attractors.! For! Barsalou,! those! who! claim! that! there! are!











tasks! while! largely! bypassing! the! need! for! preSexisting,! preScomputed!
‘summary!representations’.!!
The!next!key!issue!is!that,!until!quite!recently,!it!was!assumed!that!





particulars! of! the! experiences! with! apples! would! become! irrelevant,!
burdensome!to!memory!and!therefore,!for!reasons!of!economy,!better!lost!
than! stored.! The! issue! of! what! motivated! such! assumptions! is! given!
thorough!treatment!in!the!following!chapter!on!the!role!of!memory.!For!














instances),! creating! an! abstraction,! or! ‘summary! representation’! is! not!
necessarily!only!done!while!input!is!being!processed.!The!more!traditional,!
preSexemplar! era! models! of! abstract! representations! assume! that! all! the!
relevant!information!of!a!situation!can!be!extracted!as+the+situation+is+being+




are! somehow! preSequipped! with! infallible! organisational! principles! that!
allow! us! to! selectively! identify! at+ the+ time+ of+ initial+ processing+ what!















Before! moving! on! to! the! subsection! on! similarity,! I! briefly! return! to!









have! to! do! with! his! opposition! to! the! imagery! metaphor! of! mental! representation.! He!
thought! that! the! fundamental! misleading! implication! carried! by! the! notion! of! ‘mental!
images’!was!that!what!we!retrieve!from!memory!when!we!activate!‘mental!images’!is!like!
what!we!receive!as!input!from!our!senses,!that!is,!completely!undifferentiated,!raw!data!







we! can,! under! certain! conditions,! also! refer! to! or! represent! some!
things! without! representing! them! in! terms! of! concepts! (Pylyshyn,!
2009:!7,!see!also!2007).!!
A!typeStoken!pairing!requires!that!the!individual!visual!object!be!seen!as+
falling+ under+ a+ class,! but! in! the! early! stages! of! processing! a! scene,! the!
properties!that!would!warrant!this!classification!might!not!yet!have!been!
themselves! recognised.! In! other! words,! there! must! be! a! way! to! treat! an!








transforming! some! or! all! of! its! properties,! without! interrupting! the!
connection.! Pylyshyn’s! proposal! is! that! some! aspect! of! our! perceptual!
processes!allows!us!to!think!about!something!and!keep!track!of!it!without!
the!need!of!a!description!or!classification!of!it.!Something!in!the!world!is!
selected! by! our! perception! ‘because! it! drew! attention! to! itself’,! or,! as!
Pylyshyn!prefers,!because!it!‘grabbed’!one!of!the!indexes!called!FINSTs,!for!
FINgers!of!INSTantiation!(Pylyshyn,!2009:!5).!!
Work! on! this! proposal! has! led! Pylyshyn! to! reconsider! the!
conceptual/symbolic!mindSworld!relation!prevalent!in!cognitive!science!and!
in! his! own! earlier! approach.! Clearly,! if! something! can! be! tracked! and!
information! about! it! can! build! up! over! time! before! that! something! is!
represented! as! falling! under! a! description! or! class,! then! mental!
representations!are!not!always!necessarily!abstract!and!symbolic;!Pylyshyn!
is!forced!to!accept!the!thesis!of!nonconceptual!representation!that!he!had!! 174!
previously! rejected. 96 !He! still! rejects! the! position! that! mental!
representations!are!images!in!any!intelligible!sense,!but!he!now!admits!that!
you! can! refer! to! something! without! referring! to! it! as! a! thing! that! has!
particular! properties! and! that,! therefore,! warrants! a! particular!
categorisation.!This!is!an!advantage!if!you!want!to!offer!an!account!of!how!
mental!representations!get!their!content!since,!at!least!initially,!it!grounds!
the! mindSworld! connection! in! a! causal! relation,! instead! of! an!
evidential/semantic!one.!Once!the!connection!is!established,!it!is!easier!to!




Tversky’s! (1977)! influential! article.! This! seminal! piece! on! similarity!
statements! and! judgements! gives! similarity! a! central! role! in! human!
cognition:!‘It!serves!as!an!organizing!principle!by!which!individuals!classify!
objects,! form! concepts,! and! make! generalizations’! (p.! 327).! According! to!
Tversky,!however,!despite!the!importance!of!such!a!notion!for!psychological!
theory,!the!models!in!vogue!at!the!time!overlooked!crucial!characteristics!of!
similarity! statements! and! judgements! and! consequently! were! in! need! of!
revision.!!
The!axioms!of!the!‘geometric’!approach,!which!describes!similarity!






















features! are! not! necessarily! those! associated! with! the! necessary! and!
sufficient! conditions! of! the! classical! definitional! account.! ! They! can! be!
features!that!subjects!would!tend!to!associate!with!an!item!and!not!strictly!
necessary!of!the!category.!!Tversky!further!assumes!that!we!have!a!kind!of!





introduction! of! the! notion! of! a! script,! but! they! are! also! remarkable! for!
having!recognised!early!on!that!judgments!of!similarity!are!contingent!on!
general!reasoning!or!‘cognitive!capabilities’.!The!subject!must!have!some!
sense! of! the! significance! of! particular! features! in! order! to! ascertain! its!
relationship! to! the! rest! of! the! system.! To! illustrate,! imagine! that! we!





















actual! work;! rather,! similarity! is! like! a! blank,! or! a! slot! filled! out! by! a!
reference!frame!of!specific!respects.!Another!frequent!way!of!putting!this!
same!criticism!is!to!say!that!the!explanatory!work!in!tasks!of!similarity!is!
done! by! the! processes! selecting! attributes! (Murphy! and! Medin,! 1985).!

















This! section! takes! up! where! the! section! on! philosophical! versus!
psychological!theories!of!concepts!in!chapter!2!left!off.!In!that!section,!I!gave!
some!of!the!reasons!the!classical!approach!was!found!wanting!and!I!stated!
that! philosophers! and! psychologists! who! had! initially! jointly! agreed! to!
abandon!it!later!disagreed!fundamentally!on!the!way!forward!in!building!an!
adequate!alternative.!In!the!remainder!of!that!chapter,!I!then!focused!on!one!
particular! philosopher’s! theory! of! concepts! and! on! a! reformulation!
proposed!within!my!field:!lexical!pragmatics.!I!now!turn!to!psychological!
theories!of!concepts!and!categories.!!!
As! mentioned! in! chapter! 2,! psychologists’! interest! was! initially!
caught!by!the!fascinating!function!of!‘carving!nature!at!its!joints’,!or!in!other!
words,! by! the! everyday! but! nonetheless! astounding! human! capacity! to!





and! only+ one,! way! in! which! the! world! can! be! correctly! divided! up! into!
classes.!This!tradition!can!be!traced!all!the!way!back!to!Platonic!pure!forms!









fact! that! all! four! belong! to! the! category.! Under! the! classical! definitional!
account,! all! instances! of! the! category! VEGETABLE! are! supposed! to! share! a!
common!essence!and!thereby!possess!the!same!‘criterial!attributes’;!they!! 178!
should! therefore! be! equal! members! of! the! category.! Explaining! the! very!
robust! evidence! of! what! appeared! to! be! graded+membership! called! for! a!
radically!new!approach!to!categorisation.!A!new!area!of!research!was!born!
and,! in! a! very! short! space! of! time,! an! impressive! amount! of! empirical!
evidence!was!amassed!and!competing!interpretations!began!to!appear.!!
Categorisation!researchers!were!prolific:!there!are!extensive!lists!of!
theoretical! and! experimental! articles! and! countless! reviews! (besides! the!
references! given! throughout! this! chapter,! see! Smith! and! Medin,! 1981;!
Laurence!and!Margolis!1999;!Murphy,!2004,!and!references!therein).!Limits!
of!time!and!space!allow!only!a!mention!of!some!the!most!important!works!
pertaining! to! categorisation! research! and,! unfortunately,! not! a!
comprehensive!review.!My!objective!in!this!section!is!double:!to!give!a!brief!
and! clear! account! of! categorisation! research,! particularly! leading! up! to!
Barsalou’s!proposal!of!ad!hoc!categories!and!concepts,!and!to!underline!the!
ubiquity!of!contextSdependence.!!
The! story! is! not! one! of! homogenous! straightforward! progression;!
rather,!different!researchers!propose!very!different!theories!to!account!for!
similar! phenomena! and! consensus! is! far! from! immediate.! The!




analyses! that! are! irremediably! opposed,! they! represent! competing!
interpretations! and! approaches! that! progressively! take! more! data! into!
consideration! and! are! fineStuned! as! our! understanding! of! concepts! and!
categorisation!grows!over!time.!!
To!see!this!clearly,!I!follow!a!more!or!less!chronological!order.!The!









opposed! interpretations.! The! fourth! and! final! subsection! (§! 4.3.4)!
introduces!another!set!of!related!data!that!proves!vital!to!categorisation:!
similarity!judgments!do!not,!and+there+is+no+reason+why+they+should,+depend!













audiences! outside! of! psychology! were! mostly! only! aware! of! prototype!
theory! and! rarely! exposed! to! parallel! developments! in! categorisation!
research,!like,!for!instance!exemplar!models.!I!come!back!to!this!point!later!








everyday! categories! like! CLOTHES,! FURNITURE! and! VEGETABLES.! They! were!! 180!
instructed! to! judge! on! a! grade! from! 1! to! 7! ‘how! good’! an! exemplar! (or!
member)!of!the!category!a!particular!item!was.!Not!only!did!the!task!seem!
quite!natural!to!the!subjects!but!she!found!overwhelming!agreement!on!the!
ratings! among! subjects.98!Rosch! also! checked! that! the! ratings! did! not!
correlate! with! the! frequency! or! familiarity! of! the! items! on! the! lists.! Her!
objective!was!to!establish!that!ratings!are!robust!rather!than!accidental!so!
as!to!warrant!a!psychological!explanation!of!their!causes!and!consequences.!
In! other! words,! she! set! out! to! demonstrate! that! the! phenomena! are!




Subjects! did! answer! faster! to! members! rated! high! on! the! lists,! which!
supported! the! interpretation! that! not! all! instances! of! a! category! are!
equivalent! and! that! some! members! ‘represent! the! core! meaning! of! the!
category’!(Rosch,!1973:!135).!Rosch!concluded!that!this!inequality!amongst!
the!members!of!a!class!revealed!that!categories!had!internal!structure.!!
Rosch! (1975)! and! Rosch! and! Mervis! (1975)! further! investigated!
‘internal!structure’.!They!had!the!undergraduates!list!features!or!‘attributes’!
for!the!members!of!the!categories!rated!in!previous!experiments.!Contrary!










very! high! numbers! reported! by! Rosch! (a! correlation! of! 0.9)! is! an! effect! of! inadequate!









shared! by! other! edible! things,! and,! in! general,! would! not! allow! a! clear!
distinction!between!vegetables!and!fruit,!for!instance.!On!the!other!hand,!




members! of! a! class.! They! formulate! the! ‘family! resemblance! hypothesis’:!
natural! semantic! categories! are! networks! of! overlapping! features,! and! a!
particular!member!of!a!category!will!come!to!be!viewed!as!prototypical!of!
that!category!to!the!extent!that!its!properties!are!common!among!the!other!
members! of! that! category.! So,! in! our! reduced! example,! peas! would! be!
particularly!prototypical!because!they!are!green,!savoury,+eaten+cooked!and!
(most)+kids+do+not+like+them.!In!a!test!such!as!‘Xs!are!vegetables’!we!could!
expect! subjects! to! answer! significantly! faster! for! peas! compared! to!
mushrooms.!This!is!the!effect!of!the!prototypicality!of!peas.!In!other!words,!
prototypes!are!those!items!in!a!category!that!are!most!like!all!other!category!
members! and! this! makes! them! relatively! salient! or! representative.! The!
organisational!principle!at!the!heart!of!this!‘internal!structure’!is!that!items!








mental! images! of! typical! rather! than! atypical! members! of! that! category!
(Rosch,! Simpson! &! Miller,! 1976).! In! this! article,! prototypes! are! also!! 182!
described! as! ‘maximally! informative’,! or! as! the! ‘best! exemplars’! of! their!
class.!!
!
The! success! of! Rosch’s! account! was! immediate.! It! effectively,! if! not!
completely!or!permanently,!replaced!the!‘criterial!attributes’!account!of!the!
classical! definitional! approach.! It! offered! a! much! more! psychologically!
plausible!account!of!the!relations!between!features!and!categories.!It!did!
away!with!the!!
tenacious! tradition! of! thought! in! philosophy! and! psychology! which!
assumes!that!items!can!bear!a!categorical!relationship!to!each!other!










the! introduction! to! this! section,! my! view! is! that! categorisation! research!
advanced!in!stages!and!that!Rosch’s!account!is!only!part!of!the!first!stage!in!
a!relatively!long!list!of!contributions!by!psychologists.!I!claim!that,!because!
of! this,! interpretations! of! the! experimental! results! that! focus! on! only!
prototypes! are! best! considered! partial! until! later! stages! when! related!
phenomena,! such! as! exemplars,! the! effects! of! context! and! psychological!
essentialism!are!recognised.!The!particular!interpretation!of!prototypes!that!
was! heavily! criticised! was! the! one! that! took! it! that! since+prototypes+can+
represent+ conceptual+ information,! prototype! theory! should! be! taken! as!
advocating!the!notion!of!a+prototype!as!a!replacement!for!that!of!a+definition!
in!the!theory!of!concepts.!This!interpretation!has!taken!many!forms!in!the!
vast! amount! of! controversy,! criticisms! and! responses! it! has! generated.!
Fodor! and! his! colleagues! argue! against! it! by! pointing! out! all! the!! 183!
shortcomings! of! equating! prototypes! with! concepts;! most! importantly,!
prototypes!cannot!be!concepts!because!prototypes!do!not!compose!and,!as!
discussed! in! chapter! 2,! compositionality! is! a! sine! qua! non! condition! of!
concepts!in!Fodor’s!view.!Arguably,!however,!a!more!modest!interpretation!
of! Rosch’s! results! is! available:! there! is,! as! such,! no! autonomous! and!





way,! I! believe,! to! salvage! the! valuable! contributions! of! even! the! earliest!




prototype! effects;! it! is! an! uncontroversial! position! since! the! reality! and!
ubiquity!of!prototype!effects!are!accepted!by!all:!
The!discovery!of!the!massive!presence!of!prototypicality!effects!in!all!








not! necessarily! yet! provide! the! right! foundations.! In! my! view,! providing!
these! foundations! depends! on! reconsidering! the! role! played! by! contextS
dependence,!something!that!takes!us!far!away!from!prototype!theory.!This,!
however,! is! not! the! position! most! widely! adopted:! linguists! like! Dirk!
Geeraerts,! philosophers! like! Jesse! Prinz,! and! psychologists! like! James!
Hampton,!among!many!others,!prefer!to!keep!prototype!theory!as!a!base!! 184!














major! flaw:! in! Rosch’s! account,! context! plays! no! role! in! selecting! which!
exemplar!of!a!class!is!most!representative!for+a+particular+purpose,!or!which!
features! best! represent! a! class! given+ the+ task+ at+ hand.! Her! account! of!
prototypes! construes! them! as! fixed! and! stable.! Given! the! kind! of!
construction!processes!suggested!earlier!in!this!chapter!and!in!the!previous!







were! taken! into! consideration,! significant! variation! would! appear.! In! the!







prototypes! are! abstractions! created! by! the! subjects! in! the! countless!
experiments! of! categorisation! research;! in! later! sections,! I! add! contextS
dependency!to!the!considerations!of!how!these!abstractions!are!constructed!
in! dynamic! processes! of! categorisation.! There! are! significant! parallels!
between! my! views! on! word! meaning! and! on! categorisation! and! mental!
representation.!I!hope!that!as!this!chapter!advances!it!will!become!evident!




In! two! articles,! published! in! 1968! and! 1970,! Michael! Posner! and! Steven!
Keele!offer!one!of!the!first!reviews!of!evidence!leading!to!the!claim!that!
subjects! commonly! create! an! abstract+ prototype! to! help! them! correctly!











the! test! patterns! were! generated.! This! was! interpreted! by! some! as!
indicating! that! the! subjects! were! creating! schemas/prototypes! from! the!
series!of!patterns!to!serve!as!reference!points.!This!would!mean!that!once!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101!In! Posner! and! Keele’s! work,! there! are! two! uses! for! the! term! ‘prototype’.! First,! a!





such! an! abstract! prototype! had! been! extracted! from! the! evidence! given,!
their!subsequent!behaviour!during!categorising!tasks!could!be!explained!as!









the! patterns! can! also! be! recorded! in! memory.! Notice! that! this! last!
hypothesis!would!not!require!that!the!extraction!process!take!place!only!
during!learning!(Posner!&!Keele,!1968:!354).102!!
The! authors! designed! materials! and! conducted! a! series! of!
experiments! to! help! distinguish! between! these! two! hypotheses.! The!
materials! are! the! now! famous! ‘randomSdot! patterns’! constructed! by!
randomly! positioning! 9! dots! in! a! 30! X! 30! matrix! and! then! applying! a!
distortion! metric.! Posner! and! Keele’s! (1968,! 1970)! experiments! mostly!
include!a!study!or!‘learning’!phase!and!a!test!or!‘transfer’!phase.103!The!first!

























are! learning! about! the! original! patterns/prototypes! that! generated! the!
patterns.!They!again!had!subjects!study!lists!of!patterns!of!distorted!original!




created;! some! ‘old! distortions’,! that! is,! patterns! that! the! subjects! had!
memorized! during! the! study! phase;! some! ‘new! distortions’,! never! seen!
before!but!generated!from!the!same!prototypes!at!either!the!same!level!of!









generated! the! patterns! subjects! were! familiar! with.! Among! the! new!
patterns,! lowSlevel! distortions! were! more! accurately! categorized! than!














‘prototype’! is! not! created! during+ learning! it! can! still! be! created! during!




Another! two! experiments! in! the! 1970! article! further! test! whether! the!
prototype!is!created!during!learning!or!at!time!of!recognition.!Following!
Bartlett! (1932),! Posner! and! Keele! reason! that! forgetting! should! affect!
peripheral! information! more! than! central! information.! The! prediction! is!
that,!if!the!creation!of!the!prototype!takes!place!during!the!learning!phase,!
then! a! longer! delay! should! affect! how! well! the! individual! patterns! seen!




correlate! with! decreased! prototype! recognition.! The! results! of! the! two!
experiments!show!large!losses!in!recognition!of!the!old!distortions!but!little!










response! to! evidence! on! differential! forgetting! that! Douglas! Hintzman,! a!













theories! presented! above,! the! context! theory! of! classification! holds! that!
classification! judgments! are! based! not! on! prototypes! created! during!
learning!but!rather!on!the!stimuli!themselves!through!a!process!of!selective!
activation.! The! resemblance! between! this! proposal! and! ‘norm! theory’,!
presented!in!the!previous!chapter!(§!3.5.4),!is!not!coincidental.!Kahneman!
and!Miller!were!careful!readers!of!the!theorists!I!present!in!this!section!and!
explicitly! adopt! tenets! of! their! views.! From! a! combination! of! very! early!
smallSscale! demonstrations! like! those! of! Medin! and! Schaffer! (1978),! and!
Hintzman!and!Ludlam!(1980),!both!presented!below,!and!the!thinking!of!
people! like! Lawrence! Barsalou,! and! norm! theorists,! a! new! approach! to!
categorisation,! the! ‘exemplar! model’! was! born.! The! main! claim! is! that!
classification! judgments! like! those! described! in! prototype! theory! can! be!! 190!







that! because! each! object! or! event! can! selectively! activate! a! set! of!




so! much! depends! on! how! memory! is! construed! that! I! have! dedicated! a!
whole!chapter!to!that!discussion.!!
Here,!I!can!say!that!in!the!new!‘context!theory/exemplar’!framework,!





In! order! to! model! this! dynamic! mechanism! of! retrieval,! Douglas!
Medin! and! Marguerite! Schaffer! (1978)! adopt! Roger! Ratcliff’s! (1976)!









below! but! to! all! modern! dynamic! theories! of! memory.! It! allows! the!
integration!of!variables!such!as!the!strategies!that!subjects!use,!the!effects!of!! 191!
attention,! and! the! fact! that! memories! are! not! necessarily! veridical.!




was! later! needed.! Replaying! or! reSviewing! is! still! not! possible! in! this!
approach.!We!have!no!conscious!access!to!the!information!in!our!memory.!
We!create!mental!representations!that!use!memory!traces!but!that!are!not!
















and! A2=1010.! That! is,! TWO! LARGE! RED! TRIANGLES! and! TWO! LARGE! RED!
CIRCLES;!and!two!patterns!that!belong!in!category!B:!B1=!0001!and!
B2=1100.!That!is,!ONE!SMALL!BLUE!CIRCLE!and!TWO!SMALL!RED!TRIANGLES.!!
Furthermore,! suppose! that! the! subject! in! this! particular! experiment! has!
selectively!attended!to!colour!and!form!so!that!his!mental!representations!of!
the!stimuli!are!as!follows:!
111?! !A!(A1)!! 10?0! A!(A2)!! 192!
00?1! !B!(B1)!! 110?! B!(B2)104!
Now!suppose!a!new!pattern!is!presented:!1101!(ONE!!SMALL!RED!TRIANGLE).!
The!context!model!holds!that!this!pattern!serves!as!a!probe!that!selectively!






the! model! therefore! predicts! that! this! would! be! the! next! most! likely!
exemplar!to!be!retrieved.!!






predictions! for! the! two! alternative! views:! prototype! theories! and! the!
context!model.!According!to!the!prototype!models,!a!pattern!that!is!closer!to!
the!central!tendency!for!a!class!should!be!classified!faster!and!with!fewer!














category! prototype.! They! call! for! a! more! parsimonious! model! where! the+
same+mental+representation+created+at+the+time+of+the+event! (the! memory!
‘trace’!of!the!event),!and!not!necessarily!an!abstract!prototype,!can!be!called!




now! on.! Medin! and! Schaffer’s! (1978)! article! was! widely! read! and! has!
generated! much! debate.! The! next! two! sections! present! two! of! the! many!
responses.!First,!there!is!some!supporting!evidence!from!Douglas!Hintzman!
and!Genevieve!Ludlam!(1980).!As!a!top!researcher!in!the!field!of!memory,!








forgetting.! That! is,! the! observation! that! performance! in! classifying! the!
prototype!of!a!category!seems!to!suffer!less!from!the!effects!of!a!retention!
interval!than!performance!on!the!exemplars!themselves.!This!was!the!main!
result! of! Posner! and! Keele! (1970),! which! I! announced! would! be!




exemplar! models! and! further! develops! the! consequences! for! theories! of!
memory.! ! The! authors! create! a! computer! model! that! both! records! only!
exemplars,! instead! of! exemplars! plus! prototypes! and! can! simulate!
differential! forgetting.! The! model! clearly! belongs! to! a! particular! class! of!! 194!
exemplar!models,!called!‘multipleStrace!memory!models’!which!hold!that!




are! yellow,+ blue,+ triangle! and! square.! The! relation! in! this! case! is! bigger+
than/smaller+than.!Both!new!stimuli!and!memory!traces!are!represented!as!
property!and!relation!strengths;!in!the!examples!handled!by!Hintzman!and!










it! would! simultaneously! be! matched! for! similarity! with! all! of! the! other!
traces! in! memory.! The! model! employs! a! modified! version! of! Tversky’s!




pinpoints! the! single! most! relevant! ‘memory! trace’,! or,! alternatively,! not!
necessarily!a!single!trace!but!rather!all!those,!and+only+those,!stimuli!that!are!
relevant!(i.e.,!that!scored!positive!with!Tversky’s!formula)!to!activate!for!the!







out! the! prototypes! and! two! of! the! exemplars! and! let! the! remaining! set!
represent! what! the! subject! has! in! memory.! The! configurations! are! each!
marked! with! a! category! corresponding! to! the! prototype! that! generated!




























they! lose! as! forgetting! cycles! intervene.! Performance! on! prototypes! is!
comparatively! stable! and,! at! the! end,! can! exceed! performance! on! old!
exemplars.!Again,!this!is!due!to!the!fact!that!the!prototype!has!a!statistical!









drastically.! If! this! is! possible,! reason! Hintzman! and! Ludlam,! then! the!
evidence!brought!forward!in!favour!of!prototypes!(e.g.,!Homa!et!al.!1973;!
Posner!and!Keele,!1970)!cannot!be!taken!as!conclusive!proof!that!subjects!
create! the! prototype! they! use! for! subsequent! tasks! during! the! learning!
phase.!Second,!the!results!using!the!bestSmatch!measurements!offer!added!
support!to!the!context!model!since!that!model!posits!nothing!other!than!
exemplars! and! can! simulate! differential! forgetting.! Differential! forgetting!
can! thus! no! longer! be! considered! unequivocal! proof! that! classification!! 197!






article! carefully! outlining! and! criticising! the! methodology! and!
interpretations!of!Hintzman!and!Ludlam!(1980).!The!first!point!of!criticism!
for! the! exemplar! theory! (or,! context! theory)! of! classification! is! that! the!
categories!it!uses!in!its!experimental!designs!are!not!illSdefined!categories.!
This! is! an! important! point,! first! of! all,! because! research! into! illSdefined!
categories!has!included!various!manipulations!of!the!stimuli!that!it!would!be!
hard! to! imitate! with! wellSdefined! categories! (Homa,! Sterling! and! Trepel,!
1981:!419).!In!illSdefined!categories,!the!number!of!instances!is!potentially!
infinite;! compare! this! to! Hintzman! and! Ludlam’s! categories! where! the!
population!of!a!category!was!limited!to!6!members!and!the!complete!set!of!
stimuli!consisted!of!only!16!units.!Furthermore,!the!dimensions!underlying!
illSdefined! categories! are,! by! definition,! unknown! or! at! least! imperfectly!
known.! The! categories! in! Hintzman! and! Ludlam! were! comprehensively!
describable!by!the!values!on!7!dual!relational!properties.!Finally,!illSdefined!
categories! probably! reflect! realSlife! experience! with! learning! better! than!










more! categories! are! learned,! generalisation! to! new! stimuli! is! improved.!! 198!







prototypes! are! not! the! whole! story.! To! bring! this! point! home! with! a!







those! of! exemplar! theorists! in! that! they! show! that! old! information! is!
available! for! subsequent! tasks! rather! than! lost.! For! example,! in! the!
experiments!in!Homa!and!Vosburgh!(1976),!performance!accuracy!on!the!
old!learning!stimuli!exceeded!that!of!the!new!patterns!at!the!same!level!of!













prototype! together! with! information! about! the! breadth! of! the! category.!! 199!
Additionally,!time!would!also!favour!the!dominance!of!a!prototype!in!the!
representation! of! a! category! since! differential! forgetting! is! supposed! to!







mixed! model,! their! results! support! my! view! that! ultimately! a! better!
understanding! of! categorisation! involves! bringing! contributions! from!
different! and+ even+ opposed+ perspectives! together.! A! complete! theory! of!










stored! representations! or! exemplars.! There! are,! nonetheless,! some!
important! differences! between! prototype! and! exemplar! approaches.! The!
most! significant! difference,! in! my! view,! is! that! the! former! can! still! be!
grouped! with! the! classical! account! in! assuming! that! the! representations!
built!up!from!the!instances!encountered!are!fundamentally!different!from!
the! instances! themselves! (Posner! &! Keele,! 1968:! 353).! As! expounded! by!
Pylyshyn! (1973),! the! process! of! interpretation! was! believed! to! abstract+








prototypes! were! theoretically! preferable! to! variable! ones,! resulted! in! a!
certain! repetition! of! the! mistakes! of! the! classical! account:! instead! of!
acknowledging!that!perhaps!there!are!no+stable+conditions+of+application!and!




The! alternative,! that! is,! acknowledging! that,! to! a! certain! degree,!
conditions!of!application,!or!norms,!vary!with!the!contexts!and!purposes!in!
which! they! arise,! was! banned! as! a! sort! of! relativism.! Notice! that! the!
assumption!that!Homa,!Sterling!and!Trepel!were!reluctant!to!accept!was!
that!their!subjects’!ability!to!correctly!classify!a!stimulus!did!not!depend!on!
underlying! summary! representations.! Notice! the! similarity! in! the!
explanation! of! categorisation! between,! on! the! one! hand,! necessary! and!
sufficient!conditions!as!in!the!classical!definitional!account!and,!on!the!other!









‘finite,! and! even! relatively! small,! number! of! descriptive! propositions’!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!







cut! definitions! for! a! multitude! of! everyday! concepts! had! just! raised!
awareness!of!the!true!diversity!of!our!experience.!Designing!a!system!that!
could!cope!with!the!diversity!and!unequal!distribution!of!properties!plus!
truly! novel! experiences! was! among! the! top! motivations! for! developing!









being! processed,! and! that! this! prototype! need! only! be! ‘retrieved’! readyS
made! to! accomplish! the! task! at! hand.! The! seeming! lack! of! consensus!
however!is!in!part!due!to!the!fact!that!I!only!presented!a!small!fragment!of!
the! research! on! these! issues.! I! concentrated! on! landmark! articles! that!
defined!the!debate!in+its+early+moments.!During!the!period!I!covered,!the!
field!was!just!starting!and!it!is!still!now!very!young.!In!chapter!5,!I!will!draw!






perceptual! features;! in! the! subsection! below,! I! present! proposals! from!




approach! is! by! pointing! out! its! dependence! on! essentialism.! Roughly,!




world! into! kinds! depends! on! recognising! which! sets! of! properties! are!
necessary!of!which!kinds.!In!the!introductory!chapter!(section!1.2),!I!briefly!
presented! the! standard! ‘classical! theory! of! concepts’! view! that! essential!
properties! are! individually! necessary! and! jointly! sufficient! to! identify!
members!of!a!class.!My!critique!of!the!classical!account!then!was!that!these!
conditions! were! not! really! playing! the! roles! postulated! for! them! since!
categorising,! and! in! general,! competently! using! concepts,! seems! not! to!
depend!on!having!anything!like!necessary!and!sufficient!conditions.!In!this!





and! the! trenches! deep.! Few! venture! to! launch! an! allSout! attack,! Richard!












more! insightful! conception! of! kinds! that! shrugs! off! Platonic! ideal! forms,! takes! the!
opportunity!to!summarise!his!arguments!for!the!retirement!of!essentialism.!! 203!
evolution.!In!a!nutshell,!holding!essentialism!puts!us!at!risk!of!dismissing!the!




according! to! some! influential! voices! in! the! categorisation! community!
(Murphy!and!Medin,!1985;!Medin!and!Ortony,!1989;!Barsalou,!1987;!among!
others),! this! is! not! enough.! The! criticisms! centre! round! the! worry! that!
probabilistic!theories!of!loosely!correlated!features!are!too!unconstrained!to!
give! a! full! picture! of! how! properties! come! together! in! our! mental!
representations;!this!objection!deserves!our!full!attention!since!failing!to!
answer! it! can! inadvertently! lead! to! readopting! the! assumptions! of!
metaphysical!essentialism.!In!the!remainder!of!this!subsection,!I!argue!that!
the! best! way! to! escape! the! mistakes! of! metaphysical! essentialism,!
particularly!in!the!field!of!language!studies,!is!to!replace!it!with!psychological!
constraints,!or!‘psychological!essentialism’.!!
The! contributions! leading! to! the! proposal! of! psychological+
essentialism,!begin!with!a!certain!dissatisfaction!among!some!psychologists!
with! the! accounts! presented! in! previous! subsections! (from! Rosch’s!
‘prototype! theory’! to! the! ‘dual’! model! that! incorporates! prototypes! and!
exemplars)! and! their! tendency! to! rely! almost! exclusively! on! surface!



















similarity! could! be! a! bySproduct! of! categorisation,! rather! than! the! force!
determining! it.! Importantly,! however,! they! do! not! argue! for! abandoning!
similaritySbased! accounts.! Rather,! they! explore! the! possibilities! of!
complementing! them! with! an! account! of! what! makes! concepts! and!
categories! ‘coherent’.! By! coherent! categories,! Murphy! and! Medin! mean!











they! hold! that! these! accounts! generally! exclude! theoretical! connections,!
despite!being!broad!enough!to!include!them.!!
When!we!say!that!concepts!are!organized!by!theories,!we!use!theory!to!
mean! any! of! a! host! of! mental! ‘explanations’! rather! than! complete,!
organized,!scientific!accounts!(Murphy!&!Medin,!1985:!290).!!
As!an!illustration,!consider!dietary!rules:!what!makes!the!class!FOOD!cohere?!





flying! insects! are! regarded! as! unclean;! but,! surprisingly,! there! are! some!
exceptions:! locusts,! katydids,! crickets! and! grasshoppers! are! among! the!! 205!
‘clean’!animals!disciples!were!allowed!to!eat.!We!can!only!wonder!what!the!
logic!behind!these!distinctions!could!be,!in!Murphy!and!Medin’s!terms,!what!
makes! these! classes! ‘cohere’?! A! first! reaction! might! be! to! consider! the!
distinctions!in!Leviticus!simply!arbitrary,!although!for!some,!of!course,!they!
might!be!dogma.!Yet,!if!we!give!it!more!thought,!an!intuition!appears!that!the!









embody! causal! knowledge,! implicit! theories! of! causes! and! effects! that!
underlie!our!understanding!of!the!concepts!involved.!For!instance,!it!might!








As! Murphy! and! Medin,! concede,! this! proposal! is! only! a! first! step! in!





Kinds+ and+ Cognitive+ Development.! Among! other! things,! Keil! focuses! on!
studying!the!role!played!by!factors!other+than+surface+perceptual+features!in!! 206!
categorisation! and! reasoning! about! categories.! He! designed! an! ingenious!
experiment!with!children!and!adults:!first,!he!came!up!with!pairs!of!natural!
animal!kinds!for!which!a!description!could!be!given!that!would!mention!all!





















when! designing! the! materials! (these! included! interviews! designed! to!
identify! the! best! possible! wording! for! the! descriptions).! The! results! are!
quite!straightforward:!kindergarteners!mostly!assumed!that!the!scientists’!
discoveries!were!irrelevant!to!what!kind!the!animal!in!the!picture!belonged!
to.! The! majority! of! older! children! and! the! adults,! however,! did! find! the!
discoveries!relevant!to!what!the!animal!that!looked!like!a!horse!really+was!
(Keil,!1989:!168).!This!suggests!that!not!only!children!of!a!certain!age!but!







are! several! points! of! convergence! between! Keil’s! findings! and! Putnam’s!
proposal:! notice! that! although! kindergartners! are! overly! reliant! on!
superficial!features!and!do!not!yet!participate!in!the!division!of!linguistic!
labour,!as+soon+as+they+are+more+grown'up,!they!join!the!adults!in!finding!










kinds,+ namely,! to! what! type! of! animal! the! bones! and! blood! inside! the!
pictured! animal! would! normally! belong,! can! influence! how! that! animal,!
inside!and!out,!is!classified.!Similarly,!consider!that!it!was!very!important!for!
the! older! children! and! adults! of! Keil’s! experiments! that! the! animals! in!
question!had!cow!parents!and!cow!offspring.!!
Perhaps!we!could!say!that!older!children!and!adults!take!these!to!be!
essential! properties! of! being! a! certain! type! of! animal?! But! rather! than!
confirming! metaphysical+ essentialism,! this! result! only! confirms! that! we!
humans!have!a!very!strong!tendency!to!act+as+if!natural!kinds!had!essential!
properties,! and! this! is! an! argument! for! psychological! essentialism.! Going!
back! to! Dawkins,! the! idea! that! cows! have! cow! parents! and! cow! babies,!
confronted!with!a!specific!branch!of!science,!namely!evolutionary!biology,!
needs!to!be!hedged.!From!one!generation!to!another,!this!is!absolutely!true,!
only! animals! of! the! same! species! can! mate! and! have! offspring! that! can!
themselves!mate.!But!change!must!be!possible!otherwise!we,!Homo!sapiens!
would!not!have!evolved!from!Homo!erectus.!Dawkins!(2011a)!illustrates!the!! 208!










to! call! him! a! ‘man’! or! not,! is,! as! they! say,! a! question! of! semantics.!
Furthermore,!consider!that!there!would!be!as!little!difference!between!you!
and! this! ‘man’! as! there! would! be! between! him! and! his! 50,000SgreatsS
grandfather.!This!can!go!on!for!quite!some!time,!with!very!slight!differences!
building!up.!At!250,000!generations,!your!ancestor!might!look!a!bit!like!a!
chimpanzee:! actually,! he! would! be! the! common! ancestor! we! share! with!
chimpanzees.!Again,!if!we!look!on!either!side!of!this!ancestor’s!photo,!we!see!
indistinguishablySlike! animals,! for! tens! of! thousands! of! years! in! each!
direction!(Dawkins,!2011a,!chapter!2).!!
What! does! this! have! to! do! with! concepts! and! word! meaning?! As!
mentioned! in! the! section! on! the! traditional! view! of! concepts! (chapter! 2,!
section!2.2),!which!set!the!foundations!for!the!definitional!account,!held!that!
a!class,!such!as!‘man’,!or!‘Homo!sapiens’,!possesses!defining+essences!that!




point! on! the! imagined! list! of! ancestors! at! which! one! of! your! ancestors!
suddenly! acquires! the! essence! of! manhood,! there! is! no! point! at! which! a!
Homo! erectus! gives! birth! to! a! Homo! sapiens,! and! so;! once! more,! the!
assumption!that!there!are!dividing!lines,!absolute!definitions!and!defining+
essences! is! challenged.! As! discussed! in! chapter! 2,! among! certain!
philosophers,!one!of!the!main!functions!concepts!have!been!called!to!serve!! 209!
is! as! the! basis! of! metaphysical! claims! (Rey,! 1983:! 243,! section! 1.3).!
Expecting! concepts! to! serve! this! function! is! justified! by! the! belief! that!


























words! had! ‘core’! or! contextSindependent! meanings.! In! other! words,!
psychological!essentialism!could!be!the!key!to!explaining!how!we!manage!to!




even! experts! can! get! it! wrong! and,! perhaps! in! response! to! this,! adopt! a!
flexible!strategy!that!allows!for!knowledge!to!be!revisable.!I!mentioned!then!
that! theorising! on! this! strategy! has! since! led! to! the! postulation! of!
psychological! essentialism,! In! other! words,! there! is! a! psychological!
explanation!for!why!we!believe!that!there!really!are!pure!(Platonic)!forms!or!
essences!instantiated!in!the!objects!and!events!around!us:!we!are!under!the!
spell! of! an! inbuilt! bias.! What’s! more,! for! scientists! like! Dawkins! or!
psychologists!interested!in!these!issues,!for!our!behaviour!to!be!explained,!
essences!do!not!really!need!to!exist,!we!just!need!to!believe,!and!behave!as+if!
they! did.! Psychological! essentialism! thus! postulates! an! innate,! and!
(sometimes)!difficult!to!resist,!tendency!to!see!the!world!as!neatly!cut!up!
along!dividing!lines.!!
A! complete! exploration! of! the! ways! in! which! psychological!















and! Ortony’s! (1989)! introductory! essay! to! a! collection! of! papers! on!
similarity! and! analogical! reasoning! which! they! entitled! ‘psychological!! 211!
essentialism’,!perhaps!coining!the!term!for!the!first!time.!They!begin!with!a!
warning:!!
There! are! problems! with! equating! concepts! with! undifferentiated!
clusters! of! properties! and! with! abandoning! the! idea! that! category!
membership!may!depend!on!intrinsically!important,!even!if!relatively!
inaccessible,!features!(Medin!and!Ortony,!1989:!179).!!
In! the! alternative! they! propose,! there! is! a! constraining! relation! between!









earlier,! he! holds! that! the! database! we! use! when! carrying! out! similarity!
judgments!is!particularly!rich!(it!includes!anything!that!can!be!deduced!from!




the! required! task’! (Tversky,! 1977:! 329).! It! is! this! particular! flexibility! of!
similarity!that!allows!Tversky!to!theorise!on!examples!such!as!‘Jamaica!is!
like! Cuba,! Cuba! is! like! Russia,! but! Russia! is! nothing! like! Jamaica’.! For!
Tversky,!it!is!thus!natural!to!consider!that!the!collection!of!features!that!
represent!the!objects!are!not!necessarily!surface!‘perceptual’!features.!The!






an! overall! interpretation! of! the! results! of! categorisation! research! that! is!
significantly!different!from!the!one!that!has!usually!been!considered.!I!base!
most!of!the!discussion!on!the!ideas!of!Lawrence!Barsalou!because!his!work!
is! now! the! key! additional! component! needed! to! complete! the! picture! of!







prototypical! members,! and! grading! off! from! less! prototypical! cases! to!
nonprototypical! cases! at! the! edges! of! the! category.! The! disagreement!
between! Barsalou! and! prototype! theorists! is! that! they! assume! that! this!
structure!is!stable!for!a!given!category;!Barsalou,!on!the!other!hand,!sees!
evidence! of! ‘instability’! or,! in! other! words,! variability+ and! context'



















were! only! the! tip! of! the! iceberg! and! that! it! is! categorising! behaviour! in+
general!that!warrants!explanation.!Barsalou’s!great!insight!is!to!group!the!





and,! particularly,! on! the! possibility! of! solving! the! issue! of! arriving! at!
occasionSspecific! word! meanings! using! not! only! pragmatic! principles! but!
general!reasoning,!common!sense!and!their!related!construction!processes.!!
Before!getting!into!the!topic!of!Barsalou’s!insights!into!categories!and!








occasion.! As! with! most! research! in! this! field,! the! examples! are!
predominantly! of! natural! kinds,! but! there! are! some! examples! of! artefact!
kinds.!Barsalou’s!position,!uncontroversially,+I+should+think,!is!that!a!natural!
kind!such!as!DOG!is!represented!in!a!particular!subject’s!mind!by+different+
subsets! of! information! from! longSterm! memory+ at+ different+ times.! A!




Barsalou! sometimes! again! uses! the! term! ‘categories’! in! reference! to! the+
representations+in+our+minds!when!he!argues!against!the!idea!that!there!are!
stable,!invariant!representations!in!longSterm!memory.!I!would!argue!that,!
by! keeping! the! above! clarifications! in! mind,! it! is! possible! to! follow! the!
distinctions!Barsalou!does!make:!when!he!speaks!of!category!membership,!




prototypes! occur! because! the! same! category! (i.e.,! the! same! kind)! is!
represented!in!working!memory!on!different!occasions!by!different+concepts.!
This!is!Barsalou’s!alternative!to!the!idea!that!kinds!are!represented!by!fixed!
and! stable! ‘graded! structures’! or! prototypes. 112 !Another! possible!
terminological! difficulty! is! with! regard! to! Barsalou’s! use! of! ‘concept’.!
Initially,!he!follows!common!practice!in!his!field:!a!concept!is!a!‘knowledge!




experience,! deductions,! and! so! on).! A! concept! has! both! a! concept! label!
(generally! the! word! form)! and! associated! encyclopaedic! knowledge.!
Barsalou! breaks! away! from! the! common! psychological! conception! of!
‘concept’!when!he!claims!that!the!encyclopaedic!information!associated!with!
a!concept,!in!other!words,!the!contents!of!the!concept!file,!are!not!unchanged!
from! occasion! to! occasion.! This! is! the! main! insight! resulting! from! his! in!
depth!analysis!in!the!1987!article.!He!challenges!the!then!very!prevalent!
idea! that! subjects! have! at! their! disposal! stable,! invariable! mental!







that! there! is! no! reason! to! presume! that! we! call! forth! the! same!
representations! each! time! that! we! think! about! (or,! I! would! add,!
communicate!about)!dogs,!peace,!or!going!on!vacation.!!
Allowing! variability! to! permeate! our! notions! of! categories! and!
concepts! instead! of! assuming! stability,! puts! the! results! of! early!
categorisation! research! in! a! very! different! light:! prototype! theorists! like!
Rosch,!despite!their!initial!efforts!to!only!cautiously!advance!interpretations,!
suggested!that!categories,!(i.e.,!the!mental!representations!of!kinds)!possess!a!
graded! structure. 113 !In! other! words,! that! the! ordering! of! category!
representativeness!that!falls!from!the!most!typical!member!to!the!least!by!
degrees!on!a!gradient!is!something!that!belongs+as+a+fixture!to!the!category!
representation.! How! explicitly! Rosch! endorses! this! interpretation! is! not!










depending! on! its! similarity! to! this! unique! focal! point.! Barsalou! does! not!
deny!that!this!notion!of!‘internal!structure’!represents!some!advantage!with!













equivalent! because! all! members! possess! the! same! deciding! criteria! (or,!
using! the! terminology! of! the! previous! subsection,! the! same! ‘defining+
essence’),! but,! as! pointed! out! already,! he! feels! an! important! factor! –! the+
effects+ of+ context! –! is! wrongly! being! left! out.! In! Rosch’s! prototype!
framework,! subjects’! typicality! judgements! and! reaction! times! can! be!
explained! as! stemming! from! a! phenomenon! of! representativeness! that!
proves!very!psychologically!real,!yet!Barsalou!cannot!help!taking!issue!with!
the!unnecessary!added!assumption!that!for!each!category!there!is!only!one!
stable! graded! structure.! The! evidence,! he! notes,! points! markedly! in! the!
opposite!direction,!in!the!direction!of!‘instability’.!
Barsalou’s! (1987)! aim! is! therefore! to! dispel! the! idea! of! stable!
prototypes,! but! not! because! he! challenges! the! observations! of! prototype!
theorists!across!the!board;!rather,!he!seeks!to!highlight!certain!findings!and!
offer! an! alternative! interpretation! to! graded! structure! in! particular.! His!
starting!point!is!the!idea!that!a!particular!graded!structure!is!a!category!
fixture.! Instead,! he! suggests,! graded! structure! should! be! construed! as!
resulting!from!categorising!behaviour;!so,!instead!of!picturing!the!mental!
representation! of! BIRDS! as! invariably! representing! robins! as! central,! any!
ordering!is!theoretically!possible!and!it!becomes!normal!to!expect!different!
structures!in!different!contexts.!This!seemingly!small!change!suggested!by!
Barsalou! has! enormous! consequences:! when! faced! with! a! bird! related!
categorisation! task,! instead! of! retrieving! a! preScomputed,! abstract!




propose! to! call! ‘exemplarSbased! norm! theory’! for! short;! Kahneman! and!
Miller’s!(1986)!and!Barsalou’s!(1987)!articles!were!written!more!or!less!at!
the!same!time!and!they!cite!one!another!as!sources!of!evidence!and!support!
for! their! proposals;! so,! once! more,! the! compatibilities! are! not!! 217!
coincidental.114!Barsalou’s!additional!insight!is!that,!since!human!beings!are!
constantly! trying! to! achieve! goals,! we! should! consider! that! among! the!





TO+ TAKE+ ON+ A+ VACATION.! The! notion! of! ad! hoc! categories! is! particularly!


















derived! category! is! clearly! using! not! only! her! general! reasoning! and!
common!sense!but!also!her!folk!theories!of!dieting!and!nutrition.!Similarly,!
we! have! seen! that! cultural! customs! are! also! among! the! considerations!
subjects! use! to! create! categories,! as! in! the! example! of! what! different!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114!Kahneman! and! Miller! (1986)! also! cite! Hintzman! and! Ludlam! (1980)! and! Hintzman!
(1986)!which!was!then!in+press.!The!compatibilities!between!these!proposals!will!be!further!
explored!in!chapter!5!on!memory.!! 218!
populations! might! consider! qualifies! as! EDIBLE.! Finally,! notice! a! further!


















retrieved! from! memory! on! a! subsequent! particular! occasion,! when! the!
dieter!is,!say,!forced!to!choose!something!from!a!menu!in!a!restaurant.!The!
main!point!is!that!cows,!things!to!eat!on!a!diet!(or!anything!else!outSthereS
inStheSworld)! are! represented! in! a! subject’s! mind! by! different+subsets! of!
information! from! longSterm! memory! on! different+ occasions;! categorising!
behaviour! does! not! depend! on! preScomputed! category! representations,!













which! member! of! a! category! subjects! will! find! as! ‘more! representative’.!









that! representativeness! correlated! with! processing! making! the! fact! that!
these!members!were!more!representative!of!their!class!in+these+particular+
situations! a! psychologically! real! and! significant! phenomenon! (Roth! and!
Shoben,!1983:!363S365).!!
Another!possible!factor!that!invites!the!effects!of!context!is!‘point!of!
view’.! Consider! that! in! Rosch’s! experiments,! robins! were! predominantly!








asked! to! take! the! other! groups’! point! of! view! when! generating! graded!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
ratings! correlate! with! speed! on! category! verification! tasks! (Rosch,! 1973).! Barsalou’s!
contribution!is!to!reintroduce!elements!that!had!been!inadvertently!left!out!and,!taking!a!
step! back,! point! to! a! possible! global! interpretation! that! shows! categorisation! to! be! a!
dynamic!and!adaptive!cognitive!behaviour.!!! 220!
structures! for! the! same! classes.! When! taking! their! own! point! of! view,!
substantial! differences! appeared! between! ratings! given,! for! instance,! by!











basic! understanding! and! communication! between! individuals! and!
populations;!I!come!back!to!this!below.!!
Finally,!given!the!above!results!of!relative!betweenSsubject!reliability,!
Barsalou! and! his! colleagues! turned! their! attention! to! withinSsubjects!
reliability.! They! designed! some! experiments! to! test! how! stable! graded!
structures! are! within! particular! individuals.! They! would! ask! the! same!
individual!to!rate!the!typicality!of!the!same!members!of!a!category!on!two!
occasions! two! months! apart.! The! invariability! of! stable! graded! structure!
model!would!predict!that!a!given!subject’s!answers!would!be!highly!stable,!
especially! if! she! was! asked! to! take! her! own! point! of! view! on! common!
taxonomic!categories.!The!results,!however,!were!only!an!agreement!of!.80!
on! average! (Barsalou,! Sewell! and! Ballato,! 1986).! In! both! Barsalou’s!
framework!and!the!one!I!am!suggesting!this!is!not!at!all!surprising.!The!
subjects!in!these!experiments!did!not!have!a!stable!graded!structure!that!
they! retrieved! to! accomplish! the! task! they! were! given.! Instead! they!
selectively! activated! information! from! memory! to! help! them! order! the!
members!the!first!time!around;!and,!when!they!were!again!asked!to!rate!the!
same! members,! they! did! not! retrieve! a! stable! graded! structure! nor! the!














of! ‘pet’,! as! in! ‘pet! bird’,! I! construct! a! completely! different! ‘category!




slices! of! ourselves.! In! Barsalou’s! words,! ‘Invariant! representations! of!
categories! do! not! exist! in! human! cognitive! systems.! Instead,! invariant!
representations!of!categories!are!analytical!fictions!created!by!those!who!
study!them’!(Barsalou,!1987:!114).!This!conclusion!might!not!be!appealing!
to! those! who! believe! that! there! are! invariant! cognitive! structures,! the!
cognitive!equivalent!of!pure+forms,!and!that!the!task!of!cognitive!science!is!to!
identify! them.! In! that! view,! finding! stability! in! our! knowledge! and! our!
concepts!that+is+only+relative!is!a!meaningless!pursuit.!In!the!view!I!argue!for,!
the! ‘instability! of! graded! structure’! is! far! from! meaningless! and! the!
consequences!it!has!for!our!theories!of!concepts!cannot!be!easily!dismissed!
because!they!reveal!something!fundamental!about!our!cognition:!that!it!is!




between! radical! contextualism! and! the! ‘exemplarSbased! norm! theory’!! 222!
account!of!categories!and!concepts!I!presented!and!argued!in!favour!of!in!
this!chapter,!can!hopefully!already!be!made!clear.!!






computed! representations! for! categories! in! memory,! there! are! no! stable!






longSterm! memory! is! not! organised! into! stable! invariant! categorical!
representations! or! perfectly! delimitated! concepts;! rather,! information! in!
longSterm! memory! is! largely! undifferentiated! and! must! be! scanned! and!
summarised!in!order!to!represent!somethingSoutSthereSinStheSworld.!
A! parallel! description! can! be! given! of! how! occasionSspecific! word!
meanings!are!arrived!at:!instead!of!consulting!or!retrieving!stable,!contextS
independent! word! meanings! (and! modulating! them),! our! language!
interpretation!mechanisms!generate!‘norms’!that!represent!our!knowledge!
of! what! words! mean;! this! might! be! in! the! form! of! Recanati’s! ‘semantic!
potential’!but!it!is!too!soon!to!tell.!In!accord!with!meaning!eliminativism,!this!
account!does!not!assume!that!longSterm!memory!stores!linguistic!meanings!













and! the! ‘instability’! or! contextSdependence! uncovered! in! his! review! of!
categorisation! research! is! a! result! of! different! ‘concepts’! of! the! same!
category!(i.e.,!the!same!kind)!being!constructed!on!different!occasions.!For!
instance,!Asian!undergraduates!do!not!construct!the!same!concept!for!the!
common! taxonomic! category! BIRD! as! American! undergraduates! do;! and,!
different! populations! do! not! construct! the! same! concept! for! the! class! of!
EDIBLE+ THINGS.! A! supposed! disadvantage! of! following! Barsalou,! and!
psychologists!in!general,!on!this!point!is!that!there!is!no!way!for!such!an!
account! of! concepts! to! meet! Fodor’s! publicity! constraint.! This! point! has!
come!up!before!(chapter!2,!section!2.8),!I!claimed!that!attempts!to!meet!the!
Fodorian! publicity! constraint! regularly! failed! because! of! Fodor’s! overly!
rigorous! conditions! on! concept! individuation.! I! can! now! add! that! the!
account!of!concepts!emerging!from!the!considerations!in!this!chapter!simply!
avoids! the! Fodorian! publicity! constraint! by! rejecting! the! underlying!
assumption! that! understanding! and! communication! depend! either! on!






















exchange.! Whether! he! wants,! or! thinks! it! worthwhile,! to! hold! on! to! this!
construct!is!another!matter.!
!
This! account! strongly! contrasts! with! the! standard! views! of! cognition,!
according! to! which,! when! a! subject! needed! to! mentally! represent!
somethingSoutSthereSinStheSworld,!she!had!at!her!disposal,!stable,!invariant!
representations!of!categories!(i.e.,!invariant!concepts)!that!only!needed!to!
be! retrieved! readySmade! from! memory.! In! the! new! action!
tradition/contextualist!framework,!retrieval!is!a!much!more!dynamic!and!
adaptive! process,! knowledge! is! not! clearly! differentiated! into! invariant!
concepts!and!it!is!up!to!construction!processes!benefiting!from!seemingly!
boundless! types! of! information! and! previous! experience,! pragmatic!
principles,!general!reasoning,!common!sense,!and+the+context!to!dynamically!














To! close! the! discussion! in! this! chapter,! I! would! like! to! insist! on! the!




the! formulation! of! a! new! framework! for! word! meaning! in! context.! But,!
ultimately,! once! again,! I! left! certain! issues! unresolved.! Now,! with! the!
addition!of!Barsalou’s!account!of!concepts!as!themselves!possibly!unstable!
and! contextSdependent,! instead! of! invariable,! I! can! come! back! to! one!
important!issue!to!clearly!state!my!position:!I!have!claimed!that!my!account!
is! partially! compatible! with! Fodor’s! ‘word! meanings! are! concepts’! and!
relevance!theory’s!‘words!encode!concepts’.!This!claim!can!now!be!more!
precisely! formulated! as! words+ express+ concepts+ but+ the+ concepts+ words+
express+are+constructed+in+their+contexts+of+use.!With!regards!to!relevance!
theory’s! position:! I! claim! that! words! cannot! encode! concepts! (or! proS
concepts! or! concept! schemas)! because! there! are! no! stable! concepts!
(complete!or!incomplete)!that!words!could!map!to.!Even!if!we!considered!
that!once!a!partial!mapping!is!achieved,!mechanisms!of!completion!and/or!
modulation! allow! words! to! express! concepts! they! do! not! encode.! With!
regards! to! Fodor’s! claim,! I! agree! that! words+ express+ concepts,! but! the!
concepts!they!express!are!not!to!be!simply!retrieved!by!the!listener!(that!is,!
there! is! no! fixed! mental! lexicon);! there! is! a! process! of! construction! that!
involves!selectively!activating!information!from!memory.!But,!because!these!








needed,! or! in! other! words,! each! instance! of! DOG! is! occasionSspecific.!
Furthermore,!in!response!to!worries!about!publicity,!I!point!to!the!fact!that!it!




context,! the! less! important! it! seems! to! be! whether! there! is! a! contextS
independent,! stable,! linguisticallySmandated! word! meaning;! perhaps! we!
have!such!things!for!certain!of!our!concepts,!through!formal!education,!for!
instance,! but! this! exception! is! of! little! interest! to! a! theory! of! natural!
language!and!meaning.!!

















have! put! forward.! Much! has! already! been! said! about! the! link! between!
memory! and! occasionSspecific! word! meaning! construction! in! previous!
chapters.!Furthermore,!since!the!consensus!is!that!‘the!gap’!postulated!by!




at! such! a! pace! and! have! so! revolutionised! thinking! on! memory! that! an!
attentive,! detailed,! and! fresh! look! at! theories! of! memory! and! their!
implications!for!theorising!on!language,!and!word!meaning!in!particular,!is!
required.!!!






this! thesis,! is! presented! in! full! in! section! 5.4.! Finally,! once! all! of! this!
background! on! the! way! memory! actually! works! is! in! place,! I! close! this!













was! surely! foreshadowed! by! the! classic! works! of! people! like! Hermann!










of! research! into! human! faculties! that! came! about! with! the! cognitive!
revolution!justifies!differentiating!today’s!cognitive!view!of!memory!from!all!
those! that! came! before,! including! even! the! relatively! modern!
phenomenological!view.!
An!important!pioneer!of!our!cognitive!view!of!memory!is!Donald!O.!
Hebb.! His! contribution! to! neuroscience! is! of! such! importance! that! he! is!
sometimes!simply!called!the!father!of!the!discipline;!he!was!among!the!first!
to! study! the! neural! foundations! of! behaviour! and! work! out! a! biological!






often! summarised! as! ‘Hebb’s! rule’:+ cells+ that+ fire+ together,+ wire+ together.!




The! concurrent! appearance! of! computer! models! is! also! key! in!
understanding! the! development! of! memory! models! in! the! early! modern!
stage.!In!the!1950s,!Donald!E.!Broadbent!was!involved!in!a!major!double!
innovation:! he! defied! the! associationist! stimulusSresponse! school!






would! often! be! thought! of! as! (i)! information! moving! along! a! path! that!
initiates! with! perception! and! ends! in! longSterm! memory;! and! (ii)!
represented! with! flowcharts! strongly! reminiscent! of! electric! circuits.119!





selected! information! arrives! in! the! P'system! where! it! forms! part! of! the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118!Broadbent!was,!of!course,!also!in!his!turn!influenced!by!earlier!thinkers!and!researchers,!
particularly! by! his! teacher! at! Cambridge,! Frederick! Bartlett,! an! influential! pioneer! of!
memory!research!and!experimentation.!I!return!to!Bartlett!in!the!discussion!of!verbatim!
memory!(§!5.3).!!!
119!See! Broadbent,! 1958:! 216,! Figure! 5! for! an! example! of! this.! The! diagram! shows! two!
stages!labeled!S!and!P.!While!there!are!many!arrows!coming!into!S,!there!is!only!one!arrow!
joining!S!to!P.!! 230!







these! assumptions! need! to! be! acknowledged! and! most! of! them! rejected.!




assumptions! reveal! is! not! only! still! prominent! within! psychology,! hence!





distinct! and! separate! systems! in! memory,! each! implementing! a! different!
function:!holding+information,!rehearsing+information,!filtering+information.!
Furthermore,! the! systems! are! lined! up! in! a! sequence,! so! only! the! end!
product!of!one!system!goes!on!to!the!next.!A!second!assumption!is!that!
primary! memory,! the! S'! and! P'systems,! is! of! limited! capacity.! From! the!




filter! blocking! peripheral! information! from! attaining! longSterm! memory.!
This!limitation!was!seen!as!a!positive!protective!device!that!kept!our!minds!
from! being! overloaded! with! information.! This! second! assumption! limits!
memory!in!two!ways.!First,!following!assumption!one,!it!is!the+limited+scope+
of+ our+ awareness! that! functions! as! a! filter! and! discards! all! but! a! small!
fraction!of!what!is!available!to!our!senses.!Notice!that!even!if!our!awareness!! 231!
can! only! process! a! small! part! of! our! environment! at+ the+ moment+ of+
perception,! it! does! not! seem! to! follow! that! only! those! aspects! of! our!
environment! consciously! perceived! and! processed! at! the! moment! of!




















patterns,! a! feat! that! the! mind! accomplishes! without! awareness,! without!
commanding!any!conscious!effort.!During!the!1960s,!however,!the!focus!was!
on! experiments! testing! conscious! memorisation! with! tasks! such! as! the!
intentional! retention! of! items! on! a! list.! This! was! complemented! with!
neuropsychological! evidence:! distinct! amnesias! for! distinct! systems!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120!The!alternative!is!that!aspects!of!our!environment!not!available!to!our!awareness!are!


















with! previous! assumptions,! they! represent! memory! encoding! as!
information!being!filtered!from!the!senses!into!a!first!store!and!from!the!first!
store! to! a! more! permanent! store.! The! dual,! or! ‘multiSstore’! model’s!
innovations!include!considering!this!first!shortSterm!store!as!a!‘buffer’!or!
shield! to! further! filter! out! information! that! might! have! passed! from! the!

















by! rehearsing! one! or! more! items! the! subject! can! keep! them! in! the!
shortSterm!store,!but!the!number!that!can!be!maintained!in!this!way!is!
strictly!limited’!(Atkinson!and!Shiffrin,!1971:!83).!!
This! is! a! reference! to! one! of! psychology’s! most! cited! papers,! George! A.!













intact:! (i)! although! working+ memory! can! also! represent! reactivated+




It! is! important! to! stress! how! little! these! assumptions! were!
questioned!at!the!time.!Despite!the!fact!that!the!multiSstore!model!went!
through! various! generations! of! development,! at! the! end,! more! key!
assumptions!had!been!conserved!than!questioned.!This!is!due!in!part!to!the!
long!involvement!of!one!particularly!influential!researcher:!Richard!Shiffrin.!




1997! with! Mark! Steyvers.122!For! decades,! multiSstore! models! of! memory!










appear! in! the! late! 1970s! and! 1980s.! In! a! particularly! critical! conference!
presentation,!Ulric!Neisser!stressed!that,!after!almost!a!century!of!research,!
nearly! nothing! was! known! about! the! ‘interesting! and! socially! significant’!
aspects!of!memory!(Neisser,!1978:!4,!cited!by!Neisser,!1988:!1).!Not!only!the!
general! public’s! but! also! the! researchers’! notion! of! memory! had! been!
unfortunately!restricted!to!what!subjects!could!intentionally!memorise!and!
recollect.!If!the!kind!of!experiments!conducted!in!memory!research!labs!all!
















coverage! of! latent! semantic! analysis,! see! Kintsch! and! Mangalath,! 2011,! and! references!
therein.!! 235!
absence!of!a!positive!account,!this!is!arguably!not!what!memory!is!for.123!A!
decade! after! his! original! remarks,! Neisser! reports! that,! although! the!
question!of!what!‘realSlife’!or!‘ordinary’!memory!is!for!has!only!begun!to!be!








in! the! rememberer’s! past’! (Tulving,! 1983:! Preface! v).! Early! on,! the! key!
distinction! was! that! semantic! memory! involved! abstract! knowledge! or!











subject! might! know! or! any! conceptSbased! knowledge! he! might! have!
(Neisser,!1988).!Psychologists’!interest!in!this!type!of!memory!was!great!
since,!insofar+as+it+represented+a+subject’s+store+of+knowledge+of+the+world,!it!
was! clearly! central! to! most! if+ not+ all! cognitive! processes.! In! contrast,!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123!Hintzman! (2011)! summarises! the! point! with! an! evolutionary! remark:! our! hunterS
gatherer!ancestors!hardly!had!need!for!a!shopping!list!when!they!ventured!out!onto!the!
savannah.!Answers!to!the!question!of!what!memory!evolved+for!are!starting!to!appear!in!





A! further! fractionation! critically! challenged! the! early! assumption!
linking!awareness!or+consciousness!to!memory.!Also!in!the!1980s,!Daniel!




be! expressed! without! deliberate! recollection! (Graff! and! Schacter,! 1985;!
Schacter,!1987).!That!not!all!memory!requires!explicit!learning!or!conscious!
recollection! of! the! specific! study! episode! would! become! even! more!
important!when!researchers!started!looking!into!how!language!is!learned.!





framework! for! thinking! about! and! labelling! the! different! systems! of!
memory.! This! new! framework! maintained! the! split! between! primary,! or!
working+memory,!and!longSterm!memory,!but!critically!proposed!that!longS
term! memory! was! further! subdivided! into! two! components:! ‘explicit’,! or!
declarative! memory! and! ‘implicit’,! or! non'declarative! memory! (Squire,!












Squire! includes! under! nonSdeclarative,! implicit! memory! information!
acquired! during! skill! learning! (motor,! perceptual! and! cognitive),! habit!








stated! above,! by+ definition,! in! the! new! framework,! semantic+ memory+ is+
supposed+to+be+a+part+of+declarative+memory! from! which! it! follows! that! I!
should!be!able!to!make!statements!about!its!contents.!If!asked!for!the!capital!
of!Philippines,!I!should!be!able!to!declare!‘Manila’.!Yet!if!semantic!memory!is!





available! to! the! speaker,! they! would! surely! be! stored! within! declarative!
memory! and! more! particularly! within! semantic! memory.125!But! following+
my+thesis!that!they!are!not,!the!question!becomes!where!that!which!serves+as!
word! meanings! is! actually! stored.! In! other! words,! where! are! Recanati’s!
‘contextualised! senses’! kept?! Where! are! the! memory! traces! of! previous!





125!The! fact! that! only! definitions! purposely! learnt! are! available! to! the! speaker! (under!
favorable!conditions)!is!actually!further!proof!that!otherwise!they!are!not!thus!available!
(which!does!not!mean!that!they!cannot!be!worked!out).!!! 238!
discussion! up! to! this! point! would! seem! to! indicate! that! it! is! to! implicit!






memory! records! and! stores! and! how! memory! does! this! have! been!
questioned! and! a! new! outlook! on! memory! has! begun! to! emerge.! The!
objective! now! is! to! shine! this! new! light! on! specifically! linguistic!
representations!in!memory.!Denying!that!a!specialised!declarative!memory!
stores! standing,! contextSindependent! word! meanings! (as! in! an! ‘abstract!
mental! lexicon’! or! ‘semantic! memory’),! and! arguing! rather! for! an!






that! distinguished! between! the! approaches! of! formal! semantics! and!
contextualism! with! regard! to! word! meaning! (i.e.,! ‘minimalism’! versus!
‘maximalism’);!here,!these!terms!capture!two!opposing!traditions!of!what!
memory! for! language! registers:! accounts! that! suppose! minimal,! abstract!















processing! were! first! developed.! But! it! is! also! the! case! that! particularly!
influential!ideas!stemming!from!research!on!memory!permeated!thinking!
outside!of!psychology!and!indirectly!determined!certain!aspects!of!language!



















they! interpret?! One! of! the! most! influential! approaches! to! this! alleged!
problem! simply! assumed! that! speakers! were! endowed! with! a! way! of!
normalising!speech!signals.!‘Speaker!normalisation’,!as!this!is!called,!was!! 240!
thought! to! intervene! at! every! level! of! speech! perception,! starting! with!
consonants! and! vowels,! which! come! together! in! syllables! and! words.126!
Roughly,!it!assumed!clearly!defined!categories!for!vowels,!consonants,!and+
words;!two!assumptions!fatally!came!together:!that!‘variable!speech!signals!
are! matched! to! ideal! templates! or! prototypes’! and! that! the! independent,!




canonical! representations! in! memory! (Goldinger,! 1998).! The! underlying!
assumption,!of!course,!is!that!what!was!filtered!out,!labelled!‘noise’,!had!no!
bearing! on! language! processing.! Perhaps! even! more! importantly,!




supposed! acoustic! pattern! recognition! systems! and! ultimately! language!
form!(i.e.,!word)!recognition!but!the!results!were!disappointing.!Very!few!
invariant!cues!were!found,!despite!the!fact!that!marketable!applications!(e.g.!
in! computerShuman! interaction)! for! any! advance! in! this! area! were! a!
considerable!motivation.!!
An! alternative! construal! of! variability! in! the! speech! signal,! which!
rejected!the!assumptions!of!‘normalisation’!began!to!emerge.!I!propose!to!
call!this!approach!‘maximalism’!to!better!highlight!the!oppositions!with!the!
traditional! account! within! speech! perception! and! the! parallels! with!
oppositions! throughout! language! studies.! Maximalism! suggested! that!
variability! was! not! necessarily! a! problem! that! speech! perception! had! to!
solve,!but!that,!on+the+contrary,!it!possibly!represented!an!important!source!
of! information! for! speech! perception.! Variability! in! speech! makes! it! rich!
with! information! about! the! speaker:! if! we! know! them,! we! immediately!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!















There! is! one! more! area,! however,! that! is! worth! a! closer! look:! language!
change.!
!
There! is! robust! evidence! from! an! area! in! linguistics! receiving! much!
attention! lately! that! offers! additional! support! for! the! maximalist! view! of!
speech! perception.! Empirical! studies! in! the! area! of! lexical! diffusion! of!
phonological! change! have! actually! confirmed! and! extended! the! results!
presented! above.! Postulating! rich! representations! instead! of! the!
conventional! bare! representations! proved! necessary! in! explaining!
correlations!between!pronunciation!variability!(e.g.,!deletion!of!/t/!and!/d/!




















traditional,! received! view! of! word! meaning,! as! in! minimal! or! formal!
semantics,! belongs! to! the! former! and! that! the! emerging! view! of! word!
meaning!I!defend,!contextualism,!belongs!to!the!latter.!I!also!mentioned!that!
the! action! tradition! gave! rise! not! only! to! neoS! and! postSGricean!
contemporary! pragmatics,! among! them! relevance! theory,! but! also! to! the!
usageSbased!tradition!in!linguistics.!Since!the!time!of!their!shared!origins,!
both! contemporary! pragmatics! and! usageSbased! approaches! have!
significantly!grown!in!influence.!The!number!of!publications!and!the!range!











has! significantly! contributed! to! our! modern! understanding! of! frequency!
effects!in!language.!She!holds!that!just!as!phonological!representations!are!
built!up!cumulatively!through!use,!so!are!the!representations!of!all!the!other!




analogue! ‘exemplar’! representation! (one! that! includes! sub! or! nonS
categorical!information)!is!stored+in+memory!with!each!experience!of!a!word!
or!phrase.!The!exemplar!representations!include!details!such!as!phonetic!
particulars,! contexts! of! use,! and,! importantly+ for+ my+ purposes,! those!
components! of! speaker! meaning! recovered! by! the! hearer.! Finally,! in!












Support! for! the! alternative! maximalist! position! comes! from! other!
researchers!and!areas!in!the!usageSbased!tradition.!Olga!Gurevich,!Matthew!
A.!Johnson!and!Adele!E.!Goldberg,!for!instance,!have!recently!revisited!the!
longSstanding! assumption! that! when! the! gist! of! an! utterance! has! been!
understood,!the!form!is!immediately!forgotten.!The!widespread!acceptance!
of! this! particular! idea! surely! owes! much! to! a! particularly! wellSreceived!
notion!of!what!it!means!for!memory!to!be!limited.!It!is!because!memory!
could!not!possibly!hold!all!the!language!forms!that!we!experience!in!our!






this! conclusion! came! from! the! work! of! Frederic! Bartlett! (1920,! 1928).!
Bartlett!(1932)!asked!a!panel!of!subjects!to!listen!to!a!story!and!then!retell!it!
from! memory! some! time! later.! Critically,! the! story! was! of! an! unfamiliar!
culture! and! so! it! would! be! fair! to! note! that! it! tested! a! specific! kind! of!









Gurevich,! Johnson! and! Goldberg! (2010)! start! their! study! with! a!
review! of! classic! and! contemporary! studies! of! verbatim! memory! and!
complement! this! with! their! own! experiments.! A! first! cursory! look! at!
memory!studies!quickly!reveals!that!the!consensus!above!must!at+least!be!
further!nuanced!since!surface!form!is!remembered!in!certain!circumstances.!
If,! for! instance,! the! subjects! are! told! that! they! will! be! tested,! their!
performance! can! remarkably! improve.! Or,! if! the! sentences! are! isolated,!
unrelated! items,! memory! seems! facilitated.! Recall! is! also! positively!
influenced!by!emotionally!loaded!language.!In!a!study!cited!by!Gurevich!and!
colleagues! (Murphy! and! Shapiro,! 1994),! one! group! of! subjects! reads! a!
sarcastic!letter!and!the!control!group!an!emotionallySneutral!letter.!Some!
sentences!in!the!letter!are!identical!and!so!the!test!was!able!to!demonstrate!






the! neutral! letter! condition! are! reported! as! having! correctly! identified!! 245!
sentences! as! known! 71%! of! the! time! and! having! mistakenly! labelled!
paraphrases!as!known!54%!of!the!time.!Consider!that!recall!was!even!better!
for!the!subjects!in!the!emotional!condition.!These!results!point!to!imperfect!








results! from! previous! studies! are! in! general! unreliable! in! determining!
whether!verbatim!memory!plays!an!important!role!in!language!processing.!
They!propose!to!investigate!this!further!with!their!own!experiments.!!
Two! initial! experiments! test! recognition! memory! and! two! further!
experiments! test! recall.! These! later! two! experiments! involve! subjects!
listening! to! a! story! as! they! see! accompanying! pictures.! The! stories! are!
carefully! worded! to! avoid! the! facilitating! factors! discussed! above! and!
subjects!are!not!told!that!a!recall!test!will!be!conducted!at!the!end.!When!
they! are! asked! to! retell! the! story,! the! pictures! are! used! as! prompts.!
Responses!were!then!transcribed!and!for!a!phrase!to!count!as!verbatim,!it!
had!to!match!exactly!the!heard!phrase!or!vary!by!no!more!than!one!word.!




were! used! so! as! to! eliminate! the! possibility! that! certain! phrases! were!
coincidental! matches,! that! is,! matches! produced! not! through! verbatim!
memory!but!accidently,!simply!because!it!is!the!‘natural’!way!of!expressing!a!





might! not! seem! a! very! high! figure,! but! consider! that! before! these! tests,!





and! extended! these! results.! An! elaborate! experimental! design! allowed!
Gurevich!and!colleagues!to!test!the!number!of!times!a!subject!spontaneously!
used!verbatim!memory!in!constructing!their!own!description!of!a!video!they!
had! previously! heard! described! for! them.! ! They! conclude! that! reusing!




consciously! search! their! memory! for! earlier! content.! The! authors! further!
note!that!the!relationship!between!implicit!and!explicit!memory!is!complex.!
The!recall!phenomena!they!observed!surely!involve!interactions!of!the!two!










more! questions! than! answers.! I! would! argue! that! this! is! because! human!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129!Researchers! like! JohnsonSLaird,! simply! considered! that! ‘Listeners! do! not! ordinarily!
retain!the!syntax!of!a!sentence!for!longer!than!is!necessary!to!grasp!its!meaning’!(JohnsonS
Laird!et!al.!1974:!704,!see!also!JohnsonSLaird!and!Stevenson,!1970).!! 247!
memory! is! a! relatively! new! field! and! the! relation! between! memory! and!
language!is!something!we!are!only!beginning!to!understand.!
For! my! particular! purposes,! Gurevich! and! colleagues’! results! are!
interesting! mainly! because! they! point! to! a! previously! ignored! resource!
speakers! have! at! their! disposal:! the! limited! but! existent! access! to! the!
‘surface’! form;! in! other! words,! the! particular! word,! expression! or!
construction!used!when!they!experienced!an!episode!of!language!use.!For!an!











stake! is! the! same! as! in! chapter! 3:! do! words! have! standing,! contextS
independent! meanings,! or,! putting! it! in! the! terms! of! standard! relevance!
theory,! do! words! encode! or! map! onto! concepts! (while! they! on! occasion!




I! suggest! looking! to! Douglas! Hintzman’s! work! on! exemplar! theories! of!
concepts!as!a!point!of!departure!in!replacing!the!idea!of!an!abstract!mental!
lexicon.!More!than!any!other!approach!I!am!aware!of,!Hintzman’s!account!of!
memory! espouses! the! new! outlook! discussed! throughout! this! chapter:! a!
‘maximalist’!model!that!assumes!it!is!unproblematic!to!suppose!rich!and!
contextualised! rather! than! minimal! and! abstract! representations.! Also,!
Hintzman! has! more! than! enough! in! common! with! the! contextualists! of!! 248!
previous!chapters!to!figure!among!them.!He!is!special!within!this!group!for!
having! developed! an! experimental! paradigm! to! simulate! the! creation! of!
‘generic’!or!abstract!ideas:!the!very!well!received!and!influential!‘multipleS
trace’! memory! model,! which! includes! ‘MINERVA! 2’,! a! computer! model!







Hintzman! (1986)! takes! the! discussion! up,! more! or! less,! where!
‘context!theory’!or!the!‘exemplar!model’!(chapter!4,!§!4.3.2)!left!off:!mental!
representations!are!created!as!a!direct!consequence!of!a!subject’s!exposure!
to! different! stimuli,! or! instances! of! realSworld! experiences.!130!Critically,!
however,! unlike! prototype! theorists,! there! is! no! assumption! that! these!
representations! are! fundamentally+ different! from! the! experiences!
themselves;! rather,! they! are! ‘traces’! left! behind! by! the! experience! of! an!
instance.! Consequently,! there! are! no! abstract! representations! to! be!




‘functionally! separate’! type! of! memory! called! ‘semantic’! or! ‘generic’!












prototypes! or! some! other! structure)! are! simply! not! playing! the! role!
prototype! theorists! imagined! for! them! (that! is,! serving! as! summaries,!
models,!schemas!or!norms)!for!subsequent!tasks.!Instead,!it!must!be!the!






A! related! point! of! contention! between! prototype! theorists! and!
Hintzman!is!that!despite!allowing!that!prototypes!are!a!major!step!forward!
in! our! understanding! of! concepts! compared+ to+ the+ traditional+ theory+ of+
concepts,!he!finds!that!prototype!theory!is!still!flawed!in+the+same+way!as!
many! other! theories! of! concepts:! context! is! again! a! key! element!
insufficiently!taken!into!consideration.!Hintzman!illustrates!this!important!
point! with! an! example.! When! subjects! are! asked! to! rate! how! typical! a!
beverage! is,! context! plays! a! major! role! in! their! answers! (something!









studies! in! prototype! theory! seem! to! suggest.! ! To! be! very! clear,! to! the!






the! UK! instead! of! the! US,! tea! and! not! coffee! would! have! probably! rated! higher.! Any!
contextual!factor,!even!those!we!take!for!granted,!can!influence!how!items!are!rated.!! 250!
‘precomputed! rules’! of! any! kind,! Hintzman’s! radically! contextualist!
approach!counters!that!memory!is!endowed!with!retrieval!mechanisms!that!
produce! the! (abstract)! representations,! frameworks! of! reference,! or!
concepts!that!we!traditionally!thought!were!stored,!fixed,!and!preSexistent.!
Hintzman’s!memory!model!is!radically!different!from!the!‘dualSstore’!
type! models! presented! in! the! first! section! of! this! chapter! and! only! very!
partially! compatible! with! the! new! framework! emerging! around! the!
contributions!of!Tulving!and!Schacter.!A!first!major!difference!is!that!instead!
of! filtering! information! as! it! flows! into! the! memory! system,! Hintzman!
proposes! a! ‘multipleStrace’! model.! Experiences! produce! memory! traces!
instead! of! tokening! abstract! types! stored! in! longSterm! memory.! These!
memory!traces!largely!correspond!to!what!I!have!called!rich,!contextualised!
representations,!the!representations!postulated!by!a!maximalist!model!of!
memory.! Hintzman! (1986)! describes! a! memory! trace! as! a! ‘record’! of! an!
episode!or!experience.!Importantly,!traces,!like!exemplars,!are!supposed!to!
preserve!not!only!the!features!present!in!the!experience!they!are!a!trace!of,!
but! also! the! configuration! of! these! features.! Furthermore,! in! Hintzman’s!
model,!each!experience!attended!to!is!recorded!as!a!trace!in!memory.!If!an!
experience!is!repeated,!a!preSexisting!trace!is!not!strengthened,!as!singleS










The! third! major! difference,! already! mentioned! above,! is! that,!
following!his!own!groundSbreaking!research!on!categorisation!(Hintzman!
and! Ludlam,! 1980),! Hintzman! explains! the! creation! of! abstract! ideas! as!! 251!
occurring!not!as!memories!are!‘encoded’!or!registered!into!memory,!as!most!
models!before!his!did,!but!during!retrieval.!!










they! are! not! acquired! by! experience.133!An! experience! can! be! completely!
described!by!a!potentially!large!set!of!properties!and!the!memory!trace!of!
this!experience!is!construed!as!capturing!some!subset!of!the!properties!of!
the! concrete! experience! in! such! a! way! that! when! the! memory! trace! is!
retrieved!the!subject!potentially!accesses!the!properties!in+the+form+of+an+
ensemble;!that!is,!a!memory!trace!is!an!analogue,!holistic!representation!of!a!
concrete! episode! of! experience.! Properties! can! be! anything! from! simple!
emotional!tones!and!modalitySspecific!sensory!features!(such!as!colours!and!
odours)! to! abstract! relations! (such! as! before,+ greater+ than,! and! so! on).!!
Mental! representations! of! experiences! are! assumed! to! be! sets! of! such!
‘primitive’!properties.!Despite!the!fact!that!the!list!of!such!properties!can!be!
quite! large,! it! is! assumed! that! it! is! much! smaller! than! the! variety! of!













the! trace! then! falls! to! zero! (Hintzman,! 1988:! 529).! This! perspective! on!
learning! highlights! an! important! point:! it! has! long! been! assumed! that!
learning!is!based!on!extracting!criterial!features!or!defining!essences!from!
our!experiences!and,!as!mentioned!earlier,!selectively!recording!or!encoding!
only! these! minimal,! abstract! representations.! The! idea! is! that! what! is!
learned!from!an!experience!is!its!schematic!representation!and!that!learning!
is! effective! insofar! as! it! ignores! irrelevant! details! and! records! only! the!
essential!properties!of!an!experience.!But!this!is!a!problematic!stance!on!
abstract! representations! because! it! disconnects! experiences! from! one!




! As! I! hope! previous! sections! in! this! chapter! and! discussions! in!









than! those! of! any! model! that! assumes! that! what! is! stored! in! memory! is!
fundamentally!different!from!what!was!experienced!(i.e.,!more!abstract,!like!
a! prototype).! Memory! traces! are! richer! because,! although! learning! is!
construed! as! imperfect! (some! information! is! lost! during! ‘encoding’)! and!
primitive! abstract! properties! are! postulated! as! basic! building! blocks,!! 253!
Hintzman’s! model! rejects! the! view! that! memory! is! in! danger! of! being!
overloaded!and!so!does!not!construe!processing!as!requiring!the!kind!of!
type/tokens!pairings!Pylyshyn’s!early!model!did,!or!consider!that!filters!are!
needed! to! restrict! what! gets! into! secondary! memory.! MINERVA! 2! simply!
posits!a!multiple!trace!model:!!


















more! properties! that! the! trace! shares! with! the! probe,! the! stronger! the!
activation!of!this!trace!will!be.!Following!the!connectionist,!neural!model,!












Hintzman! also! suggests! another! image! to! illustrate! the! basic!
operations!of!retrieval:!the!notion!of!resonance.!In!this!image,!the!probe!is!
‘broadcast’!to!all!memory!traces!and!some!of!them!resonate!back.!This!‘echo’!
consists! of! ‘content’! and! ‘intensity’.! Intensity! corresponds! to! the! total!
amount!of!activation!‘triggered’!by!the!probe.!It!is!proportional!to!both!the!









become! an! experience! in! the! subject’s! awareness! as! previously+unrelated+
features+ come+ together.! This! simultaneous! activation! and! contribution! of!



















for! typeSofSbeverage! and! 10! for! nameSofScategory.! Testing! consists! of!
generating!probes!that!lack!certain!features;!in!our!example!these!would!be!
















purposely,! it! happens! automatically).! It! will! activate! similar! faces! and! a!
more!or!less!distant!memory!of!this!exact!face!(perhaps!with!a!different!
haircut).!Now!I!hear!his!name!again,!or,!for!the!first!time,!it!does!not!much!
matter! S! this! activates! exemplars! of! John,! for! instance,! and! through! coS
activation!associations!are!formed.!A!new!exemplar!is!created!where!face!
and! name! features! can! now! be! automatically! coSactivated! (in! favourable!
conditions,!of!course).!The!next!time!I!see!this!person,!all!of!the!exemplars!








A! full! description! of! the! model! would! include! a! formula,! based! on!





thesis:! namely! concepts! and! word! meaning.! Hintzman! is! aware! of! the!
interest! his! model! has! for! theorising! on! these! topics! and! discusses! the!
important!theoretical!consequences!of!his!proposal.!From!the!outset,!one!of!
his!objectives!is!to!answer!the!question!of!how!abstract!knowledge!relates!
to! specific! experience! and! his! major! claim! is! that! ‘concepts! do! not! have!
unitary! representations’! (Hintzman,! 1986;! 420).! When! Hintzman! was!
conducting!his!research,!most!investigators!were!working!within!the!‘new’!







representations,! or! ‘unitary! representations’! in! Hintzman’s! terms,! he!






































traditional! approach! assumed,! a! piece! of! information! like! ‘Manila! is! the!! 258!
capital!of!Philippines’!is!not!encyclopaedic!information!that!is!static!in!my!















and! that,! as! discussed! in! chapter! 2! (§! 2.2.3),! the! consensus! of! scientific!
explanation! is! that! such! intentional! explanations! must! be! set! within! a!
physicalist!framework.!In!other!words,!a!full!scientific!explanation!of!how!




such! is! stored! in! memory,! it! has! no! special! status! or! function.! All!
experiences! to! which! one! attends! are! encoded! as! episodic! traces,!











He! is! aware! that! his! memory! model! on! its! own! cannot! offer! a! complete!




world! is! somehow+ used! in! arriving! at! a! specific! meaning! (1986:! 423).!
Hintzman!illustrates!this!with!the!common!verb!‘eat’:!since!it!can!be!used!in!
very! different! circumstances,! for! instance,! with! different! subjects! (e.g.,!
termite,!princess,!snake)!and!objects!(e.g.!crumb,!pencil,!melon),!it!is!to!be!




a! subset! is! ‘strongly! activated’! in! any! particular! encounter;! critically,! the!





this! thesis,! I! have! begun! to! provide! arguments! in! favour! of! meaning!
eliminativism;! however,! as! I! mentioned! at! the! end! of! chapter! 4,! a! full!
account! of! my! eliminativist! position! could! not! be! given! until! Hintzman’s!
contributions!had!been!fully!explored!in!a!chapter!dedicated!to!memory.!
The!account!below!completes!the!arguments!in!favour!of!eliminativism!and!
focuses! particularly! on! clarifying! how! Hintzman’s! account! of! memory!


























outright! denying! the! existence! of! the! sort! of! input! generally! assumed! to!









adopting! these! models! entail,! an! occasionSspecific! meaning! construction!









would! in! fact! support! it! (2004:! 147).! In! order! to! truly! overcome! the!
objection! against! meaning! eliminativism,! my! task! was! therefore! to! back!
Recanati’s!claim!with!a!full!portrayal!of!Hintzman’s!multipleStrace!memory!
model!and,!with!this!portrayal!in!hand,!argue!that!eliminativism!is!not!only!
psychologically! plausible! but! truly! a! better! alternative! than! comparable!
accounts.!The!assumptions!of!Hintzman’s!model,!however,!are!so!novel,!and!
so! radically! different! to! construals! of! memory! within! linguistics,! that! in!
order! to! adequately! present! eliminativism! I! needed! to! spell! out! the!
framework!in!which!Hintzman’s!model!should!be!understood,!that!is,!give!
the! background! for! a! multipleStrace! memory! model,! which! is! broadly!
exemplar+ based,! and,! crucially,! radically+ contextualist+ in! that! it! suspends!
creation!of!whatever!structure!interpretation!needs!until!time+of+retrieval.!!
This! chapter! has! added! critical! details! to! this! picture:! most!
importantly,!a!maximalist!view!of!memory!for!language.!I!have!insisted!on!
the! details! recent! research! has! shown! memory! does! record! in! order! to!
postulate!that!memory!traces!of!word!meaning!in+use!are!rich!and!detailed!
in!ways!we!are!only!beginning!to!understand.!I!argued!this!with!the!case!of!
limited! but! important! verbatim! memory:! memory! does! record! specific!
wordings!paired!with!specific!situations!and!can!sometimes!retrieve!these!
pairings!whole.!I!also!illustrated!rich,!contextualised!memory!traces!with!the!










language! change! beyond! the! example! of! deletion;! yet,! perhaps! a! brief!
discussion!of!a!particular!type!of!meaning!or!‘semantic’!change!can!illustrate!





without! a! negative! connotation.! Then! it! became! a! euphemism! for!
drunkenness,! a! way! of! avoiding! offensive! terms! (such! as! ‘ivre’,! ‘drunk’)!
while! referring! to! someone! who! had! had! too! much! to! drink.! But,! as! the!









emphasis! is! on! the! fact! that! these! representations! can! be! described! as!
records!preserving!the!different!aspects!of!the!experience.!!
!
The! first! step! towards! implementing! Recanati’s! insights! with! Hintzman’s!
model! and! thereby! offering+ my+ own+ positive+ account+ of+ meaning+
eliminativism! is! to! match! Recanati’s! notion! of! contextualised! senses! with!
Hintzman’s!notion!of!memory!traces.!Contextualised!senses,!according!to!
Recanati,! are! the! occasionSspecific! meanings! that! words! and! expressions!
have!actually!expressed!(or!have!been!taken!to!express)!in!their!particular!! 263!
contexts.! These+ occasions+ of+ use+ are+ captured+ as+ memory+ traces.! Each!
occasion! of! use! of! a! word! or! expression! is! a! distinct! experience! and!
produces!its!own!trace.!In!this!way,!experience!with!language!produces!a!
vast! store! of! rich,! contextualised! representations! of! specific! episodes! of!
words! and! expressions! in! use+ and+ the+ senses+ to+ which+ they+ gave+ rise.!
Furthermore,! thanks! to! Hintzman’s! notions! of! cue! and! retrieval,! the!
information! in! these! traces! can! be! selectively! activated.! Contextualist!
approaches! shy! of! eliminativism! suppose! that! something! fixed,! like! a!
contextSinvariant!linguistic!meaning,!serves!as!input!to!the!occasionSspecific!
word! meaning! construction! process.! Recall! that! two! of! these! kinds! of!





between! them! is! that! for! the! pragmatic! composition! view,! the! linguistic!
meaning!associated!with!a!word!can!stand!on!its!own!while!for!the!wrong!


















generations! used! this! word! with! a! negative! connotation,! and! the! older!
generations! had! to! figure! out! this! novel! use.! I! claim! that! when! memory!
traces!capture!an!experience!with!language,!they!also!capture!social!aspects!
of!use;!particularly,!for!instance,!if!a!hearer!experiences!an!instance!of!‘soûl’,!
or! ‘intelligent’! in! an! unexpected! context.! Speakers,! mostly! unconsciously,!






















very! powerful! cue! to! activate! memory! traces! of! other! utterances! with!







poor! or! the+ act+ of+ eating.! In! this! account,! any! similarity! with! previous!
utterances!can!be!exploited,!and!the!assumption!is!that!there!are!myriad!
clues!to!the!speaker’s!meaning!in!this!utterance!which!are!to!be!found!in!




of! selection.! In! the! previous! section,! I! discussed! how! Hintzman’s! model!
avoids!the!need!for!any!kind!of!executive!control!mechanism!to!manage!








a! framework! to! determine! in+ what+ respect! one! thing! is! to! be! similar! to!
another.!Hintzman!provides!that!framework:!in!his!account,!the!probe!that!




similarity! judgements! the! model! depends! on,! are! part+ of! the! probe! or!
emerge!as!the!probe!interacts!with!what!it!activates.!To!get!a!glimpse!of!
possible!consequences!for!the!language!theorist,!consider!the!effects!of!cue!
and! retrieval! on,! for! instance,! the! notion! of! polysemy.! In! the! traditional!
account,!where!words!are!supposed!to!have!core,!fixed,!literal!meanings,!























traditional! approaches! to! fail! to! fully! appreciate! the! role! played! by!
contextual! factors! in! determining! occasionSspecific! word! meanings.! The!
rejection! of! the! notion! of! polysemy! has! much! to! do! with! Hintzman’s!
mechanism! of! cue! and! retrieval! because,! even! if! ‘polysemy’! is!
‘deconstructed’,!something!remains!to!be!explained:!‘indeterminacy’,!that!is,!






in! the! context! of! a! conversational! exchange,! the! cue! contains! sufficient!
contextual! information! to! only! highly! activate! memory! traces! from! the!




this! situation! simply! does! not! arise! because! words! are! embedded! in!
utterances,! and! utterances! are! embedded! in! conversational! exchanges!
between! interlocutors! who! share! common! ground! and! common! goals! in!
such! a! way! as! to! ensure! that! a! single!sense!emerges!as!the!most!highly!
activated!one.!!




a! linguisticallySspecified! meaning! that! allows! access! to! information!
associated!with!the!elements!that!make!up!the!utterance.!Rather,!the!words!
and+the+phrases+in+which+they+appear,!are!used!as!cues!to!activate!memory!


















This! recognition! might! not! seem! a! great! feat! accomplished! by!
memory!traces,!but!it!is!important!because!of!what!it!suggests!regarding!the!
interpretive!process.!First,!notice!the!amount!of!processing!involved!in!the!
example! above! and! compare! with! the! example! of! ‘angel’! discussed! in!
chapter!3.!This!is!not!because!I!am!selecting!an!easy!example!for!myself,!but!
rather!because!I!want!to!insist!on!one!of!the!roles!memory!traces!play!in!




traces! an! utterance! activates.! In! the! account! presented! in! chapter! 3,! the!
process!of!utterance!comprehension!of!an!utterance!with!‘angel’!involves!a!
core! or! ‘literal’! encoded! meaning! for! ‘angel’! and! the! modulation! of! the!
encoded!concept!ANGEL!in!the!creation!of!an!ad!hoc!concept!ANGEL*.!Critically,!
however,! despite! the! fact! that! this! kind! of! ad! hoc! concept! creation! is!




ANGEL*! from! a! canonical! ‘atomic’! concept! ANGEL! was! done! from! scratch,!
without! the! help! of! any! previous! occurrences! in! which! ANGEL! required!
modulation.!!In!my!eliminativist!account,!on!the!contrary,!the!assumption!is!
rather!that!‘angel’,!together+with+whatever+context+it+appears+in,!works!as!a!






they! have! appeared,! and! the! interpretations! that! pragmatic! expectations! of! those!
occurrences!legitimated.!The!interpretational!process!both!creates!new!ad!hoc!concepts,!or!
occasionSspecific!senses,!and!benefits!from!previous!occurrences.!!! 269!
idiolect,! again,! recognising! a! specific! expression! or! wording! used! by! one!
individual.! This! results! in! an! interpretation! that,! much! like! previous!























time.140!It! is! also! an! interesting! exercise! to! imagine! this! utterance! in! a!
context!in!which!nothing!steers!me!away!from!a!‘literal’!construal!of!‘angel’;!









In! this! situation,! I! might! even! consider,! despite! knowing! that! Sally! is! a!
human!being,!that!there!is!something!fundamentally!different!about!Sally!








both! individual! memory! and! collective! memory,! in! which! a! woman! is!
referred!to!as!an!angel!and!which!would,!therefore,!suffice!for!figuring!out!

































argued! from! a! theoretical! perspective,! first! by! laying! out! the! current!





argued,! moving! in! that! direction.+ ! From! a! technical! perspective,! I! have!
argued! that! both! radical! contextualism! in! general,! and! meaning!
eliminativism!in!particular,!are!strongly!supported!by!psychological!models.!











drastic! consequences! for! theorising! on! word! meaning! in! context! that!
accepting! meaning! eliminativism! would! entail.! With! this! in! mind,! I!
undertook!a!stepSbySstep!presentation!of!arguments!and!counterarguments!
leading! to! my! own! proposal.! In! the! introductory! chapter,! I! focused! on!
presenting!the!traditional!view!of!concepts,!which,!because!of!its!profound!
influence,!marked!the!discussion!of!both!theoretical!and!empirical!studies!
for! decades! even! after! its! demise.! Since! much! of! the! work! in! the! thesis!
would!oppose!the!different!traditions!and!assumptions!regarding!the!study!
of!concepts!and!word!meaning!that!emerged!after!the!fall!of!the!traditional!! 273!
definitional! account,! I! proceeded,! in! the! following! chapter,! with! a!
presentation! of! the! predominant! cognitive! framework! for! the! study! of!
concepts.! In! that! chapter,! I! focused! on! the! perspective! of! one! particular!
philosopher,!Jerry!Fodor,!and!his!influential!(atomistic)!theory!of!concepts;!
this! in! turn! provided! the! background! for! the! presentation! of! relevance!
theory’s!construal!of!concepts.!I!finally!turned!to!the!topic!of!word!meaning!
from!the!perspective!of!pragmatics!in!chapter!3;!my!aim!in!the!first!half!of!




logic! that! had! led! theorists! thus! far! further! would! reveal! that! the! new!
consensus! is! sufficiently! incompatible! with! the! traditional! semantics!
framework!to!justify!breaking!away!from!it.!The!eliminativism!I!advocate!is!
still! an! extreme! position,! but,! I! hope,! given! the! arguments! provided! in!
chapter!3,!it!no!longer!appears!as!such!an!outlier.!!
Anticipating! certain! objections,! I! turned! my! attention! to! a! careful!
presentation! of! the! wellSestablished! psychological! models! that! support!
eliminativism!in!chapters!4!and!5.!Among!other!things,!chapter!4’s!aim!was!
to!reveal!the!true!extent!of!context!dependence:!it!goes!well!beyond!the!kind!










section! of! the! chapter! on! memory,! I! focused! on! drawing! out! the!
consequences! of! Hintzman’s! model! for! an! account! of! word! meaning! in!! 274!
context! and! integrating! arguments! from! previous! sections! to! give! a! full!
picture!of!the!account!I!propose.!!
!








accommodate! such! a! circumstance,! which,! after! all,! is! probably! more!
frequent!than!we!imagine.!!
Before! I! begin,! however,! I! must! mention! and! put! aside! the! much!
more!common!phenomenon!of!encountering!‘new’!words!that!have!such!a!
degree! of! transparency! that! they! would! not! serve! my! purposes.! For!
instance,! consider! two! new! entries! recorded! by! the! Oxford+ English+
Dictionary!in!the!last!ten!years:!‘catastrophise’,!and!‘automagically’.!From!
reading! or! hearing! ‘catastrophise’,! even! on! the! very! first! encounter,! the!
wordSform! can! serve! to! activate! a! host! of! memory! traces! that! will! be!
relevant!to!the!task!at!hand!not!only!because!they!are!similar!to!the!cue,!but!
because!the!act!of!figuring!out!what!a!speaker!means!by!what!he!says!is!very!
frequent! as! a! cognitive! operation! and! computations! involved! are! only!
slightly! different! for! a! ‘new’! word.! The! echo! from! the! probe! could! then!





most! relevant! traces! for! the! purpose! at! hand! are! highly! activated,! and,!
following!norm!theory,!they!‘aggregate’!to!create!a!‘framework!of!evaluation’!




according! to! multipleStrace! memory,! translates! as! an! abundance! of! this!
word!in!our!individual!and!collective!memory!stores.!‘Automagically’,!as!a!















population.! As! I! hope! my! examples! will! leave! clear,! however,! it! is! not!
necessary!to!know!very!much!about!the!scientific!technical!term!‘gene’!to!
competently!use!or!understand!certain!expressions!with!the!word!‘gene’.!
Furthermore,! as! suggested! in! the! section! on! psychological! essentialism,!









development! and! common! evolutionary! origin! but+ not+ heredity.! The!! 276!
scientific!discovery!of!genes!forever!changed!this!and!consequently!today,!
the!notion!of!heredity!is!also!attached!to!‘genetic’.142!!


































of! sharing! is! well! represented! already! in! the! cue! Mary! can! construct! to!
probe!her!memory!since!the!response!she!is!expecting!is!something!like!
what!it!is!that!Peter’s!family!shares,!and!the!form!Peter!uses!suggests!that!
‘there! is! something! that! is! in! their! ––––(s)’;! it! would! be! reasonable! to!
suppose! it! is! something! they! share.! The! echo! that! resonates! back! could!
include!memory!traces!of!utterances!that!have!included!expressions!such!as!







feels! that! nothing! too! important! depends! on! a! fuller! understanding! of!
Peter’s!intended!meaning,!she!can!still!keep!the!whole!episode!as!a!trace!in!
memory!with+whatever+little+sense+she+has+made+of+the+utterance.!Perhaps!










that! there! are! other+ things! that! families! share! such! as! quirks,! pets,!





heard! this! word,! and! focus! on! some! specifics! to! do! with! the! fact! that!










into! everyday! speech.! This! rise! in! frequency! culminates! around! the! year!
2000,!and!the!upward!trend!evens!out!in!recent!years.!‘Ngrams’,!as!these!






















another! word,! in! a! construction! already! encountered,! or! in! a! new!
construction,! is! recorded! in! memory! as! a! memory! trace.! We! can! also!
suppose! that! initial! encounters! will! resemble! Mary’s! in! that! a! probe!
including! the! information! at! hand! returns! an! echo! that! is! informative,!




next! encounter.! Each! encounter! activates! some! traces! on! the! basis! of!
similarity! to! the! situation! at! hand! and,! in! the! terms! of! norm! theory,!




episode+ is+ recorded+ in+ memory.! This! might! frequently! be! the! case! at! the!
beginning!of!the!frequency!trend;!yet,!as!encounters!with!the!word!add!up,!
attempts! at! interpretation,! and+ their+ results,! also! add! up.! All! of! this! is!
captured! in! memory! and! can! be! ‘scanned! and! summarised’! by! retrieval!
mechanisms! that! selectively! activate! only! those! memory! traces! that! are!
relevant! to! the! context! at! hand.! Eventually,! successful! interpretations!
accumulate! in! the! form! of! Recanati’s! contextualised! senses.! As!
contextualised!senses!accumulate,!a!certain!semantic!potential!appears,!the!


























In! this! last! section,! I! have! attempted! to! illustrate! meaning! eliminativism!
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